GSL continues to mull over response to LTTE's

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000696

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-23-13
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS EAID CE NO JA LTTE
SUBJECT: GSL continues to mull over response to LTTE's
withdrawal from talks, but leans toward restraint

Refs: (A) Ops Center-Colombo 04/23/03 telecon

- (B) Colombo 688, and previous

(U) Classified BY Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of
Mission. Reasons: 1.5 (B, D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Key Ministers Moragoda and Peiris told
the Ambassador that the GSL continues to mull over its
response to the Tigers' decision to withdraw from the
peace talks. The government seems to be leaning toward
a restrained, but firm approach at this time. Taking
another tack, the president has urged an increase in
anti-LTTE security measures. Overall, we think it is
positive that there has been no panic, but rather a
level-headed feeling that efforts should be made to try
to get the process back on track. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) CONVERSATIONS WITH KEY MINISTERS: The
Ambassador held separate conversations today (April 23)
with Milinda Moragoda and G.L. Peiris, two key ministers
working on peace process issues. Moragoda told the
Ambassador that the government continued to review how
it should react to the April 21 announcement by the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that it was
withdrawing from the peace talks (see Ref B). Moragoda
noted that the view of most of the Cabinet was that the
GSL should be restrained in its response, but firm.
Current thinking was to have Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremesinghe send a letter to the LTTE at some point
in the next several days. (Note: Per Ref B, the PM
sent a brief letter to the LTTE on April 22, but it was
only a placeholder.) This proposed letter would respond
to the positive points raised in the LTTE's
announcement, Moragoda said. In the meantime, the
government -- including key negotiators Moragoda and
Peiris -- would continue to engage the Tigers on
"technical" issues in an effort to build back trust.


3. (C) In a brief colloquy, Moragoda said the GSL
wanted to proceed with planning for the Tokyo donors
conference in June, which the LTTE has said it would not
attend. Ambassador Wills agreed that this was a
sensible approach and something the U.S. supported
fully. The Ambassador noted, however, that if there was
no change in the LTTE's position on not attending it was
possible that some donors might wonder whether holding
the conference was worthwhile. Moragoda took this
comment on board, but seemed a bit unsettled by the
thought.


4. (C) In his comments to the Ambassador, G.L. Peiris
took a somewhat softer line than Moragoda, emphasizing
that the government needed to review its response to the
LTTE's April 21 statement very carefully. The GSL, for
example, should consider the LTTE's points that steps
need to be taken re the Jaffna "high security zones,"
the resettlement of the displaced, improving assistance
delivery, etc. The Ambassador asked Peiris whether he
was being just a bit lenient on the LTTE given its hard-
line behavior. Peiris admitted that it was difficult
dealing with the group.


5. (C) In line with the views of most observers, if a
tad more optimistic, Peiris also underlined what he saw
as silver linings in the LTTE statement, including:

-- The peace process has not broken down and the search
for a political settlement goes on;

-- The ceasefire still holds;

-- The (joint GSL-LTTE) Sub-Committee on Immediate
Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and
the East (SIHRN) is still in operation; and,
-- The LTTE continues to support and recognize the
authority of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).

6. (C) KUMARATUNGA'S TACK: In contrast to the cool,
calculated response of the government (thus far),
President Kumaratunga has seemingly sought to create a
crisis atmosphere in the aftermath of the LTTE's
announcement. In a blitz, the president's office has
announced that she was summoning this-or-that meeting
with the military and police chiefs, and convoking the
GSL National Security Council to deal with the "any
eventuality." The president's Peoples' Alliance (PA)
party has also taken the lead in calling for an
"emergency" meeting of Parliament to discuss the
"crisis."


7. (C/NF) In one April 22 announcement, which received
significant local and wire-service coverage, the
president's office stated that she had "directed" the
military and the police "to reintroduce immediately the
security measures that were set up in 1995 to ensure the
security and safety of the people." (Note: These
security measures have to do with the widespread use of
checkpoints and road blocks, as well as other efforts to
prevent LTTE infiltration. Many of these measures were
lifted in the early days of the peace process.) Re this
announcement, Interior Secretary M.N. Junaid told A/RSO
that he had sat in on the late April 21 meeting
Kumaratunga had had with service chiefs and police
officials. He said Kumaratunga had spoke interminably
throughout the four-hour meeting on the need to increase
security measures. Those present heard her out, but in
the end only agreed to continue to monitor and assess
the situation, i.e., there was no reintroduction of the
measures put in place in 1995. In the meantime, based
on what Mission is hearing, there has been no increase
in the operational readiness of the Sri Lankan military
or police.


8. (C) COMMENT: In the aftermath of the LTTE's
announcement, we think it is positive that there is no
sense of crisis in Sri Lanka. Instead, per Moragoda's
and Peiris' remarks, there is a seemingly level-headed
feeling that work needs to be done to try to get the
process back on track. The president's somewhat
contrived response to the LTTE's withdrawal from the
talks seems to be an effort to underscore her long-
standing claim that the group simply cannot be trusted.
Despite her best efforts, however, most Sri Lankans
don't seem to want to up the tension, but to cool things
down. Whether the LTTE wants to cooperate in that
effort remains unclear. END COMMENT.


9. (U) Minimize considered.

WILLS