MDC SECRETARY GENERAL ON CARROTS AND STICKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 002225 SIPDIS AF/S FOR S. DELISI, M. RAYNOR NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, TEITELBAUM LONDON FOR C. GURNEY PARIS FOR C. NEARY NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID ZI MDC SUBJECT: MDC SECRETARY GENERAL ON CARROTS AND STICKS REF: (A) HARARE 1977 (B) HARARE 1971 (C) HARARE 1185 (D) HARARE 1130 Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. MDC Secretary General Welshman Ncube on November 6 told poloff that he intended during his planned visit to Washington next week to urge the USG to be more vocal in its criticism of the GOZ. At the same time, he concluded that the time had come for a more explicit elaboration by the USG of future assistance, conditioned on political progress, as a means to induce greater seriousness by the ruling party. Ncube reported that the MDC's economic platform, dubbed RESTART, was being revised with particular attention to land reform details that might offer common policy ground with the ruling party. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Ncube said that his planned visit with MDC National Coordinator Isaac Maphosa to Washington November 12 was at the behest of MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai. Their principal objective was to brief USG officials on the increasingly difficult operating environment faced by the MDC, and to stimulate discussion of where collaborative efforts should go in light of the ruling party's non-movement on talks. For his part, he thought it was time to review what he termed the "quieter" approach adopted by the USG since President Bush's visit to South Africa in July. Ncube reiterated that President Mbeki's efforts had been wholly unsuccessful in moving Mugabe and were unlikely to succeed without ramped up international pressure. In particular, he asserted that a more vocal effort by the USG would help fortify the confidence of SADC players who were most likely to influence the ruling party's posture. Conversely, the U.K. should keep as low profile as possible, as any public British actions tended to play into Mugabe's posturing with SADC. ¶3. (C) Referencing departing Assistant Secretary Kansteiner's widely reported comments about the potential utility of reviewing carrots and sticks vis-a-vis the GOZ, Ncube expressed interest in exploring potential additional sticks, although he had none to suggest beyond more forceful diplomacy. As for carrots, he recognized the potential utility of an articulation by the USG of what kinds of assistance could be advanced upon the achievement of political progress as a means to induce movement by the ruling party toward talks. Areas for potential assistance and appropriate indices of political progress would have to be explored. The MDC was working on a policy paper that would give greater definition the party's views on carrots, sticks, and foreign policy generally; Ncube said he hoped to see a draft before he departed for the Washington but the product was not due to be finalized until later this month, at the earliest. ¶4. (C) Ncube reported that the party's economic policy paper, dubbed "RESTART", had been sent back to the drawing boards but was still scheduled for release in late December. Party leaders had agreed that many sections required greater specificity, especially the segment on land reform. In particular, a tenure system needed to be defined that would establish predictable, reliable, and marketable property rights in such a way that would restore the agricultural sector's productivity. Echoing characterizations by colleagues (ref B),Ncube said that there could be no return to status quo ante and recognized that the government's redistrubution was a fait accompli from which any new government would have to work. He predicted that RESTART's system for land use and property rights would contain elements that would converge with the ruling party's objective to make existing land reform productive. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: As the second leading figure in the MDC, Ncube speaks with authority for the party and we recommend that he be received at a high level. It is the first time since the indictment of Tsvangirai and Ncube on fabricated treason charges prior to the March 2002 presidential elections that a senior MDC official has been free to visit the United States. The MDC has evidenced some insecurity over our engagement with Mbeki on Zimbabwe and more "balanced" public comments on the regime (e.g., qualified recognition of progress in August municipal elections); the visitors are hoping for a strong show of support from Washington interlocutors with which to impress regional players, domestic constituents, and the ruling party. Ncube's conclusion about conditioned carrots coincides with repeated calls from the bishops (ref A). Some explicit articulation of potential USG support, along the lines set out in the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act and contingent on progress on the polical front, might strengthen the MDC's hand here and stimulate constructive deliberation within the ruling party. Drawing from the discussion of options set out in refs C and D, we will explore potential measures in that regard via septel. SULLIVAN