SCENE SETTER FOR GUATEMALA'S ELECTIONS: A GROWING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GUATEMALA 002850 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2013 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR EAID PHUM GT SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR GUATEMALA'S ELECTIONS: A GROWING EXPECTATION OF CHANGE Classified By: PolCouns David Lindwall for reason 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The November 9 elections will pit Guatemala's past (represented by General Rios Montt and his authoritarian vision of Guatemala rooted in the armed internal conflict) against the region's future (represented by Oscar Berger and Alvaro Colom, and their vision of private sector-driven economic growth, free trade and social justice). All indications are that Guatemalans are rejecting Rios Montt's vision of Guatemala, and will turn out in large numbers on November 9 to vote for change. The ruling FRG's attempts to manipulate the vote do not appear to have made much of an impact, though many in the opposition continue to believe Rios Montt's candidacy taints the legitimacy of the elections. Fears of election day fraud have largely vanished, and violence is expected to be limited to a small number of rural locations. There continue to be problems with the voter registration list ("padron") which could have the impact of confusing some voters on election day, but no one at this time expects these problems to be significant. No candidate is likely to get 50% of the vote, forcing a runoff election on December 28. Guatemalans are becoming more enthusiastic about the election process as the prospect for change is growing, and turn-out is expected to be high. The prospect for change also offers opportunities to advance key U.S. objectives, and we should be prepared to engage quickly with the two finalists that emerge from Sunday's election. End summary. Putting the War Behind Them Once and For All -------------- ¶2. (C) Former General and patriarch of the ruling FRG Efrain Rios Montt has been a polarizing force in Guatemala politics for much of the past thirty years. His authoritarian populism, sprinkled with moral injunctions and liberal references to class struggle, has always had a following in Guatemala, especially among the rural poor. While viewed by the international community as the perpetrator of some of the worst human rights violations committed during the internal conflict, he is viewed by many Guatemalans as having restored order during a convulsive period in their history. In 1974 it is widely believed that he was deprived of the presidency by fraud, and at least during the initial months of his 19 month presidency in 1982-1983 his government was very popular. Polls showed that he would have won the presidency by a large majority had he been allowed to run in 1990, when the courts first struck down his candidacy. In the last three elections, Rios Montt was the polarizing force. His candidates won in 1990 and 1999, and lost by the smallest of margins in 1995. At 76 years of age, this is almost certainly the final battle of his political career, and he continues to define the political debate in Guatemala. ¶3. (C) But times have changed for the General. The FRG's four years in power have left many voters believing that Rios Montt could not and cannot deliver the promised land of better security, more jobs and improved social justice he offered in 1999. Indeed, violent crime and corruption have spiraled during the FRG's time in office, and most Guatemalans have not seen the benefits of anemic economic growth. Surveys conducted in July and again in October by the Embassy in the most remote corners of the heartland of Rios Montt's support revealed an overwhelming rejection of the ruling party, and made no distinction between President Portillo and the General. Voter preference polls show him running a distant third, 16 points behind second place candidate Alvaro Colom. While the Embassy's sample was not scientific, and the professional polls are frequently accused of having an urban bias, it is clear from every measure that Rios Montt is fighting an uphill battle to make it into the second round of the election. We do not discount the possibility that the FRG's superior organizational ability on election day and their payoffs to the ex-PAC's and other election spending could get them over the hump into the second round, but at this point it looks like a long-shot. ¶4. (C) The vision Rios Montt has tried to sell Guatemalans during the election campaign is one of providing law and order, and confronting the oligarchy that, in his words, has long run Guatemala like their own farm. While security and social justice are issues of importance to a large majority of Guatemalan voters, Rios Montt's appeal to confrontation is increasingly viewed as a legacy of the civil war, a vision drawn from Guatemala's past, and not the choice of Guatemalans for their future. ¶5. (C) His primary competitors for the presidency are center-right GANA candidate Oscar Berger, closely allied to the private sector, and center-left UNE candidate Alvaro Colom, with closer ties to grass roots civil society. Berger's message of job creation through investment and free trade appeals to Guatemalans (especially in urban areas) who believe the country's future lies in a stronger relationship with the U.S. and regional economic integration. Colom's message of combating corruption and increasing social spending resonates in rural areas and with the urban poor. The Embassy surveys (in rural areas) found that most voters identified with Berger and Colom mainly as alternatives capable of defeating Rios Montt, and showed less enthusiasm for the candidates themselves. And the Dead Shall Rise -------------- ¶6. (C) All the major candidates have told us privately that they do not expect significant fraud on election day. However, past misbehavior by the FRG (especially their violent protests that shut down parts of the capital in July) has fueled popular perceptions that fraud is possible. Stories of missing voter registration cards, dead people, minors and Salvadoran nationals appearing on voter registration lists, allegations that the FRG contracted all public transportation on election day, and problems with voters finding their names double registered or eliminated from the voter registration lists are part of every conversation on the elections. The political parties and international observers agree, however, that adequate safeguards are in place to ensure free and fair elections, and all acknowledge that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) is above partisan manipulation. There will be over 300 international and thousands of domestic observers spread out all over the country, making this the most observed election in Guatemala's history. International observers has been deployed in rural areas for over a month now, visiting potential flash-points, meeting with local leaders and making it clear that fraud and violence will not go unreported. ¶7. (C) The voter registration list ("padron electoral") has problems resulting, among other things, from the incomplete incorporation of a new registry for urban areas, which was designed to allow voters to vote closer to their homes. Problems have been detected which will affect some voters on election day, and the TSE will be opening special "observed vote" tables at each voting site to address many of these problems. The indelible ink should also ensure that double registrations do not result in double voting. We recognize, however, that some voters will encounter difficulties voting, and many will view this erroneously as a deliberate attempt to manipulate the vote. ¶8. (C) The decision by the Constitutional Court in July to allow General Rios Montt to be a candidate, in apparent violation of a constitutional prohibition against those who had participated in unconstitutional governments, was for many Guatemalans the original sin that fatally flawed the 2003 election. Unable to stop a legal process that was carefully manipulated by the FRG, many in civil society, the media and the opposition have raised alarms publicly about every subsequent issue that could potentially be an FRG attempt to influence the elections, in order to have a well documented basis for crying fraud if the General makes it into the second round. Many of their complaints are valid. The compensation package for the ex-PAC's was clearly used to try to build support for the FRG in the elections (note: When the GOG came through with actual cash payments for less than half of those who claimed to be ex-PACs, however, protests broke out around the country, ultimately working against the FRG candidate. End note). The school breakfast and fertilizer programs were also augmented during the election year in a thinly-veiled attempt to earn largely rural support. Public works programs, while admittedly less than the election year binge of the former Arzu government, have also targeted areas where the FRG hoped to strengthen its support. An independent NGO investigating election year public spending, working under a USAID grant, concluded that while the Portillo government has used public spending to try to influence the outcome of the election, the volume of spending was not significantly different from previous election years and beneficiaries were not selected for their partisan preferences. Throwing the First Stone -------------- ¶9. (C) Violence has also been a concern in the 2003 elections. By some counts, 29 political activists have been murdered since the May opening of the election campaign. All of the international observer groups have investigated these murders, however, and agree that most are clearly not related to the elections. MINUGUA believes that five could have been politically motivated, and the OAS lists two as being clearly politically motivated. The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) in its report on the elections said, "relatively few have been proven to be directly related to the political campaign. Many of the incidents involved "common" rather than "political" crime. It is reassuring that there have been few documented incidents of politically motivated violence, and it is important to counter alarmist opinions and to emphasize the relatively peaceful nature of the process to date." ¶10. (C) The violent protests of July 24-25, orchestrated by the leadership of the FRG, fed fears that the FRG is capable of putting gangs on the streets either on election day to discourage the vote, or to burn ballot boxes on the night of November 9 if they lose. Many of our contacts believe, however, that the July protests hurt the FRG in the elections by making them look to voters like a band of thugs. Since July, the FRG has been careful to convey an image of law abiding democrats. Members of the Executive Committee of the FRG visited us and other members of the international community on November 3-4 in a gesture that showed that the FRG is concerned about its international image. They assured all of us that they will respect the outcome of the election, whatever it is, and Zury Rios told us directly "we will behave" on election day. While we do not discount the possibility of post-electoral violence in hotly disputed municipal elections in isolated areas, as has occurred in past elections, there are no indications at this point that the FRG is planning to dispute the November 9 results in the streets. The Inevitable Second Round -------------- ¶11. (C) Poll results (and the Embassy's informal survey in rural areas) show the gap between front runner Oscar Berger and Alvaro Colom narrowing decidedly. No candidate is expected to get the fifty percent of the vote necessary to win the election in one round. The second round election would be held on December 28, less than three weeks before the January 14 inaugural. If Rios Montt makes it into the second round, all indications are that the election will polarize, with an overwhelming majority voting for whichever candidate competes against the General. If Colom and Berger make it into the second round, the election becomes an unpredictable contest with a totally new dynamic. Polls show Berger beating Colom by a declining margin in a second round, but even Berger's closest advisors do not put much faith in the numbers. A group of private sector and civil society members, who by and large had thrown their lot in with Berger as the only candidate capable of burying the FRG, told us on November 6 that they now believe Alvaro Colom would beat Berger handily in a runoff election. ¶12. (U) Public opinion polls show that Guatemalans believe they can make a difference in their future by voting and that they plan to vote in record numbers in the upcoming elections. While polls have historically overstated the actual voter turnout, trends suggest that voter turn out will be significantly higher that the average (around 45%) since the restoration of democracy. An early November poll also shows an increase in public confidence in the electoral process. Generating public confidence in the election process has been a key element in the Ambassador's public diplomacy strategy over the past 2-3 months. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) The participation of Rios Montt in the elections has created a climate of tension and distrust that has fed fears in many sectors of civil society and the population at large that elections would not be free and fair. With polls showing the General pulling a distant third, many of those sectors are now convinced that Rios Montt will not make it into the second round, and if he does there is virtually no chance he could win it. We believe leaders of the FRG may have reached the same conclusion and have adjusted their strategy to use their legislative strength in the new Congress to protect their interests, as we reported in September. Fears that there will be significant fraud or violence on election day are subsiding. ¶14. (C) Many Guatemalans believe the November 9 elections will put an end to 20 years of political polarization, and that the candidates that emerge will no longer reflect the authoritarian structures and policies evolved from the internal conflict, but rather will bring Guatemala into a closer relationship with the U.S. and their regional partners through free trade and a greater set of shared interests. We are poised to meet early on with the transition teams of the two victors of the November 9 elections to engage them on CAFTA, human and labor rights, transnational crime and the full range of bilateral interests. HAMILTON