C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000252

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, EAP/J; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/13
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EAID CE JA NO IN LTTE
SUBJECT: Japanese envoy Akashi reviews preliminary
plans for donors' conference and possible U.S. role

Refs: (A) Tokyo 770 (Notal)

- (B) Colombo 113, and previous

(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of
Mission. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: In a February 13 meeting with the
Ambassador, Japanese Special Envoy Akashi reviewed
preliminary plans for the Tokyo donors' conference in
June, noting that exact details still needed to ironed
out with the GSL. Japan felt that U.S. participation
was important in giving the event credibility. He
remarked that his next stop was India where he planned
to press the GoI to participate in the conference.
Akashi was well-briefed, but Japan's exact role still
needs further refinement in light of Norwegian
involvement and Indian sensitivities. END SUMMARY.

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Akashi Reviews Plans for Conference
--------------


2. (C/NF) Ambassador Wills and DCM met February 13 with
Yasushi Akashi, Japan's Special Envoy on Sri Lankan
issues. Akashi related that his latest visit to Sri
Lanka was going well. (Note: Akashi also visited Sri
Lanka in January and met with the Ambassador at that
time -- See Ref B.) The Ambassador asked Akashi how
plans were proceeding regarding Japan's hosting of the
international donors' conference for Sri Lanka due to be
held in Tokyo, June 9-10. Akashi replied that exact
details for the conference still needed to ironed out
with the Sri Lankan government. He planned to have a
long meeting that night with Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe plus key Ministers G.L. Peiris and
Milinda Moragoda to discuss how the conference should be
organized. The U.S. would be briefed regarding the
meeting's conclusions as soon as possible, he added.

3. (C/NF) Akashi went on to note that the GoJ had some
preliminary notions regarding the conference that he
could share. The current idea was to have four co-
chairs -- Japan, Norway, the EU, and the U.S. This
model had worked for last year's Afghan reconstruction
conference. As host, Japan planned to do most of the
work involved in putting the conference together. That
said, Japan was committed to consulting fully with the
other co-chairs on the format of the conference. The
co-chairs, for example, would have to work closely
together in drafting a declaration for the conference.
Much of the work on the declaration could take place
closer to the timeframe of the conference.


4. (C/NF) Continuing, Akashi noted that much thought
had to go into the exact role of representatives of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) at the
conference. Japan's current thinking was that the group
would definitely not have equivalent status with the
GSL. In addition, nothing should be done to enhance the
group's position that was not absolutely necessary.
Ambassador Wills noted that exact plans regarding how to
handle the LTTE could be modulated closer to the
timeframe of the conference per the group's pattern of
behavior. Some flexibility in this regard could serve
to reward the LTTE for positive moves regarding the
peace process, while a negative pattern of behavior
could be dealt with in a different manner. Akashi said
he thought that approach made sense.

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Possible U.S. Role
--------------


5. (C/NF) When asked for more information about the
possible U.S. role, Akashi said the GoJ felt that U.S.
participation in the conference was important in giving
the event credibility. Akashi said he strongly hoped
that the U.S. would serve as a co-chair and that Deputy
Secretary Armitage could participate, as he was a real

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"drawing card." The Ambassador noted that the Deputy
Secretary was keen to participate in the conference, if

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at all possible. Akashi noted that GoJ representatives
had met with the Norwegians to discuss how the
November 2002 Oslo conference was structured as regards
interactions between the LTTE and donors, such as the
U.S. Japan wanted the U.S. to know that it was
sensitive to this issue and would work closely with us
to ensure that there were no potentially embarrassing
encounters with the LTTE, including photos, at the June
conference.
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Re India
--------------


6. (C/NF) In response to a question, Akashi said he
continued to work the India angle. He noted that he
planned to meet India's High Commissioner to Sri Lanka
later in the day and his next stop after Sri Lanka was
India. In New Delhi, he planned to meet with National
Security Adviser Mishra and some other officials. He
would urge the GoI to participate in the donors'
conference. Akashi said he thought the Ministry of
External Affairs was not very flexible regarding Sri
Lanka. Mishra was more flexible, but even he was
constrained by the anti-LTTE domestic political dynamic.
The Ambassador asked whether he planned to meet Congress
Party leader Sonia Gandhi and Akashi said he had no such
plans this trip. The Ambassador noted that India had
made clear that it supported the peace process on many
occasions, but it really needed to take a more visible
role. Indian influence, for example, might be an
important factor in getting the LTTE to take the first
step toward disarmament and demobilization.

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Other Items
--------------


7. (C/NF) Akashi also briefly touched on the following
items:

-- Prabhakaran: Akashi noted that he had received an
invitation some time ago to meet with LTTE leader

V. Prabhakaran. He was thinking of possibly doing so in
early March when senior Tiger negotiator Anton
Balasingham visited Sri Lanka. Such a meeting might be
useful in probing Prabhakaran's exact thoughts on the
peace process.

-- Kumaratunga: Akashi said he planned to meet
President Kumaratunga on February 14. During his last
visit, she had cancelled her meeting with him on very
short notice, but had sent him a nice letter of apology.
He asked the Ambassador whether it was likely that the
president might dissolve Parliament and call new
elections at some point in the next several months, and,
by doing so, disrupt the donors' conference. The
Ambassador responded that he did not think Kumaratunga
would do this, but it was in the realm of the possible.

(Note: Akashi took some flak from one of the
president's press spokesmen the other day. The
spokesman accused Akashi of portraying himself as an
"adviser" to the GSL. Akashi, in fact, has never
claimed to be that, although he is an adviser
to the GSL-LTTE humanitarian issues sub-committee. In
addition, some anti-peace process elements, including in
the press, have hit out at Akashi, accusing Japan --
wholly inaccurately -- of having a soft spot for the
LTTE. End Note.)
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COMMENT
--------------


8. (C/NF) As he was in our last meeting with him,
Akashi was highly articulate and well-briefed about the
Sri Lankan situation. He underscored that Sri Lanka was
important to Japan as a way to show its foreign policy
to be "positive" and "activist." All that said, it is
clear that Japan's exact role in the peace process still
needs further refinement in light of Norwegian
involvement and Indian sensitivities. At one point in
the conversation, for example, Akashi used the past
tense in discussing Norway's role as peace facilitator,
almost as if Japan was waiting in the wings to take
over. Our guess is that the GoN would not have been
happy to hear that. Moreover, based on what we hear,
India is still not thrilled with the GoJ's emerging
role. Japan needs to draw these threads together if it
wants its effort to be fully effective. END COMMENT.


9. (U) Minimize considered.
WILLS