Adviser to president indicates that PA party

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000381

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03-06-13
TAGS: PGOV PINS PTER PHUM PINR CE
SUBJECT: Adviser to president indicates that PA party
and radical JVP are inching closer to pact

Refs: (A) Colombo 280; (B) Colombo 175

(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met March 5 with Ronnie
De Mel, a close adviser to the president and a senior
MP. In a change of tune from a previous meeting, De Mel
indicated that a formal linkup between the PA and the
radical JVP party was a real possibility and could come
soon. If it happened, elections were also a
possibility. The Ambassador urged great caution in
working with the JVP given its anti-peace process, anti-
economic reform views. De Mel's comments heighten our
concern that the domestic political situation may be in
for some flux, with negative implications for the peace
process. END SUMMARY.

==============================
PA-JVP Linkup: Inching Closer
==============================


2. (C) On March 5, Ambassador Wills met with Ronnie De
Mel, a close adviser to President Kumaratunga and a
senior MP in her People's Alliance (PA) party.
(Note: For additional bio-data on De Mel, a long-time
Sri Lankan politician with a colorful past, see Ref B.)
When queried, De Mel -- in a decided change of tune from
a previous meeting -- indicated that a formal alliance
between the PA and the Sinhalese extremist Janantha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party was a real, near-term
possibility. (Note: In a late January conversation, De
Mel had downplayed the possibility of such a linkup --
see Ref B.) De Mel confirmed that representatives from
the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP),the key constituent
element in the PA, were meeting virtually every week
with the JVP in an attempt to hammer out a memorandum of
understanding.


3. (C) While noting that he was not personally involved
in the talks, he said he understood that progress was
being made in putting together an agreement. That said,
he had heard that major sticking points remained, and
involved peace process and economic reform issues.
These were problematic, complex issues, and it was not
at all clear whether the two sides could reach agreement
on how to handle them. If differences were bridged,
however, it was possible that an agreement could be
concluded within weeks, but probably not before May. On
this point, De Mel added that the president had given
him the green light to go on vacation for the next eight
weeks, telling him that she doubted any urgent matters
(i.e., announcement of a PA/JVP pact) would arise in
that timeframe.


4. (C) As for his own views, De Mel indicated that he
could accept a PA/JVP linkup under the right
circumstances, e.g., provided the JVP agreed to support
the peace process and economic reforms. Asked whether
any PA MP's might cross-over to the United National
Party (UNP) government if a pact with the JVP was
reached, De Mel shrugged his shoulders, commenting that
it all depended on whether the outlines of an agreement
were acceptable to party members. (Note: In Ref B
conversation, De Mel had claimed that up to 25 PA MP's
might be prepared to work with the UNP under the right
circumstances.) He added that he personally preferred
the idea of the PA's joining in an alliance with the
UNP. The latter idea, however, did not seem likely to
go anywhere: President Kumaratunga and UNP leader Prime
Minister Wickremesinghe could not get along with each
other in any way, shape, or form. The Ambassador
remarked that we had noticed that unfortunate fact.

=============================
Ambassador's Words of Caution
=============================


5. (C) The Ambassador noted that Sri Lanka was a
democracy and as such the U.S. took no view on its
internal matters. That said, he urged the PA to
exercise great caution in working with the JVP given its
stridently anti-peace process, anti-economic reform
views. A PA-JVP alliance could have a profoundly
negative impact on the peace process. The Tamil Tigers,
for example, could end the talks, pointing to the PA/JVP
alliance as the reason. In this sense, a PA/JVP
alliance could be a gift to the LTTE, which could
plausibly argue that the Sinhalese could not be trusted.
International sympathy for the LTTE, in other words,
could accrue in the event of a PA/JVP pact.


6. (C) Underlining that she had the final say regarding
the nature of any agreement with the JVP, De Mel replied
that he was certain that President Kumaratunga would not
agree to anything that undermined the peace process.
She had always been in favor of peace and remained
committed to ethnic reconciliation. The Ambassador
agreed that that was the case, but JVP extremism had to
be dealt with very, very carefully. De Mel replied that
the SLFP had had success in the past in "taming" and
subsuming left-wing parties. Many in the party felt
that the JVP could be handled and controlled in a
similar manner. In any case, it was doubtful that the
JVP would push for cabinet positions if there were an
election in which a PA/JVP combination won. (Note: As
a matter of background, the PA and JVP briefly entered
into a governing pact in late 2001. The JVP turned down
ministerial positions in that short-lived government.)

==========
Elections?
==========


7. (C) Queried about the possibility of new
parliamentary elections if there were a PA/JVP linkup,
De Mel responded that it was a possibility, although no
decisions had been reached. He noted that there were
some in the PA who felt that the party could defeat the
UNP government with the addition of JVP support. De Mel
said he tended to agree with this view, noting that the
PA's and JVP's combined vote had slightly surpassed that
of the UNP in the December 2001 election. (Note: On
the numbers, De Mel is correct: the UNP and allies
received 48.1 percent vs. the PA's 39.2 percent and the
JVP's 9.5 percent, which equaled a total of 48.7
percent. FYI: After their short-lived government
collapsed in late 2001, the PA and JVP ran different
slates of candidates in the December 2001 election,
dividing their combined vote in constituencies. End
Note.) The PA's alliance with the radical JVP might
cost it some support among the middle class, but
probably not too much. In any case, he continued, the
UNP government was rapidly losing popularity. People --
especially in rural areas -- were angry at cost of
living hikes and were eager to take it out on the
government. Prime Minister Wickremesinghe was a clever
politician, who knew how to use the press, but he was
indecisive and people were seeing through him.

=======
COMMENT
=======


8. (C) De Mel -- who chooses his words carefully and is
in a position to know -- was clearly signaling that work
on a PA/JVP pact was proceeding quickly and that
something potentially could be announced soon. This was
a far cry from his previous comments to the Ambassador,
which indicated that things were moving much more
slowly. (Note: FYI. We doubt De Mel's calculus that
such a linkup would easily defeat the UNP if an election
took place soon. While the government might be losing
some popularity due to economic problems, we think it
remains relatively strong.)


9. (C) His comments heighten our concern that the
domestic political situation could be in for some flux.
We cannot see how a PA/JVP linkup, if it comes to pass,
could be good news for the peace process. Not too far
underneath the surface of its leftist rhetoric, the JVP
is a Sinhalese extremist party and Tamils know that.
One can only guess at the reaction of the Tigers, but,
given their volatility, they could -- in a worst case
scenario -- use such a pact as a pretext to end the
peace process. At this point, we do not think it is
time to hit the panic button, but the U.S. needs to
monitor the situation carefully, while cautioning actors
on the need to proceed with Sri Lanka's larger national
interests in mind. We might consider enlisting others
in the international community (UK, India) to make a
similar case if present trends continue. END COMMENT.


10. (U) Minimize considered.

WILLS