Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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03COLOMBO1284 | 2003-07-23 11:04:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Colombo |
1. (C) SUMMARY: In a July 23 meeting, Tilvin Silva, leader of the radical JVP party, asserted that the GSL's recent proposal on forming an interim structure in the north/east would give the Tigers too much power. He also claimed that the Norwegian facilitators were biased toward the Tigers. The JVP remained committed to forming an alliance with the president's party. Based on Silva's comments, the JVP has not climbed down a wit from its long-standing anti-peace process views. END SUMMARY. 2. (C) MEETING WITH RADICAL PARTY LEADER: Polchief and poloff met July 23 with Tilvin Silva, the General Secretary of the Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) SIPDIS ("People's Liberation Front"). The meeting took place at the JVP's headquarters in a large house in a non- descript Colombo suburb. Fitting with its radical image, the party's offices were modestly furnished (no bourgeois elements here!) and festooned with large pictures of "revolutionary" heroes, including Marx, Lenin, and Guevara. There was also a large picture of Rohana Wijeweera, the JVP's founder, looking more than a bit like Che thanks to a beard and beret with a red star on it. (Note: Wijeweera, who led failed insurrections against the government in the 1970's and 1980's, was slain by security forces in November 1989. Through the 1990's, the JVP, which now professes a commitment to democracy, has steadily gained in elections and now holds 16 seats in Parliament. End Note.) While he clearly understands some English, Silva spoke in Sinhala throughout the meeting. (Note: The JVP is an overwhelmingly Sinhalese party and its officials make a conscious choice to speak Sinhala, the "mother tongue.") 3. (C) HITTING OUT AT THE PEACE PROCESS: Silva used much of the meeting to flay the government's effort to achieve a negotiated settlement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). While sticking to his typically low-key style, Silva exuded a strong sense of purpose in the process, indicating no lessening in the JVP's long-standing hard-line stance against the peace track. (Note: For bio-data on Silva, who served time in prison during the 1988-89 JVP uprising -- see Ref B.) 4. (C) Silva, specifically, criticized the GSL's recent proposal setting out modalities on forming an interim structure in the north/east. (Note: Per Ref A, the Norwegian government facilitators provided the proposal to the LTTE last week and the Tigers continue to review it.) Silva claimed that the proposal provides the Tigers too much power in running the north/east. In addition, the proposal did not provide enough protections to minority communities, such as the Muslims and the Sinhalese. While underscoring his party's support for an end to the war, Silva said peace could only come about through the disarmament of the LTTE, which had created an "illegal" military force. In response, polchief underscored U.S. support for the peace process, urging the JVP to work with the government on this key issue of national importance. 5. (C) NORWEGIANS COME IN FOR SOME FLAK: Regarding Norway's role, Silva had no/no words of support. The JVP, he said, believed that the Norwegians were no longer acting as a "facilitator," but were increasingly acting as a "mediator," recommending items to the parties and, thus, trying to "direct" their course of action. This was unacceptable to an independent country. Moreover, the Norwegian government and the Norwegian-run Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) had generally shown themselves to be pro-LTTE. As an example of this, he said the SLMM should not have recommended that the government recognize the legitimacy of the "Sea Tigers," the LTTE's naval force. (Note: Silva got this wrong: the SLMM, reacting to several violent confrontations at sea, had earlier this year offered to work with the GSL and the Tigers on ways to avoid incidents. The SLMM never said the government should "recognize" the Sea Tigers, however.) Polchief remarked that the JVP should reconsider its view of the GoN effort; the Norwegians really wanted what was best for Sri Lanka and were in no way biased toward the Tigers. 6. (C) JVP STILL WANTS AN ALLIANCE: When queried, Silva replied that the JVP still wanted to ally itself with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), the key constituent element in President Kumaratunga's People's Alliance (PA). Shooting down reports to the contrary, Silva said there had been no delay in forming the alliance: the two parties were still negotiating a joint framework, which should be completed soon. The major factor propelling the JVP's desire to form the alliance, he continued, was the need to bring down the United National Party (UNP) government, which was "ruining" the country. If a SLFP-JVP alliance was reached and took power, the JVP would seriously consider assuming ministerial positions. (Note: This view re ministries is new. The PA and the JVP formed a pact in late 2001 in which the JVP backed the faltering PA government in Parliament. The JVP refused to assume ministerial positions at that time. The pact later lapsed.) 7. (C) COMMENT: Based on Silva's comments, the JVP has not climbed down a wit from its long-standing anti-peace process views. It is hard to assess how dangerous the party is to the peace track. If the JVP does link up with President Kumaratunga and her party, it may have a shot at being in the next government, which would be a serious blow to the peace process. As an independent force, however, the party is a bit marginal: it can stir up demonstrations, etc., but otherwise has little leverage. Some observers say, however, that the party may be gaining strength in the rural Sinhalese heartland and be on its way to becoming even more of an electoral force than it already is. (Note: In the last election in December 2001, the JVP won almost 10 percent of the vote, an impressive total for a hard-line left wing party in Sri Lanka.) END COMMENT. 8. (U) Minimized considered. ENTWISTLE |