C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 002160

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, EUR/NB, EAP/J

PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12-22-13
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS CE NO JA EUN LTTE
SUBJECT: Ambassador meets with other Tokyo co-chairs to
discuss possible joint statement on cohabitation impasse

Refs: (A) FBIS Reston VA DTG 210609Z Dec 03

- (B) Colombo 2121, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met December 21 with
representatives of the other co-chairs of the Tokyo
process (Japan, Norway, Italy/EU) to discuss a possible
joint statement regarding Sri Lanka's cohabitation
impasse. The co-chairs agreed on the outlines of a
possible statement drafted by the Japanese (see Para 9
and suggested tweaks in para 4). Mission will be coming
back to Department in the early January timeframe to
review the possible issuance of the statement. The co-
chairs also discussed a possible visit by Special Envoy
Akashi to Sri Lanka in January and urged Japan to review
the purpose of any such visit further. The Ambassador
and the DCM also met December 20 with Minister Moragoda,
who said both the President and the PM are still divided
over what to do with the Defense Ministry. Based on the
December 21 meeting, the co-chairs appear to be on the
same page regarding the seriousness of the situation and
the need to press both sides to settle the ongoing
crisis as soon as possible. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Co-Chairs review Draft Statement
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador Lunstead met December 21 with other
representatives of the co-chairs of the Tokyo process
(Japan, Norway, Italy/EU) to discuss Sri Lanka's ongoing
cohabitation impasse. At the meeting, Japanese
Ambassador Akio Suda handed out a possible joint
statement concerning the cohabitation situation for the
co-chairs to review. Suda said his government was
thinking that the draft statement should be issued this
week in the name of the four co-chairs. Norwegian
Ambassador Hans Brattskar noted that he did not think

that the GoN would want to be a co-signer of such a
statement given its longtime role as peace process
facilitator. Suda (as if by magic) then took out
another draft joint statement that did not include
Norway's name. (This draft is contained in Para 9.)
There was some discussion as to whether the possible
statement should be issued by the co-chair Chiefs of
Mission in Colombo or, alternatively, at a meeting
outside Colombo attended by high-level representatives
of the co-chairs. (This idea was floated by Milinda
Moragoda in an earlier discussion.) The Ambassador and
the others present did not see the need for such a high-
level meeting at this time, and agreed that the possible
statement should be issued in the name of local
representatives of the co-chairs. Ambassador Brattskar,
however, did note that if the cohabitation impasse
continued into late January perhaps a high-level meeting
should be considered by the co-chairs. One reason such
a meeting might be important down-the-line, he
continued, was that donors had to decide on how to
handle their assistance to Sri Lanka if the impasse
seemed set to continue.


3. (C) Regarding timing, Suda indicated that the GoJ
was thinking that now would be a good time to issue the
statement. The other representatives present disagreed,
noting that the cohabitation crisis was quiet for the
moment with Sri Lankans focusing on the holiday season.
If a statement was issued now, it would not have the
intended effect and would be lost in the run-up to
Christmas. After some discussion, the representatives
agreed that early January (perhaps around January 5-6),
would be the best time to issue the statement. Suda
said he would check with Tokyo on this.


4. (C) There was also the following discussion with
respect to the substance of the draft statement:

-- The Ambassador and the other representatives noted
their full agreement with the fourth para of the draft
where it states that "The co-chairs cannot overemphasize
the importance of restoring the clarity of
responsibility for the peace process within the
government of Sri Lanka." The Ambassador noted that
this was an especially key para given the pressing need
for the government and the Tigers to meet and discuss
outstanding issues.

-- There was also some discussion regarding the third
para, with Ambassador Brattskar noting that the term
"peace negotiations" should be substituted for "peace
process," as the peace process was ongoing, but it was
the talks that had been stalled since April 2003.
Ambassador Suda agreed with this point and noted that he
would review the matter with Tokyo.

-- The Ambassador also expressed concern about the fifth
para, noting that it directly implied that the Tamil
Tigers were acting in "full compliance" with the
ceasefire accord. Through their actions, the Tigers had
shown this was not fully the case. After some
discussion, it was agreed that the sentence in question
would be rewritten and tempered to stress that both
sides should act in full compliance with the ceasefire
accord. Ambassador Suda agreed with this and noted that
he would review the matter with Tokyo.

-- Ambassador Lunstead and Italian Ambassador Salvatore
Zotta both made the point that the sixth para was not
"sharp" enough. They noted that the para did not
underscore that full implementation of the assistance
committments made at the June Tokyo conference would not
be possible unless there was an end to the cohabitation
impasse. Ambassador Suda agreed that the para needed to
be sharpened up and noted that he would review the
matter with Tokyo.

--------------
Possible Akashi Visit
--------------


5. (C) The co-chairs also discussed a possible visit to
Sri Lanka in the mid-January timeframe by Japanese
Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi. When asked about the
purpose of the visit, Suda replied that Akashi had "some
empty space" in his calendar and had a meeting around
that time in India. Akashi was also "frustrated" about
the cohabitation situation and wanted to see what he
could do to smooth matters out. The other
representatives present noted that this matter of "empty
space" was not a very convincing reason for Akashi's
visit. Ambassador Zotta remarked that "If Akashi wants
to send some sort of message, wouldn't it be better if
he did not come?" Suda, listening carefully to these
points, said he would review the purpose of Akashi's
possible visit with Tokyo and consult further with the
co-chairs.

--------------
Meeting with Moragoda
--------------


6. (C) In a related development, the Ambassador and the
DCM met December 20 with Minister Milinda Moragoda, a
close confidant of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe.
Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar was also present for part
of the meeting. Moragoda noted that there was still a
wide gap in the positions of President Kumaratunga and
the PM regarding what to do about the Defense Ministry
(the President took over this ministry and two others on
November 4). He was not sure whether the two sides
could come to an agreement on how to handle this matter.
Moragoda said he hoped that India would become more
involved in settling the dispute. Nirupam Sen, the
Indian High Commissioner, had just returned from
consultations in New Delhi and had indicated that there
was a new Indian approach. Moragoda said it was
important that the GoI "underpin" any cohabitation
agreement reached by the two sides. (Note: We have no
confirmation of the purported new Indian approach
mentioned by Moragoda. The DCM is having lunch on
December 23 with Indian Deputy High Commissioner Mohan
Kumar and will check then.)


7. (C) In the meantime, Moragoda said, the PM was
concerned that the international community -- including
the U.S. -- was treating him and the President in an
equivalent manner, although she had been the one who had
precipitated the crisis. Ambassador Lunstead responded
that this was not the case; the U.S. knew that she had
provoked the situation. Publicly, however, we had to
urge both sides to try to reach an accommodation in the
national interest. This was the only logical position
the international community could take. For the U.S.,
and the international community, to take public
positions urging the President (alone) to compromise
would have two likely effects. One, the President would
become more obdurate. Second, we (the international
community) would become the issue. Neither would
contribute to a solution. Moragoda said he understood
and would inform the Prime Minister.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) As we have reported (see Ref B), there is no
indication of any progress on the cohabitation front.
Despite some press reports to the contrary (see Ref A),
the talks have not in fact broken down -- they are
postponed, however, due to the fact that the two sides'
chief negotiators are leaving the country for the
holidays. (In the meantime, the Tigers -- doing their
best to appear moderate -- have issued a statement
asserting that they are willing to negotiate with just
about anyone chosen by Colombo!) In terms of the
international response, the co-chairs seem to be on the
same page regarding the seriousness of the situation and
the need to press both sides to settle the ongoing
crisis as soon as possible. We think that the separate
U.S. messages that we suggested be sent to the President
and the Prime Minister in Ref B are also timely and will
help set the stage for the co-chairs' efforts. END
COMMENT.


9. (SBU) The possible joint statement drafted by the
GoJ follows (also see suggested tweaks to the draft
contained in para 4). We will send a final version to
Washington in early January:

Begin text:

Joint Statement by Three Co-chairs of the Tokyo
Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri
Lanka (DRAFT)

(1) Japan, the U.S. and the EU, as Co-chairs of
the Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and
Development of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to
as the "three co-chairs"), express their deep
concern over the prolonged political crisis in Sri
Lanka, by which the resumption of the peace talks
has been made impossible.

(2) The three co-chairs are disappointed that no
breakthrough has so far been achieved in the
meetings between President Chandrika Kumaratunga
and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe as well as
through the discussions in the Committee of
Officials.

(3) The three co-chairs strongly urge both parties
to settle the current crisis swiftly so as to make
it possible to resume the peace process
expeditiously.

(4) The three co-chairs cannot overemphasize the
importance of restoring the clarity of
responsibility for the peace process within the
Government of Sri Lanka. This will provide an
essential condition for achieving a negotiated
peace.

(5) The three co-chairs welcome the continued firm
commitments by the parties concerned, including the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), to the
peace process and to the full compliance with the
ceasefire agreement.

(6) The three co-chairs also welcome the
willingness of the Government of Norway to resume
its facilitation role when the peace process is re-
started.

(7) The three co-chairs wish to reiterate their
continued determination to implement the assistance
pledged at the Tokyo Conference based on the Tokyo
Declaration. They also remind the parties
concerned of the importance of taking advantage of
the momentum of the donor community created at the
Tokyo Conference.

(8) The three co-chairs reaffirm their unflinching
support of the widespread aspiration of the people
of Sri Lanka to achieve a durable peace in their
country.

End text.


10. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD