Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03COLOMBO1025
2003-06-12 09:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

Tigers stick to hard-line stance, essentially

Tags:  PGOV PTER KPAO CE JA NO LTTE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001025 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, SA/PD; NSC FOR

E. MILLARD

LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-12-13
TAGS: PGOV PTER KPAO CE JA NO LTTE
SUBJECT: Tigers stick to hard-line stance, essentially
rejecting Tokyo's call to re-engage GSL right away

Refs: (A) Ops Center/Colombo 06-12-13 telecon

- (B) Colombo-SA/INS 06/11/03 unclass e-mail
- (C) Colombo 1018, and previous
- (D) Tokyo 3772, and previous (Notal)

(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.
Reasons: 1.5 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001025

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, SA/PD; NSC FOR

E. MILLARD

LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-12-13
TAGS: PGOV PTER KPAO CE JA NO LTTE
SUBJECT: Tigers stick to hard-line stance, essentially
rejecting Tokyo's call to re-engage GSL right away

Refs: (A) Ops Center/Colombo 06-12-13 telecon

- (B) Colombo-SA/INS 06/11/03 unclass e-mail
- (C) Colombo 1018, and previous
- (D) Tokyo 3772, and previous (Notal)

(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.
Reasons: 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Reacting with haste to the Tokyo
donors conference, the Tamil Tigers restated their view
that the GSL must take quick steps to form an interim
structure in the north/east. The Tigers also
underscored that they did not accept the understandings
reached at Tokyo. In spite of the stark message, the
government has little choice but to keep plugging away
as it tries to break the deadlock. Suggested press
guidance is contained in Para 9. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) TIGER STATEMENT: Not wasting much time, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) organization has
reacted to the Tokyo donors conference. (Note: Please
see Refs C-D for reporting on the Tokyo conference,
which was held June 9-10.) As is the group's recent
custom, the LTTE response -- which was relatively terse
by Tiger standards -- was posted on the pro-LTTE website
"TamilNet." (Note: The statement was issued late June
11 local time and was passed to SA/INS in Ref B. We are
not certain whether the "TamilNet" text contained all of
the statement, but it seemed to encapsulate the main
points. Also, while most LTTE statements are issued in
the name of its London-based spokesman Anton
Balasingham, this one was characterized as an "official"
message from the group's "headquarters" in northern Sri
Lanka.)


3. (SBU) In the statement, the LTTE stuck to its recent
hard-line stance, essentially demanding that the GSL
take quick steps to give the group interim control of
the north/east. (Note: Since late April when the LTTE
left the peace talks and said it would not participate
at Tokyo, the group has been harping on the issue of
forming an interim structure in the north/east -- see

Ref C.) Denigrating the remarks made on the topic by
Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe at Tokyo,
the LTTE stated:

"We are disappointed to note that the prime minister's
statement does not offer anything new...The prime
minister has not responded to our call for a draft
framework for an innovative and effective political-
administrative structure. Contrary to Mr.
Wickremesinghe's statement to the international donor
community, we seriously differ in perception in
connection with what the LTTE leadership proposes and
what his government offers. While our leadership has
proposed an interim administrative framework, a
political-administrative structure for the northeast
with wider participation of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan
government has offered a council with a structure and
mechanism for the development of the region."


4. (SBU) Regarding Tokyo, the LTTE made clear that it
resented the government's interactions with the donors,
stating:

"The compulsions that arose from severe economic and
political bankruptcy have compelled the government to
seek the ultimate refuge in the so-called `international
safety net' to resolve the economic and political crisis
of the country. By seeking this `safety net' the
Colombo regime has shifted the peace process from third
party facilitation to the realm of international
arbitration by formidable external forces that has far-
reaching consequences for the political and economic
destiny of the island."


5. (SBU) Finally, noting that it was not present at
Tokyo (though not mentioning that this was its own
choice),the statement underlined that the Tigers did
not feel bound by understandings reached there, stating:

"The LTTE was not involved in the deliberations or in
the formulation of these declarations. We have not been
consulted on the set of propositions and resolutions
enunciated in the Tokyo Declaration. The Colombo
government, with the active assistance of the
facilitator and its international `tactical allies' has
formulated this strategic paper to superimpose its own
agenda on the LTTE. This is unacceptable to us."


6. (C) GSL REVIEWING STATEMENT: As of late June 12
(local),the government has not yet responded to this
latest LTTE message. Ambassador Nanda Godage, a
director at the GSL's Peace Secretariat, told us that
the government was carefully reviewing the message, but
had not yet decided how to respond. He said he thought
any response would take at least several days in coming,
as the GSL discussed the matter with the Norwegian
government facilitators and Japanese government
representatives. (Note: Per Refs B-C, there has been
some talk of Japanese representatives trying to meet
with the LTTE soon in order to brief the group on Tokyo
among other items. It is not clear, however, whether
these plans have been finalized.)


7. (C) OTHER REACTION: No one that Mission has touched
base with was particularly surprised by the substance of
the LTTE's June 11 statement. The general feeling was
that the group was simply restating its positions. In
discussions with contacts, two items that did stand out
were the following:

-- Speed of the response: Ambassador Godage told us
that he was a bit surprised by how quickly the LTTE
reacted to Tokyo. He said he had originally thought it
would take the group at least several days to mull
things over and get its reaction out. Instead, the
group took all of one day to send out a response.
Godage said he wondered whether the group, embarrassed
by the success of the Tokyo meeting, had decided to
react quickly and viscerally in re-emphasizing its hard-
line position.

-- Blunt tone: Other contacts flagged what they saw as
the very blunt tone of the LTTE's statement. Roman
Catholic Bishop for Jaffna Thomas Savundranayagam told
us that he thought the tone of the statement was quite
telling and indicated just how serious the group was on
the issue of an interim administration.


8. (C) COMMENT: In spite of the LTTE's stark message,
the government has little choice but to keep plugging
away as it tries to break the deadlock. The LTTE's
statement, unfortunately, gave the government very, very
little to work with. Despite calls at Tokyo for the
group to re-engage in the peace talks, for example, the
group gave zero indication that it planned to do this
soon. All in all, the latest statement serves to
highlight how difficult it is to deal with the LTTE,
especially in light of the group's truculent mood. END
COMMENT.


9. (SBU) SUGGESTED PRESS GUIDANCE: We recommend that
Department not comment on the LTTE's statement, allowing
the Sri Lankan government to have the spotlight. If
Department does make a comment, however, we would
suggest something along the following lines:

Begin text:

We regard the Tigers' reaction as precipitate. The
international community at the Tokyo conference
unanimously agreed that the Tigers should be invited to
take part in the development of Sri Lanka's north and
east. The Tigers should accept this invitation. The
details of a provisional arrangement in the north and
east should be worked out at the negotiating table.

End text.


10. (U) Minimize considered.

WILLS