C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001425

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, EUR/NB; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08-14-13
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS CE NO JA LTTE
SUBJECT: No breakthroughs in meeting with Tigers, but
Norwegian facilitators emerge with some confidence

Refs: (A) Oslo 1645 (Notal)

- (B) Colombo 1419, and previous

(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Charge'
d'Affaires. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In an August 13 meeting with the
Charge', Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim and Norwegian
Ambassador Brattskar said the atmospherics of their
meeting with the Tigers earlier that day had been
positive. They said they had discussed the Tigers'
upcoming meeting in Paris. Re contentious matters, the
Tigers reiterated that they had no plans to vacate a
base in the east and denied involvement in a spate of
killings of Tamil opponents. Queried by Charge' about a
Japanese MFA document setting out possible next steps
post-Tokyo, the GoN side said they continued to review
it, but saw some problems. Although the meeting with
the Tigers did not lead to any breakthroughs, the
Norwegians seemed relatively optimistic about the state
of the peace track. END SUMMARY.

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Norwegians meet with the Tigers
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2. (C) Late August 13, the Charge' (accompanied by
polchief) met with Norwegian Special Envoy Erik Solheim,
who is on an August 12-15 visit to Sri Lanka, and
Ambassador to Sri Lanka Hans Brattskar. The focus of
the discussion was the Norwegians' meeting earlier in
the day with S.P. Thamilchelvam, the political chief of
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Solheim
said the atmospherics of the two hour meeting, which had
taken place in the LTTE administrative center of
Kilinochchi in the north, had been quite positive.
Thamilchelvam, as is his customary style, had been
professional and polite, listening keenly to the
Norwegians. He seemed serious and businesslike, even
when the GoN team raised contentious issues. Based on
what he had heard, Solheim said he felt that the LTTE

appeared committed to cooperating with the facilitation
effort and moving forward with the peace process.
Solheim confirmed he would travel to Batticaloa District
in the east on August 14 to assess the situation there.

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Upcoming meeting in Paris
--------------


3. (C) With respect to the substance of the discussions
with Thamilchelvam, Solheim related that the first item
on the agenda was the Tigers' upcoming meeting in Paris
(see Reftels). The meeting was slated to begin on or
about August 20 (there are reports the dates could slip
by a week or so) and would continue for about 10 days.
About 20 Tamils were scheduled to attend, with
participants roughly split between those from the LTTE,
led by Thamilchelvam himself, and those from outside Sri
Lanka, including one from the U.S. (Note: We think
this was a reference to V. Rudrakumar, a pro-LTTE lawyer
based in the U.S.) The French government, Solheim said,
was only providing visas for the meeting and nothing
else. The Norwegian embassy in Paris was still scouting
for a suitable venue for the meeting and it would
probably take place in the city's suburbs. Solheim said
he might participate in the latter stages of the meeting
per a request he had received from the LTTE. Brattskar
said he might also travel to Paris if his schedule
allowed it.


4. (C) Solheim and Brattskar confirmed that the Paris
meeting's focus would be on constitutional/legal issues.
Specifically, the participants in the meeting were
supposed to come up with ideas on how the LTTE should
respond to the GSL's recent proposal setting out
possible modalities of forming a Tiger-dominated interim
administration in the north/east. Counter-proposals
agreed to at the meeting would then be taken to the LTTE
leadership in northern Sri Lanka for review. The LTTE
would then get in touch with the Norwegians who, in
turn, would pass the finally agreed on LTTE set of
counter-proposals to the government. Solheim expressed
confidence that the LTTE would put forward a written
document rather than just rejecting or finding fault
with the government's proposal. Brattskar, who said the
LTTE's counter-proposals would probably be "tough, but
manageable," estimated that this whole process could
take several weeks. While there were no guarantees and
many things could happen, Brattskar continued, it was
possible that GSL-LTTE talks could resume in the October
timeframe.

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Tigers hold the line on base in east
--------------


5. (C) Turning to an issue that has raised tensions in
recent weeks, Solheim confirmed that he had urged the
LTTE to dismantle its "Wan Ela" base near Trincomalee in
the Eastern Province. Solheim said he had underlined
that the situation was proving an embarrassment for the
facilitation effort and the monitors. In response,
Thamilchelvam said the Tigers were fully committed to
adhering to the rulings of the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM). The Tigers, however, felt strongly that
the SLMM's ruling regarding the base was wrong. The
base, in fact, had not been constructed in government-
held territory recently and thus did not violate the
February 2002 ceasefire accord as the SLMM had ruled.
The base, Thamilchelvam asserted, had actually been
there for many years and LTTE "martyrs'" graves were
located in the vicinity of the site. For these reasons,
Thamilchelvam said, the LTTE's local commanders did not
want to give up the base.


6. (C) Reflecting on Thamilchelvam's comments, Solheim
remarked that he thought the Tigers' stance on the base
issue was a hard one. That said, Thamilchelvam had
indicated that he would take the Norwegians' request for
the LTTE to dismantle the base back to LTTE leader V.
Prabhakaran for further review. Solheim told the
Charge' that there did not seem to be any "strategic"
reason the Tigers had to hold onto the site. This might
mean that maybe there was some way the LTTE could
gradually climb down from its hard-line stance and find
a "creative way" to vacate the base in the near-term.
In any case, he commented, the Norwegians would continue
to work on the issue with the LTTE, hoping that
continuous interventions would have some constructive
effect on Tiger thinking.

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Issue of Killings
--------------


7. (C) The two Norwegians told the Charge' they also
had bearded Thamilchelvam on the dozens of killings of
Tamils perpetrated by the LTTE over the past year. As
the group has on multiple occasions, Brattskar said
Thamilchelvam denied any Tiger culpability in the
killings. He blamed other anti-LTTE Tamil groups for
what had transpired and said the government needed to do
a better job of investigating the crimes. Brattskar
said the Norwegian side had underlined that the killings
were doing serious damage to the Tigers' reputation in
the international community and raising distrust of the
peace track in the south. Solheim added that the LTTE
had stopped other forms of terrorist activities in the
past two years, such as suicide bombings, so there was
hope that the group would eventually abandon the
practice of assassinating its opponents. Norway would
continue to raise the issue with the LTTE every time it
could, he stressed.
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Japanese MFA Document
--------------


8. (C) Shifting gears, the Charge' asked Solheim and
Brattskar for the GoN's view of a document drafted by
the Japanese MFA setting out possible next steps post-
Tokyo donors conference. (Note: This document was
class e-mailed to SA/INS and analyzed in Ref B.)
Brattskar stated that Oslo had not yet finished its
review of the document. Brattskar noted that he had
expressed unhappiness with a clause mentioning
"monitoring and review" of the progress of the peace
process when he was provided the document by Japanese
MFA official Takio Yamada last week. Such a review did
not seem necessary, he said. Other aspects of the
document also needed to be better defined. Brattskar
went on to indicate that he thought the Japanese were
being a bit clumsy, and there needed to be further
clarification of the exact responsibilities of Norway
and Japan on peace process issues. Nonetheless,
Brattskar and Solheim emphasized that the GoN
appreciated Japan's efforts and its desire to take on a
more important role internationally. Norway also
understood that Japan was the largest donor to Sri Lanka
and deserved a special role. Brattskar said he planned
to speak to Japanese Ambassador Seiichiro Otsuka about
the document once the latter returned from vacation.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) Although the meeting with the Tigers did not lead
to any breakthroughs, the Norwegians seemed relatively
optimistic about the state of the peace track. Their
basic focus, which seems sensible to us, is to work all
the angles possible to try to get the LTTE back to the
direct talks. Without the talks, there is little doubt
that tensions on-the-ground, such as over the base in
the east, become that much harder to deal with.
Solheim, who has a lot of experience with the LTTE,
seemed to think that the group still wanted to play ball
despite its stance on the base and the killings of Tamil
opponents. That is good news, though the Norwegians --
correctly in our view -- underscored that the situation
remained fragile. The Charge' expressed our support for
the Norwegian facilitation effort, noting that we were
committed to helping anyway we could. END COMMENT.


10. (U) Minimize considered.

ENTWISTLE