Sri Lanka's Sinhalese extremist Sihala Urumaya

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 002010 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-20-13 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR SOCI CE SUBJECT: Sri Lanka's Sinhalese extremist Sihala Urumaya -- a small party that packs a political wallop Refs: Colombo 2001, and previous (U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of Mission. Reasons 1.5 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Sihala Urumaya (SU) party is minuscule as an electoral force. The party packs a political wallop, however: its leadership is articulate and generates press coverage; its cadre are devoted to the party's extremist views; and it maintains strong support in the influential Buddhist clergy. While unlikely to gain electoral power anytime soon, the SU -- in a sign that Sinhalese extremism cannot be written off as a force -- has shown the ability to get its anti-peace process message across and mold the public debate. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) A SMALL PARTY: Sri Lanka's Sihala Urumaya ("Sinhalese birthright") party is minuscule as an electoral force, especially when compared with Sri Lanka's big four parties (the United National Party "UNP", the People's Alliance "PA", the Tamil National Alliance "TNA", and the Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna "JVP"). The SU holds no seats in Parliament and in the last parliamentary elections in December 2001 it won only .56 percent of the total vote. The party also holds only a small smattering of seats in the country's provincial and local councils. Moreover, the party's membership base is quite limited, with an active cadre numbering in the hundreds and actual dues-paying party members numbering in the low thousands. ¶3. (C) NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL INFLUENCE: While the party lacks electoral muscle, however, it does maintain a fair degree of political influence. One factor in its favor is that its major leaders, chief secretary Tilak Karunaratne and national organizer Champika Ranaweke, are young and articulate. They manage to generate a fair amount of press coverage for the party's Sinhalese Buddhist extremist point of view through interviews in which they often make radical statements. Karunaratne stated to the press earlier this year, for example, that the SU was ready to train suicide bombers in order to defeat the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). While Karunaratne quickly backtracked on this statement, he netted a lot of publicity for his party in the process. To some extent, in showing the ability to get in the press, the party is benefiting from press outlets, such as the ISLAND and DIVAINA, English-and Sinhala-language dailies respectively, which routinely take an anti-peace process, pro-Sinhalese editorial slant. ¶4. (C) In the meantime, SU cadre are fanatically dedicated to the parties' anti-peace process, anti-LTTE platform, and they consistently show up for its rallies (see below). At the same time, the party maintains a high degree of support within Sri Lanka's influential Buddhist clergy. Commenting on the SU's influence, Rohan Edirisinha, an analyst for the Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA),a local think-tank, told polchief on November 18 that the SU "while small, has shown the ability to nudge the political debate in its direction." ¶5. (C) RECENT ACTIVITIES: In the past several months, the SU has been highly active and there is every sign that it will remain so. Its recent activities included: -- In its recent public pronouncements, the SU came out strongly in favor of the President's November 4 sacking of three ministers and suspension of Parliament. The party has also sponsored several small rallies in support of her actions. -- On October 29, SU members disrupted a "pro-peace" cultural festival sponsored by Tamils and some Sinhalese in Colombo. Several people were lightly wounded in the ensuing fracas. The SU, without convincing evidence, asserted that the event was sponsored by the LTTE. Several SU members were arrested at the scene, but were later released. -- On October 14, the SU led a protest march in Trincomalee District in the Eastern Province. The marchers were protesting the LTTE's unauthorized camp located at "Wan Ela" near Trincomalee city. The marchers were turned back by security forces before coming too close to the camp. -- In late September, SU members joined with the Patriotic National Movement ("Jathika Deshahitayashi Peramuna") in a lengthy protest march from the central city of Kandy to Colombo. The Patriotic National Movement, which was formed earlier in September, is a grouping of opposition political parties including the JVP and some anti-peace process elements of the PA. (While the SU often joins in anti-peace process activities with the Marxist JVP, it differs from the JVP in that it has no discernible economic philosophy.) -- On September 15, approximately 400 Sihala Urumaya members joined radical Buddhist monks in a visit to an archaeological site in Ampara District, located in the southeast. A prominent monk had been denied access to the site by the LTTE in August and the SU wanted to show that Buddhists had a right to visit the site. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Despite its best efforts, the SU appears unlikely to gain mass support anytime soon. After 20 years of conflict, the Sri Lankan public strongly supports the peace process and is unlikely to turn to the often shrill SU. That said, the SU has shown the ability to mold the debate. In doing so, the SU could make things easier down the road for mass parties that are skeptical toward the peace process, such as the People's Alliance, or out-and-out opposed, such as the radical JVP. Moreover, the fact that the SU is able to get its anti-peace process, anti-LTTE views across, tends to underscore the point that Sinhalese extremism cannot be written off entirely as a force in Sri Lanka. END COMMENT. ¶7. (U) Minimize considered. LUNSTEAD