TEACHERS STRIKE DEEPENS, TESTING GOG

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 GUATEMALA 000537 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/IL WHA/PPC AND WHA/CEN DEPARTMENT OF LABOR FOR ILAB: ROBERT WHOLEY USTR FOR BUD CLATANOFF E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ELAB PGOV KDEM ASEC CASC GT SUBJECT: TEACHERS STRIKE DEEPENS, TESTING GOG REF: A. GUATEMALA 507 ¶B. GUATEMALA 473 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: February 26, Day 38 of the national teachers strike affecting 80,000 public schoolteachers and over 2 million students, saw blockades of major airports, ports, border crossings, and oil refineries, and the indefinite suspension of Congress due to the protests. After receiving a conciliatory message from President Portillo later that day, however, strikers abandoned protests blocking Guatemala's two international airports on February 27. Wrangling between strikers and the GOG now appears back to the bargaining table, mediated by Archbishop Quezada Toruno. The Archbishop told the Ambassador early on February 26 that the GOG's ability to increase the budget is constrained. Strike leaders told LabAtt they are committed to non-violence and do not seek to destabilize the GOG by collaborating with opposition groups including the organized private sector. Nevertheless, the teacher strike occurs at a moment of vulnerability for the GOG and governing FRG, and could spur additional protests if it continues. End Summary. Teachers Give Their Side of Conflict -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On February 26 LabAtt met with a group of strike leaders including Nery Barrios, Secretary General of the Unity of Social and Popular Action (UASP) labor federation, and Teachers Association leaders Roberto Madrid, Romualdo Maldonado, Joviel Acevedo, and Julio Solano. LabAtt stated USG concerns over the blockage by protesters of airports, ports and border crossings, which we do not view as legitimate means to impel dialogue in a democracy. Strike leaders responded that throughout a long and frustrating process that originated over a year ago, they have strictly maintained a policy of non-violence and has striven mightily to prevent their members from responding in kind to intimidation, threats and provocations from anti-strike agents. Acevedo said he had received threats explicitly sourced to the Presidential Guard (EMP),and that his home has been invaded and family members threatened. Solano said he had also suffered similar threats. Strike leaders agreed to keep this meeting with LabAtt confidential, and did not ask for any public Embassy role in their conflict. Madrid 
suggested, however, that the Consultative Group might helpfully address the issue of educational reform directly in its May meeting resolutions. ¶3. (SBU) Strike leaders said that strikers had received and rejected many offers by opposition political parties and other groups including university students, campesinos and the private sector to join the teachers' protests. The teachers said they rejected these offers, most recently from the president of the main employer association (CACIF) because the do not want to lose control, be used for partisan political ends, or for the situation to threaten the democratic stability of the country. LabAtt praised this stance. Madrid summarized the origins and motivation of the teachers' demands, which the GOG and media have distorted by portraying the conflict as essentially about salaries/budgets instead of the educational reforms blocked by the FRG in Congress in August 2002, which provoked the current escalation of direct action by teachers. However, key demands that must be addressed for the teachers to return to class include an agreement on the budget increase for the education ministry, and a GOG commitment to desist from reprisals against strikers. (Note: A labor court judge declared the strike illegal on February 20 and gave strikers five days to report to work, which was promptly appealed by strikers. If upheld, strikers who refuse to return to work could be legally dismissed. End Note.) CACIF Denies Meddling -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Upon hearing of teachers' allegations of CACIF offers to support teachers with a "general strike," EconCouns, on Ambassdor's instructions, expressed concern to Roberto Castaneda, current Chamber of Agriculture President and CACIF Vice President, who will be named CACIF's new President starting March 3. Castaneda agreed that, if true, Nuetze was "out of line," and he reconfirmed what CACIF leaders told the Ambassador on February 25: they are concerned over apparent escalation of agitation against the government and have the perception that situation could spiral out of control. Calm and leadership, not inciting passions, was what the country needed, they told the Ambassador. Castaneda promised to look into this and get back to us. Archbishop Sees Difficult Negotiations Ahead -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Archbishop Rodolfo Quezada Toruno told Ambassador in a courtesy call on February 26 that it would be very difficult to resolve the conflict, which he was called upon to mediate by both sides. Three early rounds of meetings during the week of February 14 were getting nowhere, so on February 24, Quezada told both sides that without a shift in positions, he saw no reason to continue. When the GOG, represented at the dialogue table by the Ministers of Education, Labor, and Finance, expressed willingness to consider an increase to the education ministry's budget, Quezada asked strike leaders to reconsider their demand for 2.8 billion queztals and submit a more realistic proposal. He had not received a response when Ambassador and LabAtt called on him, but confided that he believed the most the GOG could offer would be an increase of 1 billion, without having to raise the consumption tax, which would be politically impossible. That would permit a salary raise of 2-300 quetzals per month ($25-38) and money left over to improve schools. Quezada Toruno noted that the Education Ministry budget currently comprises 11% of the budget, the highest amount after payment of government debt. Minister of Finance Eduardo Weymann publicly defended the level of that budget, saying it was now 40% higher than in 1999. ¶6. (SBU) On other issues, Quezada thanked the Ambassador (three times) for his early visits to human rights defenders, including the Archbishop's Office on Human Rights (ODHAG), for the important signal that sent of U.S. interest. Quezada's most difficult decision, he said, since taking office in June 2001, was to continue the Church's status as a plaintiff in the Gerardi case. The Ambassador praised that decision as the right one, and asked whether Quezada believed the justice system had revealed the truth of the Gerardi killing. Quezada said no, but expressed confidence in the Supreme Court ruling that the appeals (but not the original verdict) be re-done. Asked by the Ambassador for his view on the complicity of Mario Orantes, the priest sentenced to 20 years for his role in the crime, Quezada said he believed, with the vast majority of the clergy, that Orantes knows more than he is saying. Comment -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The teachers' strike occurs at a moment of weakness for the GOG and the governing FRG: -- GOG intervention to save another failed bank (supposedly to protect cronies) and continued efforts to pay off the ex-PACs (former civil defense patrols whose votes the FRG wants) contrast with its inability to meet teachers' demands. -- The GOG seeks to stay in the good graces of the IMF, in large part so it can attract more foreign bond buyers (proceeds will go to projects that help the FRG's 2003 campaign),so its budget options are limited. -- Just as the GOG's cave-in to ex-PACs in 2002 probably encouraged the teachers to strike, a perceived capitulation to the teachers would make it difficult to fend off a transport strike (due to shrinking profits on bus fares due to fuel price increases). -- Portillo has hitherto absented himself from the strike issue, fueling unfounded speculation and uncertainty. -- With the election campaign to begin formally in May, there is no incentive in other parties to oppose the strike. ¶8. (SBU) While strike leaders now tell us that the GOG's new flexibility had brought dialogue "back from the brink," deep divisions over money and many other issues remain on the bargaining table, including the issue of lost wages for strikers during this month out of class. Portillo's overdue intervention to mollify protesters is typical of his crisis management, and follows a similar move with campesino groups earlier this week. Unfortunately, Portillo's history of dealing with protests by announcing half-measures and unfulfilled commitments have deepened skepticism and prolonged protests to the point where they reach the crisis point, as in this instance. This strike, which enjoyed broad popular support, could prove the most politically costly to Portillo and the FRG, alienating left-leaning teachers who help shape public opinion in the provinces. ¶9. (SBU) While a major inconvenience to travelers and serious drain on commercial activity, this conflict has not to date directly threatened U.S. citizens nor has it risen to a level of a threat to Guatemalan democracy. We will continue to monitor protests with a view to U.S. citizen security and other U.S. interests. HAMILTON