C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 002036

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NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-25-13
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS MOPS CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: Acting chief of monitors says ceasefire being
observed; Navy chief defends aggressive posture

Refs: (A) Colombo 2010
- (B) Colombo 1845

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met November 24 with
Hagrup Haukland, the acting head of the Norwegian-run
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), and separately with
Sri Lankan Navy Chief Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri.
Haukland said the GSL and the Tigers continued to
observe the ceasefire accord. The SLMM remained
concerned about the possibility of Tamil-Muslim violence
in the east, however. Haukland indicated that Norway
might make a determination soon regarding the fate of
chief monitor Tellefsen, whose removal President
Kumaratunga had demanded in October. Despite the
tensions in the south and other uncertainties, it is
positive that the SLMM finds itself able to continue its
important work. Admiral Sandagiri agreed that it was
important to support the peace process, but showed a
more belligerent attitude towards the Tigers. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) MEETING WITH SLMM: Ambassador Lunstead met
November 24 with Hagrup Haukland, the acting head of the
SLMM. Haukland, a retired Norwegian military officer,
told the Ambassador that both the Sri Lankan government
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
continued to observe the February 2002 ceasefire accord.
Regarding the LTTE's unauthorized camp located at Wan
Ela near Trincomalee city in the east, Haukland noted
that the LTTE had made no move to dismantle the camp in
spite of the SLMM's earlier ruling that its construction
violated the ceasefire agreement. The Ambassador
queried Haukland as to why the Tigers were adamant in
their refusal to dismantle the camp. Haukland replied
that it was a "matter of principle" for the Tigers, as
the camp was not particularly strategic and "could

probably be disassembled in a couple of days."


3. (C) In addition to the Wan Ela camp, Haukland noted
that the Tigers occupied seven "pockets" in the east and
one in the north in the Mannar District area. He said
the existence of such pockets could be "explosive"
should the GSL challenge LTTE occupation of the areas in
question. Haukland added that one of the most crucial
missions the SLMM had was defusing Tamil-Muslim ethnic
tension in the east. The situation there was poor and
LTTE-Muslim violence was possible. Along these lines,
Haukland briefly mentioned a November 23 incident in
Kinniya, near the Wan Ela camp, in which two Muslims had
been killed.


4. (C) The Ambassador related that, during his meeting
with President Kumaratunga following her November 4
takeover of three ministries and suspension of
Parliament, he had stressed the importance of the GSL's
and the LTTE's continued adherence to the ceasefire
agreement. The Ambassador added that he had also
underlined to the President the vital importance of the
SLMM's role.


5. (C) NORWAY TO DECIDE ON CHIEF MONITOR: Noting the
difficulties inherent in the SLMM's work, Haukland
underscored the continued importance of monitoring the
situation at sea. He stated that the SLMM's monitoring
effort at sea continued much as it had previously
despite the October 16 incident which had led to the
President's calling for the removal of chief monitor
Tryggve Tellefsen. (Note: In the incident referred to,
a SLMM official contacted the LTTE to ask about a report
about a possible Tiger resupply ship. In doing this,
the SLMM was accused of inappropriately tipping the LTTE
off to Sri Lanka Navy scrutiny of the reported vessel.
Citing such concerns, President Kumaratunga demanded
that Tellefsen be replaced -- see Ref B.) Responding to
the Ambassador's query as to Tellefsen's status,
Haukland replied that Tellefsen remained in Norway for
"consultations" and the Norwegian government could make
a decision as early as this week whether or not to
retain him as chief of mission. Haukland noted,
however, that he "couldn't see how Tellefsen could come
back" with President Kumaratunga acting as head of the
Defense Ministry. The Ambassador commented that
considering the nature of the SLMM's mission, it was
difficult to deal with political pressure of this type.
Haukland concurred, remarking that if the SLMM were seen
as susceptible to political pressure, then its mission
would be compromised.


6. (C) MEETING WITH NAVY CHIEF: In an office call later
the same day with the Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Daya
Sandagiri, the Ambassador reiterated the message that he
has given each of the service commanders -- U.S.
appreciation of the responsibility and restraint shown
by the armed forces throughout the peace process.
Admiral Sandagiri was the most outspoken of the three
Commanders in asserting the rights and duties of the
military to defend the "sovereignty of the nation." The
LTTE, he said, is not a legitimate organization and
should not be allowed to import items into Sri Lanka.
It became clear throughout the session that while he
publicly supported the peace process, he would not be
deterred by the confines of the MOU in preventing the
LTTE from importing dangerous materials into the
country. "Why else does the Navy exist?" he asked.


7. (C) Ambassador noted the difficulty and ambiguity of
the Navy's task. The Navy wanted to support the peace
process and observe the ceasefire, but at the same time
wanted to protect Sri Lanka's waters and prevent the
LTTE from smuggling in weapons. These two objectives
could conflict with each other. Discussing the Navy's
recent imbroglio with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission,
Sandagiri said that in future the SLMM will not be
informed of a suspected LTTE vessel until confirmation
is made of its location and identification. He admitted
that in some cases getting an SLMM representative to the
site of an incident could take up to a day, but argued
that the alternative, giving up secrecy and surprise to
the LTTE by allowing SLMM observers on board earlier,
was unacceptable.


8. (C) During the discussion, the Admiral revealed that
he believes the war could have been won in 2001 if the
government had not established the peace process. He
described an LTTE that was "nearly beaten," hampered by
the Army's attacks against its leadership and running
out of resources. With the peace process, Sandagiri
lamented, the LTTE has been able to build itself
geographically, politically, socially, economically, and
militarily. Ambassador reiterated the US belief that
neither side would have been likely to win, and that
negotiation, not fighting, was the path to ending the
long-term conflict.


9. (C) COMMENT: The SLMM's role as chief monitor of
the ceasefire has been, and will continue to be, a key
component in the success of the peace process. The good
news is that Haukland seemed upbeat and confident in his
group's ability to carry out its mission. Given the
uncertainties involving the political situation in the
south and over Tellefsen's continued leadership of the
group, as well as Norway's recent decision to place "on
hold" its facilitation effort, it is certainly positive
that the SLMM finds itself able to continue its
important work. On the other side, Admiral Sandagiri
seems almost to be spoiling for a fight. The new
procedure, where SLMM monitors will not be taken aboard
while the SLN searches for suspected Tiger vessels, but
only brought out after a vessel is located, is fraught
with danger. It could take up to a full day for a
monitor to reach the scene. It is hard to believe that
a Sri Lankan Navy vessel and an LTTE gunrunner will sit
calmly and observe each other for that length of time.
END COMMENT.


10. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD