C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 000284

SIPDIS

FOR A/S ROCCA; ALSO FOR SA/INS AND D

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR PARM CE UK LTTE
SUBJECT: HMG ON LTTE'S PROSCRIPTION UNDER UK LAW


Classified By: AMBASSADOR E. ASHLEY WILLS. REASONS 1.5 B, D.


1. (C) I met for an hour today (2/19) with HMG's very able
High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, Stephen Evans. Evans came to
see me under instructions from London to discuss next steps
in (1) moving the LTTE toward a formal renunciation of
violence and (2) attaching conditionality to loans and grants
announced at the coming Tokyo Conference so as to encourage
good behavior by the Tigers. By classified email, I am
forwarding to SA and SA/INS a copy of the FCO cable of
instructions to Evans, which he gave to me.


2. (C) This cable should be handled very discreetly both
because he wasn't authorized to pass a copy to the USG and
also because in it FCO makes a surprising admission, namely
that were the LTTE to challenge its proscription under the
UK's 2000 Terrorism law, HMG reckons that the Tigers would
win and would be de-proscribed. I asked Evans whether the
FCO thinks the LTTE will in fact challenge its proscription
and he said he did not know.


3. (C) We compared notes about what the LTTE needs to do to
get itself de-proscribed in our countries. It appears that
we and the Brits agree that the Tigers need to make a public
statement permanently renouncing terrorism at least and
preferably violence of any type and then follow that
statement with a "decent period" -- presumably a period of at
least a year or two -- when its deeds match its verbal
commitments. It appears that HMG is a bit uncertain, as are
we, about the methodology to be used in pushing a move to
de-proscribe through its bureaucracy. As you will see from
the cable from the FCO, the UK has the further complication
of not getting crosswise with Article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.


4. (C) On conditioning aid, we also agreed that it was much
to be sought in whatever assistance that we and other donors
announce in Tokyo. We even thought it prudent to encourage
the Norwegians to talk to the Tigers ASAP about the kinds of
steps they could take prior to Tokyo to encourage donor
generosity and also to calm southern Sinhalese anxieties
about LTTE intentions. These confidence-building steps by
the LTTE could include setting milestones for its
administration of the North and East regarding transparency
and respect for human rights; permitting local elections and
allowing non-LTTE parties to participate therein; improving
accountability regarding the taxes and other fees the LTTE
collects/extorts so that the Tamils (and we too) know how
their money is being spent; and introducing such
security-related measures as phased disarmament, putting
their long-range weapons under international supervision, etc.


5. Comment: Evans and I run into one another often and
consult closely on peace-related matters. It would be useful
for us and HMG to agree on next steps for the international
community because this will make it easier to get our EU and
Japanese pals to adopt consistent positions as we
collectively apply pressure to the two parties to the Sri
Lankan conflict.
WILLS