C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001453

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08-20-13
TAGS: PGOV PINS PTER PHUM CE NO FR LTTE
SUBJECT: No movement regarding Tiger camp, as GSL
reviews next steps; Tensions spike in the east

Refs: Colombo 1425, and previous

(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Charge'
d'Affaires. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: There has been no movement regarding
the unauthorized Tiger camp in the east. As the
Norwegian facilitators continue to work on the issue,
key ministers are giving us differing views on the
possibility that the GSL may use force to try to resolve
matters. In other peace track developments, tensions
have spiked in the east with Muslims blaming the Tigers
for a rash of recent killings. As the Tigers head to
Paris to review the government's proposal for governing
the north/east, the on-the-ground situation is growing
increasingly fractious. END SUMMARY.

===================
No Movement on Camp
===================


2. (C) There has been no movement regarding the
unauthorized Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
camp located in Trincomalee District in the east.
According to reports from the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM), which has ruled that the LTTE's presence
in the area violates the February 2002 ceasefire accord
(see Reftels), the "Wan Ela" camp is still occupied by
LTTE personnel. The SLMM regularly sends patrols to the
area of the camp, which is located in Kinniya near
Trincomalee city, but has detected no change in the
camp's setup. Tomas Stangeland, a Norwegian Embassy
poloff, told us on August 20 that the GoN continues to
raise the issue with the LTTE, urging the group to
comply fully with the SLMM's ruling. Stangeland related
that his embassy's latest communication with the Tigers
had taken place on August 19 and had not yielded any
sign that the group planned to dismantle the camp
anytime soon. Stangeland exhibited a high degree of
exasperation with the LTTE's intransigence over the
issue, but said he hoped the Tigers would reconsider

their hard-line stance at their upcoming meeting in
Paris (see Para five).

====================
GSL Mulls Next Steps
====================


3. (C) As the camp issue continues to simmer, key
ministers involved in peace process issues are giving us
differing views on the possibility that the Sri Lankan
government may use force to try to resolve matters. In
an August 18 meeting, Milinda Moragoda, Minister of
Economic Reforms, told the Charge' that the government
is losing patience with the LTTE's refusal to vacate the
camp. Moragoda stated that the GSL "reserved the right
for military action," but that any move would not take
place until September, if then. He went on to state
that if any action was taken it would be a "police
action," with the military in a supporting role if
needed. Moragoda described himself as somewhat
"hawkish" on the issue, much more, he said, than Prime
Minister Wickremesinghe. With Moragoda's threat to use
force still ringing in his ears, the Charge' heard a
contrary view of the issue in a conversation with
Minister of Constitutional Affairs G.L. Peiris later on
August 18. When queried about the camp issue and the
GSL's reaction, Peiris -- who generally takes a "soft"
stance re the LTTE -- replied that there was "no way"
the government would undertake a police or military
action to expel the LTTE from the camp since such a move
could trigger a quick return to general hostilities.


4. (C) Asked about the GSL's somewhat confused stance
on the camp, Stangeland remarked that his impression was
that the government was seriously mulling over what to
do, but had taken no decision to use force. Stangeland
said he hoped the GSL abstained from force as "the
situation could really get out of hand if there was a
land confrontation" between the two sides.
(Note: Since the peace process began in December 2001,
there has been no serious military confrontation between
the two sides on land. There have been several deadly
confrontations at sea, however.)

===============
Tigers to Paris
===============


5. (C) Amid the continuing tensions over the camp, a
Tiger delegation left Colombo for Paris early August 20
to attend a Norwegian-facilitated conference focusing on
the government's recent north/east interim arrangement
proposal. Stangeland confirmed that S.P. Thamilchelvam,
the LTTE's political chief, was the head of the Tiger
delegation. Karuna, the LTTE military chief in the
east, was also on the delegation. In Paris, the LTTE
team will meet up with pro-LTTE Tamils from Canada, the
UK, Australia, the U.S., etc., who are also attending
the conference. It is not certain whether chief LTTE
negotiator Anton Balasingham will participate.
Stangeland said the meeting was slated to begin on
August 21 and last for about a week. Norwegian
facilitators were set to participate in the last couple
of days of the conference, he noted.

==========================
Tensions Spike in the East
==========================


6. (C) In other peace track developments, tensions have
spiked in the east, with Muslims blaming the Tigers for
four recent killings. The Tigers have not accepted
responsibility for the slayings of the Muslims, although
most observers believe they are to blame. Details of
the killings follow:

-- On August 13, two Muslim postal workers were shot and
killed near Trincomalee city. In protest, Muslims
sponsored hartals (work stoppages) throughout the
Eastern Province and the situation was described by
contacts as "very tense." Following the killings, two
Muslims were abducted near Trincomalee city by suspected
LTTE militants on August 16, but were later released.

-- On August 17, two Muslim farmers were shot and killed
in Samanthurai town in Ampara district. In protest,
Muslims sponsored more hartals, as well as rallies and
demonstrations throughout the east.


7. (SBU) Reacting to the spike in communal tensions,
the GSL sent additional military units to the east.
Police units were also dispatched following an incident
on August 16 in which four police officers were injured
as they tried to disperse an angry mob near Mutur, a
Muslim-dominated town in the east. Police imposed a
dusk-to-dawn curfew in Mutur and at some other sites
along the eastern coast.


8. (C) Muslim politicians have expressed outrage about
the killings. Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader
and Minister of Ports Rauf Hakeem rushed to the east on
August 18 to assess the situation. Hakeem said the
government was not doing enough to protect Muslims and
urged it to do more to restrain the LTTE. Addressing
reporters on August 19, Hakeem stated that "the LTTE is
trying to intimidate Muslims and make them servile."
Hakeem further noted that his future support for the
governing coalition would be conditional on Muslim
representation as a separate participant in any peace
talks with the LTTE that take place. (In the past,
Muslims participated in the talks as members of the
government's delegation.) In other Muslim reaction,
Ferial Ashraff, head of the National Unity Alliance
(NUA) party and a MP with close links to President
Kumaratunga, ominously demanded that the government take
action before Muslim youths were compelled to take up
arms against the LTTE.

=======
COMMENT
=======


9. (C) It is encouraging news that the Tigers are
meeting in Paris at such a high level to review the
government's north/east administration proposal. The
Tigers have seemed to go out of their way to flag their
interest in the proposal and their possible interest in
returning to the face-to-face talks. All of this seems
to be a net positive for the peace process. As
witnessed by the unresolved camp issue, the killings of
the Muslims in the east, and the larger issues of LTTE
assassinations of Tamil opponents, however, the on-the-
ground situation is growing increasingly fractious, with
the cumulative weight of the Tigers' nasty behavior
steadily adding up. Although support for the peace
track remains strong among the general public, patience
with the Tigers will inevitably sail downward if they
fail to curb the violence and aggressive behavior. END
COMMENT.


10. (U) Minimize considered.

ENTWISTLE