C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000612

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-09-13
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS CE NO JA LTTE
SUBJECT: Report re Jaffna security zones recommends
mutual GSL-LTTE drawdowns and increased monitoring

Refs: (A) Colombo-SA/INS 04/08/03 class e-mail
- (B) Colombo 593, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.
Reasons: 1.5 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Minister Moragoda (pls protect) has
provided us a copy of a long-awaited re the security
zones in Jaffna. The report, which was written by a
retired Indian general, recommends that the GSL and
Tigers agree to mutual drawdowns of their military
positions. In doing this, both sides would engage in
confidence-building measures facilitated by increased
monitoring. While the report is fair-minded, the Tigers
-- who seem to want to keep this issue alive for
political reasons -- will probably balk at its
recommendations. (Note: Also see DATT's Septel review
of the report.) END SUMMARY.

==============
Nambiar Report
==============


2. (C) On April 7, Milinda Moragoda (Amcit -- pls
protect), the Minister of Economic Reform and a key
player on peace process issues, provided the Ambassador
a (close-hold) copy of a long-awaited independent report
on the "high security zones" in Jaffna District.
Retired Indian General Satish Nambiar wrote the short,
complex report, which was sent to Department in Ref A.
Nambiar, who had been asked by the GSL to draw up the
report, had visited Sri Lanka earlier this year for
consultations and research on the controversial security
zones issue. (Note: Our understanding is that the
Indian government, while publicly taking a hands-off
posture regarding the report, paid Nambiar's salary and
expenses.) According to Moragoda, the GSL continues to
review the report. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) have not yet seen it, but are scheduled to
receive a copy soon. Nambiar is due to visit Sri Lanka
in late April to discuss the report with the government
and the LTTE.

=============================
Recommending Mutual Drawdowns
========================

=====


3. (C) The report acknowledges the importance of
assisting Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in
returning to their home areas in Jaffna, including to
sites within the security zones. To facilitate this,
the report's central conclusion is that the government
and the LTTE should engage in carefully calibrated and
mutual military drawdowns of their Jaffna-related
military positions. (Note: The military's security
zones constitute approximately 18 percent of the land
size of Jaffna. The LTTE only has military posts in a
sliver of Jaffna, but it has many cadre in Jaffna and a
strong military presence just south in the Wanni area.)
In making this recommendation, the report, in effect,
rejects the LTTE's long-standing view that the
government should unilaterally slash the size of its
security zones, so that the IDPs can return home
immediately. (Note: Per Ref B, about 270,000 IDPs have
already returned to their homes in the north/east. Over
500,000 IDPs remain in the south.) In light of the
LTTE's strong stand on this issue, the report admits
that agreement to the notion of mutual drawdowns will
have to be achieved by the two sides within the context
of the ongoing GSL-LTTE peace talks.


4. (C) If the LTTE agrees to (unspecified) drawdowns of
its own forces and at least some of the confidence-
building measures set out below, the report recommends
that the Sri Lankan military move forward and consider
drawdowns of its own positions in the following two
stages:
-- (A) The military would dismantle its "forward
positions" in areas near "Muhamalai, Nagarkovil, and the
promontories south of Chavakachcheri, along the beach
road south of Jaffna and along the coastal areas."
(Note: The three areas named above are all in eastern
Jaffna and close to the GSL-LTTE Northern Forward
Defense Line, "FDL," on the Jaffna Isthmus.)

-- (B) The security zones surrounding Palaly airbase,
Kankesanturai ("KKS") harbor, and Point Pedro harbor
would be "considered for reduction in size..."
(Note: The area around Palaly airbase and KKS harbor
forms the largest of the security zones in Jaffna. It
is where the government's Security Force Headquarters in
Jaffna is located.)
====================
Increased Monitoring
====================


5. (C) In moving toward military drawdowns, the report
recommends that both sides engage in confidence-building
measures facilitated by increased international
monitoring. The report is not dispositive on what
organization would do such monitoring. It recommends,
however, that the Norwegian-run Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM) assume the responsibility, as it is
already in place monitoring the February 2002 ceasefire
agreement. In order to do this, Nambiar states that the
SLMM should expand the size of its staff and be provided
more resources. If the SLMM was to assume more
responsibility, consideration should be given to it
reporting to a "joint commission" that could include
"representatives from the major countries that agree to
provide the additional observers/monitors, and from some
of the major aid donors."


6. (C) The report outlines the following two major
areas for the increased monitoring effort to focus on:

-- (1) Long-range weaponry: The report recommends that
the two sides agree to place their long-range weaponry
in "designated areas under international monitoring."
If the LTTE objects to this, the group would be asked to
allow the monitors to inspect the equipment where it is
in place.

-- (2) Challenge Inspections: At the request of one of
the sides, the monitors would inspect a site or sites
controlled by the other side in order to ensure that all
was in conformity with the ceasefire agreement.


7. (C) (((Note: In recommending that monitors focus on
these two areas, the report clearly is taking into
account two great fears of the Sri Lankan military in
Jaffna: First, that the LTTE, in a sudden strike, would
use its long-range guns positioned in the Wanni to
devastate Palaly airbase. Second, that without
inspections, the military could miss a surge in LTTE
troop concentrations potentially signaling the launch of
a surprise attack.)))

==================
Re Key Road Artery
==================


8. (C) In addition to the items reviewed above, the
monitors would also be responsible for facilitating a
confidence-building measure involving the use of the
"A-9" road. (Note: This important road connecting
Jaffna with the south reopened a year ago. Due to the
war, it had been closed for over a decade.) Nambiar
advocates that the Sri Lankan military be allowed to use
the road, something that it is currently unable to do
because a key stretch is within LTTE-controlled
territory. If the Tigers were amenable, the monitors
would ensure that the military's vehicles would not be
subject to stops and searches on this stretch of the
road. (Note: The opening of the A-9 to such convoys is
important to the military, which is now reliant
exclusively on air and sea transport for resupply and
troop deployments involving Jaffna.)

=======
COMMENT
=======


9. (C) In our estimation, the report is professional
and fair-minded. Nambiar clearly understands how
volatile this issue is and the need to proceed via
deliberate steps. Our guess is that the Sri Lankan
military will like most of the report, as it takes into
account many of its security concerns. (Note: The
military may not be too thrilled with the idea of
"challenge inspections" of its positions, however.)


10. (C) Despite Nambiar's best efforts to be fair to the
LTTE, however, it is quite possible that the group will
balk at what he recommends. The Tigers seem to want to
keep the security zone issue alive for political
reasons, as it has proven a useful tool in whipping up
support in Jaffna. It is also tough to see the Tigers,
at this time, agreeing to the monitoring of their long-
range weapons or allowing "challenge inspections" of
sites in the Wanni. Of course, the Tigers could
surprise everyone, but the group has shown no indication
that it wants to compromise on this particular issue.
(Note: Earlier this year, for example, the LTTE pulled
out of a joint committee set up to review security-
related issues, after vociferously rejecting a
preliminary report prepared by the GSL military re the
security zone issue.) The best that can probably be
expected is that the group does not reject the report
outright, but agrees to review it. END COMMENT.


11. (U) Minimize considered.

WILLS