C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001916

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/IP/NEA/SA
NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-05-13
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL ASEC SOCI CASC CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: President's moves place spotlight on deep
cohabitation divisions, raising worries re peace process

Refs: Colombo 1902, and previous

(U) Classified by Charge' d'Affaires James F. Entwistle.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Kumaratunga's dramatic
November 4-5 moves against the UNP government have
placed the spotlight on Sri Lanka's deep cohabitation
divisions. The Constitution gives her office
overwhelming executive powers. Without access to
Parliament, which has been suspended, the Prime Minister
has few tools at his disposal and he is on the defensive
as the President tries to lure UNP MPs to her side. The
government has leverage due to its popularity, however.
In the meantime, the volatile situation in the south is
clearly of great concern to the highly unpredictable
Tigers. It seems that elections may be a way out of the
current morass, but, while the situation in the south
plays out, peace track moves seem set to be delayed even
as the Tigers grow more restless. END SUMMARY.

=============================
Constitution Favors President
=============================


2. (C) President Kumaratunga's November 4-5 bombshell
moves of firing ministers, suspending Parliament, and
declaring an emergency have placed the spotlight on Sri
Lanka's deep cohabitation divisions. (Note: Septel
reviews the President's latest actions and reaction
locally. Reftels review her November 4 actions.)
Although Prime Minister Wickremesinghe has been the most
dynamic political leader in the country since his United
National Party (UNP) was elected to power in December
2001, it is the case that the Constitution gives the
President's office overwhelming executive powers.
According to the terms of the 1978 Constitution, the
presidency holds the following powers:

-- The president is head of state, head of the
government, and commander-in-chief.

-- The president has the power to nominate the prime
minister and the cabinet.

-- The president also has the power to make definitive
statements of governmental policy without consulting the
prime minister or the cabinet of ministers.

-- The president can suspend (or "prorogue") Parliament
for up to two months at a time.

-- The president can dissolve Parliament (after it sits
for one year) and call for new elections.

-- The president has the power to declare a state of
emergency.


3. (C) Moreover, if there are any questions about her
powers under the Constitution, most observers believe
the President can rely on the Supreme Court to bail her
out. Most justices on the eleven member Supreme Court
were chosen by the President and are considered her
allies. In particular, Chief Justice Sarath Silva is
considered to be very close to the president and to
support a "maximalist" reading of her powers under the
Constitution. For example, the President would seem to
be able to rely on the Supreme Court to render an
interpretation of the Constitution that allows her to
suspend Parliament indefinitely, as long as she does so
regularly in up to two month increments.


4. (C) The question of why the President did not use
these powers until now is a complex one. Earlier in
2003, the President tried to take over the government-
controlled National Lotteries Board, but was
unsuccessful because the PM and his party pushed back.
The President -- apparently not wanting to press the
matter -- let it slide. Observers believe that she may
have been waiting for what she considered the "right
moment" to spring again into action against the PM.
This moment may have appeared, in her eyes, with the PM
being out of the country (he is in Washington) and right
after the Tamil Tigers came out with their controversial
power-sharing proposals (See Reftels). The President
may have also felt that recent recrudescence of UNP
threats to impeach her and the Chief Justice were going
too far and she had to react aggressively.


5. (SBU) (((Note: As background on how the confusing
cohabitation situation first developed: Sri Lanka's
1978 Constitution was structured by the UNP, which was
then in power, with the idea that the president and the
PM would be from the same party. Except for a brief
spell in 1994, it has worked out that way -- until
recently. Due the following confluence of events, the
situation changed:

-- Kumaratunga had been elected President in 1994, re-
elected in late 1999, and is scheduled to leave office
due to term limits in late 2005.

-- In December 2001, PM Wickremesinghe's UNP party won
the parliamentary election, defeating President
Kumaratunga's party.

-- With the UNP-controlled Parliament scheduled to be in
place until 2006, the PM and the President are scheduled
to serve concurrently from late 2001-late 2004. END
NOTE.)))

=======================
PM lacks ready Tools...
=======================


6. (C) In the face of the President's high-level of
authority under the Constitution, Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe has very few tools at his disposal. One
of the tools he might have had -- the majority he
maintains in Parliament -- was effectively taken away
from him when the President on November 4 suspended
Parliament until mid-November. Without Parliament being
in session, the PM does not have the ability to proceed
with long-prepared plans to try to impeach the President
and the Chief Justice on abuse of power charges. In
addition, the PM may also have been able to rely on the
popular support his government generally maintains to
take matters to the streets to make Kumaratunga feel the
heat. With the President's imposition of a state of
emergency on November 5, however, no demonstrations or
rallies or other political work can take place without
the approval of the Interior Ministry, which is now
under her control. Finally, while he maintains a slim
majority in Parliament (though he probably can also rely
on the 16 Tamil National Alliance MPs), the PM is on the
defensive as the President tries to lure his MPs to her
side by offering them various favors. Although the PM
is considered popular in his party and is not abrasive,
he is not known for being a hands-on manager and it is
possible that some UNP MPs could be induced to cross-
over because they feel he was not attentive enough to
their needs.

================
But has Leverage
================


7. (C) Despite being hamstrung in so many ways, the PM
and his UNP government still have leverage. As touched
on, the government is generally quite popular due to its
peace process and economic intiatives. It is believed
to maintain very strong support not only in the business
community, a traditional stronghold, but also among the
public at large. Its strength in the Western Province,
the most urbanized section of the country and where
Colombo is located, seems to be overwhelming, as is its
support in the Tamil community, which forms just under
20 percent of the total population. Christians, roughly
8 percent of the populace, are also believed to support
Wickremesinghe's government quite strongly. Moreover,
if the crisis drags on, the PM can probably count on his
support from the public steadily increasing, with many
Sri Lankans feeling that the President's actions of
continuing to suspend Parliament and maintaining a state
of emergency to be unreasonable in a democratic country.
With all of this pressure falling on the President, she
may be forced to either allow Parliament to go back in
session or to call fresh elections. If she does not
take either of these two routes, she could be courting
widespread anger among the general public. This could
result, sooner or later, in a confrontation between the
President-led security forces in charge of implementing
the emergency regulations and "people power" led by the
PM.

=====================
Peace Process at Risk
=====================


8. (C) In the meantime, the confusing situation in the
south forms a risk to the peace process. As reported in
Septel, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
organization has already underscored its concern about
the situation in the south, noting that the February
2002 ceasefire may be at risk. The group also appears
to be pulling its political cadre from their offices in
government-controlled areas of the north and east, and
bringing them back to LTTE-controlled areas.


9. (C) These signals are serious ones, indicating that
the LTTE is worried about what is going on in the south.
They are also explainable by the fact that the LTTE is
known to distrust President Kumaratunga in a bitter
fashion -- the group went so far as to attempt to kill
her in December 1999 (she lost an eye in the bomb
attack). Any sign that she is increasing her strength
in the south will set off alarm bells in LTTE circles.
The LTTE, for its own reasons, has long associated
Kumaratunga with Sinhalese Buddhist extremism, a force
that the LTTE sees itself as waging a long war against.
The President's declaration of a state of emergency on
November 5 probably will only alarm the LTTE even more
because it may well see that act as preparing the south
for action against the LTTE (however unreasonable a view
that may be). The fact that the President and her
advisers have issued assurances that they intend to
respect the ceasefire and support negotiations may not
cut much ice with the LTTE.

=======
COMMENT
=======


10. (C) It appears that elections may be a way out of
the current morass. There is speculation that the
President aims eventually to call new parliamentary
elections, perhaps thinking that her party would win.
If that happens, the President and the PM would be from
the same party, which would almost certainly put an end
to cohabitation bickering (though it would raise the
LTTE's level of concerns). Most observers do not
believe that her party would win, however, but believe
the UNP would come out on top and, in the process, quite
possibly increase its majority. In short, Sri Lanka
would be left in much the same cohabitation position as
before the crisis began. At the same time, if the
President managed to convince enough UNP MPs to defect
so that she could form the government, the anger in the
UNP would be severe and such an act might spark a
backlash among the public over perceived crooked
politics. In any case, while the situation in the south
plays out, peace track moves seem set to be delayed even
as the Tigers grow more restless. In sum, there does
not seem an easy way out of the crisis triggered by the
President's brazen moves. END COMMENT.


11. (U) Minimize considered.

ENTWISTLE