C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 001893

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, INR/NESA; NSC FOR

E. MILLARD

PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-03-13
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS PREL CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: LTTE counterproposals on interim
administration in north/east generate mixed reaction

Refs: (A) Colombo-SA/INS 11/03/01 unclass e-mails

- (B) Colombo-SA/INS 11/01/01 unclass e-mail
- (C) Colombo 1878, and previous
- (D) Oslo 2153 (All Notal)

(U) Classified by Charge' d'Affaires James F. Entwistle.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Norwegian facilitators provided
the Tamil Tigers' long-awaited counterproposals on the
modalities for an interim administration in the
north/east to the GSL on October 31. The Tiger plan,
which was publicly released at a November 1 press
conference, seeks wide-ranging powers for the group,
including over law and order, finance, and sea access.
The plan has generated a mixed reaction: The GSL, for
example, while noting that it has differences with the
plan, underscored its interest in restarting direct
talks. Muslims and the radical JVP, however, came out
against the Tiger plan, and indications are that
President Kumaratunga and her party will too. In our
estimation, while some of what the Tigers have spelled
out is extreme, the issuance of the counterproposals is
a potentially vital step forward for the peace process.
The test of real progress will be whether the LTTE shows
flexibility in face-to-face talks. END SUMMARY.

============================
LTTE issues Counterproposals
============================


2. (SBU) Per the schedule laid out in Refs C-D, the
Norwegian facilitators provided the counterproposals
developed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
regarding the setting up of an interim administration in
the north/east to the GSL on October 31. The LTTE plan
was formulated in response to a July 2003 proposal made
by the Sri Lankan government. In a brief October 31
trip to the LTTE-controlled Vanni region in north-
central Sri Lanka, Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar

received the counterproposal document from LTTE
political leader S.P. Thamilchelvam and handed it over
to the GSL that same day. The government then
transmitted copies of the LTTE document to President
Kumaratunga and Rauf Hakeem, the leader of the Sri Lanka
Muslim Congress (SLMC), who was in London.


3. (C) The LTTE made the counterproposals public at a
November 1 press conference held in the town of
Kilinochchi in the Vanni. At the press conference,
Thamilchelvam read a brief statement highlighting key
elements of the counterproposals. (Note: A copy of the
LTTE counterproposal document was e-mailed to SA/INS in
Ref B. The text of the proposal can also be found at
www.TamilNet.com. Highlights of the document are
reviewed below. A U.S. Embassy press statement issued
on November 3 is contained in Ref A. Septel reviews
press reaction. End Note.) In his statement,
Thamilchelvam said the formation of an "Interim Self-
Governing Authority" was necessary in order to bring
"dignity and equal rights to Sri Lanka's Tamil people"
in the north/east. While he said he recognized that the
entire island had suffered due to the war, he asserted
that only the south had benefited from the peace process
to date, as opposed to the north and east. In response
to one of the few press questions that were allowed,
Thamilchelvam replied that the LTTE would not be
participating in the peace process if it still sought a
Tamil Eelam (a separate state). Tomas Stangeland, a
Norwegian Embassy poloff who attended the press
conference, told polchief on November 3 that
Thamilchelvam's comments were basically "non-polemical
in tone."


4. (C) For its part, the Sri Lankan government --
through G.L. Peiris, key minister and chief peace
process negotiator -- issued a brief statement reacting
to the Tigers' counterproposals on November 1. Without
providing specifics, the GSL statement noted that the
LTTE's document "differs in fundamental respects" from
the government's July proposal. The statement went on
to say, however, that "the government is convinced that
the way forward lies through direct discussion of the
issues arising from both sets of proposals."


5. (C) In both the GSL statement and Thamilchelvam's
comments at the press conference, each side requested
that the Norwegian facilitators arrange an initial face-
to-face meeting between the two parties. The aim of
this meeting would be for the two sides to settle on the
modalities for a resumption of the substantive
negotiations which the Tigers pulled out of in April.
As Mission has been told before (see Ref C), Stangeland
told polchief that the GoN hoped that this meeting could
take place by late November or early December, with
substantive talks to follow by early 2004. Stangeland
also confirmed press reports that Deputy Foreign
Minister Vidar Helgesen planned to visit Sri Lanka for
talks with the GSL and the LTTE from November 10-13.
According to Stangeland, Helgesen would use the visit to
take the temperature of the process in the aftermath of
the issuance of the Tigers' counterproposals, and to try
to set dates for the recommencement of talks.

===============================
Group seeks Wide-ranging Powers
===============================


6. (SBU) The LTTE document itself is awkwardly
entitled, "The Proposal by the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam on behalf of the Tamil People for an
Agreement to Establish an Interim Self-Governing
Authority for the NorthEast of the Island of Sri Lanka."
The document, which is relatively moderate and non-
strident in tone for something issued by the Tigers (if
extreme at times in substance), sets out a menu of wide-
ranging powers for the group in the north/east. The
document is believed to be the first time the Tigers
have put to paper their ideas for an interim governing
structure in one comprehensive text. The document,
which is considerably more sweeping than the GSL's July
proposal, is the culmination of months of meetings
between LTTE officials and pro-LTTE elements living
outside of Sri Lanka.


7. (SBU) With respect to the specifics of the plan, the
Tigers have termed their governing structure the
"Interim Self-Governing Authority" (ISGA). The ISGA
would have jurisdiction over eight districts in the
north and east, including Amparai, Batticaloa, Jaffna,
Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, and
Vavuniya. Key aspects of the Tigers' plan include:

-- ISGA Composition: The ISGA will include members
appointed by the LTTE, the GSL (picking for the
Sinhalese community), and the Muslim community in the
north/east. The LTTE appointees will have an absolute
majority in the ISGA. A chairperson, elected by
majority vote in the ISGA, will serve as chief
executive. That chairperson will then appoint the chief
administrator for the north/east and other officers.

-- Operational Term: The ISGA will be in operation for
five years at which time elections for the north/east
will be held if a permanent solution to the conflict has
not yet been reached.

-- Plenary Powers: The ISGA will have plenary power for
governance over the north/east for resettlement,
rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of the
region, as well as power over raising revenue, law and
order, and land.

-- Finance: A Finance Commission, made up of ISGA-
appointed members, will make recommendations on the
amount of funding to be allocated in the north/east.
The ISGA will control all expenditures for the
north/east, including all allocations by international
organizations or institutions earmarked for the
north/east. The ISGA will also have the authority to
borrow money.

-- Sea Access: The ISGA will "have control over the
marine and offshore resources of the adjacent seas and
the power to regulate access thereto." (Note: If
implemented, this provision would appear to allow the
Tigers the unrestricted ability to import arms-related
items.)

-- Judiciary: According to the document, "separate
institutions for the administration of justice shall be
established for the north/east." Such institutions will
have sole and exclusive power to resolve all disputes
that arise in the north/east.

-- Sri Lankan Military Forces: The document asserts
that the "occupation of land by the armed forces of the
GSL, and the denial to the rightful civilian owners of
unfettered access" is a "violation of the norms of
international law." The LTTE demands that "such land
must be immediately vacated and restored to the previous
owners." (Note: It is not clear whether this provision
would require the Sri Lankan military to withdraw from
all of its "high security zones," or just from some of
them.)

-- Human Rights: The document says that "the people of
the north/east shall be accorded all rights as are
provided under international human rights law and all
actions of the ISGA shall conform to internationally
accepted standards of human rights protection." To
ensure this, there will be an ISGA-appointed
"independent" human rights commission.

-- Religion: No religious faith shall be given the
"foremost place" in the north/east. (Note: The Sri
Lankan Constitution gives Buddhism the "foremost place
in the country.")

-- Constitutional Issue: It is not clear whether the
Tigers consider the ISGA to flow from the Sri Lankan
Constitution or not. It appears possible that the group
believes that the ISGA could be encompassed by the 13th
Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution which merged
the north and east per the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord.
Because of the sharp political controversy over the
Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, implementing legislation for the
13th Amendment has never been passed and a national
referendum has never taken place to approve it.

================================
Proposals garner Mixed Reaction
================================


8. (C) Reaction to the Tigers' counterproposals has
been mixed. While President Kumaratunga has not yet
issued a formal reaction, she indicated publicly on
November 2 that she thought the Tiger document was too
far-reaching, but she did not elaborate. In the
meantime, her party, the People's Alliance (PA), is
reportedly studying the document, but -- as of mid-day
November 3 -- has not issued a formal statement as of
yet. The PA is expected to hold a press conference late
November 3 to discuss the LTTE counterproposals


9. (C) There has already been negative feedback from
Muslims and the radical Marxist Janatha Vimukthi
Peramuna (JVP):

-- Muslims: From London where he is visiting, SLMC
leader Rauf Hakeem publicly rejected the Tigers'
counterproposals, characterizing them as "unacceptable"
and stating that they did not reflect the "aspirations"
of the Muslim people. Muslims, who "are concerned about
living in a LTTE-dominated structure," need "firm and
legal" protections in the north/east, Hakeem said.
Hakeem has called for a meeting with fellow Muslim MPs
to discuss next steps.

-- JVP: As could have been predicted, the radical JVP
reacted swiftly and strongly against the
counterproposals, with JVP Secretary General Tilvin
Silva asserting to the press on November 2 that the
proposals laid the foundation for a "separate state,"
and that the GSL should not even discuss them. JVP MP
Wimal Weerawansa characterized the counterproposals as a
"stepping-stone to Tamil Eelam."


10. (C) Other interlocutors were considerably more
balanced in their comments, expressing some concerns but
noting that the way now seemed open for a return to
negotiations:

-- Buddhist Clergy: Initial reaction by Buddhist clergy
was moderate in tone, with the Mahanayake (leader) of
the important Malwatte temple in Kandy stating publicly
that "we should not disrupt the peace process at any
cost" and calling for open discussion of the
counterproposals. Expanding on the Mahanayake's
comments, another Malwatte temple official, Dehideniye
Rathanasara, told Mission that it was a positive
development that the GSL had been able to get the Tigers
to formalize their ideas on power-sharing. Rathanasara
expressed concern, however, about the future of the Sri
Lanka military in the north/east, feeling that the GSL's
forces must not be withdrawn.

-- Civil Society: Local think-tank commentators were
relatively upbeat in their remarks. Kethesh Loganathan,
an analyst at the Center for Policy Alternatives, told
poloff that submission of the counterproposals was a
constructive step. Jehan Perera, media director for the
National Peace Council, agreed, remarking that he saw
the situation as a net positive as the LTTE and the GSL
clearly wanted to move forward and restart negotiations.

=======
COMMENT
=======


11. (C) In our estimation, the issuance of the
counterproposals -- although they are extreme in some
aspects -- is a potentially vital step forward for the
peace process. Since the Tigers pulled out of the talks
in April, the process has basically been on ice, with
Sri Lankans enjoying the considerable fruits of a "no
war, no peace" situation, but without there being
measurable movement toward an interim or final
settlement. Now, with the LTTE for the first time ever
providing a set of comprehensive proposals, the two
sides have something new and important to debate in
face-to-face talks.


12. (C) That said, the test for real progress will be
whether the LTTE shows flexibility in these talks, or
whether it considers its counterproposals its
irreducible bottom-line. Based on Norwegian
interactions with the group over the past several
months, Tomas Stangeland told us that he thought the
group would be willing to be flexible to some extent.
Other observers, however, doubt that this is the case
given the group's tendency to veer toward the hard line.
If the Tigers are not willing to do some give-and-take,
that could spark turbulence in the south. Overall, as
with much of the peace process dating back to its
inception in December 2001, progress hinges to a large
extent on the LTTE's realization that "all or nothing"
will not do. END COMMENT.


13. (U) Minimize considered.

ENTWISTLE