C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 001256

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2013
TAGS: CE PGOV PREL LTTE
SUBJECT: NEW PROPOSAL GOES TO LTTE

Classified By: CHARGE DON CAMP; REASONS 1.5 B, D.


1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 17, the Norwegians conveyed to
the LTTE the new GSL proposal to try to lure the LTTE back to
the negotiating table. We may not know for several weeks
whether it will be successful, but the 19-month old ceasefire
does not seem at risk. President Kumaratunga,s own
political plans are the biggest uncertainty and a potential
threat to the process. Cohabitation strains between the
President and PM are as serious as ever. If the President is
successful in her efforts either to align with the Sinhalese
chauvinist JVP party or to attract dissidents from the ruling
party, she could attempt to topple the current government.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In a meeting with Charge, G.L. Peiris, a key
minister involved in peace process issues, confirmed that
Norwegian special envoy Jon Westborg carried to the LTTE
&capital8 of Kilinochchi July 17 the GSL proposal for a
provisional administrative structure for the north and east
of Sri Lanka. He is to report back to Peiris tonight (July
17), but the LTTE is not expected to respond substantively
until it has had a chance to study the proposal and pass it
through their represenatives outside Sri Lanka, including
Balasingham. Though the GSL is keeping the details to
itself, the PM in a July 16 meeting and .Peiris have shared
with us some of the details. LTTE representatives would
have a majority on the &apex body8 of the structure. The
government would also be represented (including
representatives from the President,s party, according to the
PM) as would the Muslem community. Peiris stressed that
this proposal was the basic minimum the LTTE could accept as
well as being (barely) acceptable to representatives of the
east,s Moslems. Peiris also said that the proposal
incorporated another principle (borrowed from proposals made
in Quebec and northern Ireland disputes) requiring that any
issue affecting the &vital interests8 of a minority
community (Sinhalese or Muslim) would also require a majority
vote of that community,s representatives in the apex body.


3. (C) The President,s political plans continue to roil the
waters in Colombo, and have potentially serious consequences
for the peace process. The long-discussed alliance with
the far-left and anti-peace process JVP is perhaps the most
problematic, since the JVP reportedly would want ) at a
minimum ) to renegotiate the MOU with the LTTE that
initiated the peace process. There is increasing backlash
against the proposed tieup, however, and the papers recently
claimed the President,s non-political children were
questioning how the party could countenance an alliance with
the killers of their father. (Note: Vijaya Kumaratunga was
gunned down in 1988. The JVP is accused of perpetrating the
killing, but it has never been proven.) There are also
rumors that the President is trying to lure away members of
the UNP government. We have not confirmed these reports, or
their success.


4. (C) The President must in any case be convinced she can
improve her position in parliament with either alliance.
The politicians and the astrologers are both reportedly
telling her that the coming months are the best time for a
move to topple the UNP government or perhaps call fresh
elections; she would like to have a government in place
before the provincial council elections next April.
Elections would disrupt the process and a PA-led government
would threaten the existing talks; LTTE political leader S.P.
Thamilchelvam has said they will not negotiate with
Kumaratunga.


5. (C) COMMENT: The good news is the general assumption in
Colombo and the north that the ceasefire is not currently
threatened. The LTTE is relatively content with the status
quo, in which it controls much of the northern Vanni and
parts of the east, while exercising considerable influence in
the government-controlled Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE
collects substantial revenue from customs duties in its
region as well as taxation of businesses and Tamils
individuals in the Vanni and Jaffna. Independent estimates
in Colombo put the revenue as high as 30 million US dollars
per year. The government too desperately wants to retain the
ceasefires the twentieth anniversary approaches (July 23) of
the 1983 riots that set off the insurgency, the ceasefire is
seen as the major achievement of this government. The
peace too has given the government some breathing space for
the economic reform and investment programs it has initiated.
There is hope in Colombo, but always tinged with memories
of dashed hopes of previous years. END COMMENT.
CAMP