EU ON CUBA: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 005113 SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CCA KEVIN WHITAKER, EUR/ERA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2013 TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV CU EUN USEU BRUSSELS SUBJECT: EU ON CUBA: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? REF: A. A) BRUSSELS 5073 ¶B. B) NIGRO-WHITAKER E-MAIL 10/24/03 ¶C. C) STATE 306443 ¶D. D) BRUSSELS 4451 Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: On November 5, Poloff discussed EU Cuba policy with Karl Buck, Latin America Division Chief in the EU Council Secretariat. He said the EU Latin America Working Group (COLAT) had affirmed unanimously on November 4 the punitive measures the EU had announced in June in response to Cuba's March crackdown. Buck said the EU was unsure of how to react to Cuba's current restriction of EU diplomats' access to Cuban officials. Buck said the U.S. ideas of (1) common U.S.-EU approaches to third countries on Cuba; and (2) restricting Cuban officials' visits to Europe found little resonance in the EU. Buck reported that a European Parliament committee had invited Cuban dissident Oswaldo Paya to Brussels. This conversation and the November 4 EU Explanation of Vote on the Cuban anti-embargo resolution at the UNGA strengthen our impression that we must keep pressure on the EU to remain firm in its condemnation of the Cuban human rights situation. End Summary. EU: DISSIDENTS TO NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS -------------- ¶2. (C) Poloff asked Buck how EU members had reacted to the decision of the Austrian embassy in Havana not to celebrate Austria's national day so as not to have to act upon the agreed EU policy of inviting Cuban dissidents to such occasions (ref B). Buck reported that the EU Latin America Working Group (COLAT) had affirmed unanimously on November 4 the punitive measures the EU had announced in June in response to Cuba's March crackdown, including the policy of inviting dissidents to national day celebrations of EU embassies in Havana. Buck said the COLAT agreed that the measures needed to be implemented by all EU member states so as not to allow Cuba to render EU policy ineffectual. EU STYMIED BY CUBAN FREEZE -------------- ¶3. (C) Continuing his report of the November 4 COLAT discussion, Buck said the EU was unsure of how to react to Cuba's restriction of EU diplomats' access to Cuban officials. He said some member states' Havana embassies were being granted almost no access at all to Cuban authorities, and the EU was worried that that would weaken its influence in Cuba. Here, Buck stressed that EU policy was to work toward a democratic transition through dialogue not only with civil society, but also with the Cuban government. Buck said the COLAT was considering possible "legal or political" measures in response to the Cuban access restrictions, but did not specify further. He said there was some disagreement on this among member states, with some advocating an escalation of EU measures against Cuba and others recommending a cautious approach. Buck offered his own view that the June punitive measures had been announced without thinking carefully enough about the possible consequences. Now, he said, the EU found itself between the rock of needing to react to the Cuban freeze and the hard place of not wanting to provoke even harsher Cuban measures. EU WOBBLY ON U.S. SUGGESTIONS -------------- ¶4. (C) On possible common U.S.-EU measures discussed at the U.S.-EU Latin America consultations September 19 (ref A), Buck said the ideas of common U.S.-EU approaches to third countries on Cuba and of restricting Cuban officials' visits to Europe found little resonance in the EU. He said that COLAT members found "no plusses" for the EU in common approaches to third countries, especially in reference to Latin American countries. He implied that the EU was worried that such common approaches would blur the line of demarcation between the U.S. and the EU that the EU wanted to maintain in its interaction with Latin American countries. He added the comment, "And if the Latin Americans say no, what then?" ¶5. (C) On restricting Cuban officials' visits to Europe, Buck said that the COLAT feared such a policy would only lessen Europe's influence over Cuba and possibly strengthen the Cuban resolve to freeze access of EU diplomats to GOC contacts in Havana. BUCK: GREEKS WON'T KEEP CASTRO FROM OLYMPICS -------------- ¶6. (C) In the context of Cuban visits to Europe, Buck volunteered his view on whether Greece was likely to refuse to invite Castro to visit the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens (ref C). He said the Greeks saw the spirit of the Games as being a "global truce," and opined that they, in that spirit, would not refuse to welcome Castro to Athens. PARLIAMENT INVITES PAYA -------------- ¶7. (C) Buck reported that the Chairman of the European Parliament (EP) Foreign Affairs Committee, Elmar Brok, had invited Cuban dissident Oswaldo Paya Sardinas to attend a Foreign Affairs Committee meeting in Brussels on December 1. Buck said that Brok had done this, as far as he knew, without consulting anyone outside of the EP. Buck went on to say that helping dissidents, which per se remains a good possibility for U.S.-EU cooperation, had been rendered more difficult since the GOC had managed to sew doubt as to whether those who purported to be dissidents were actually agents of the GOC (ref D). BLAND EU EOV ON CUBAN ANTI-EMBARGO RESOLUTION -------------- ¶8. (C) Buck supplied Poloff a copy of the November 4 EU Explanation of Vote (EOV) on the Cuban anti-embargo resolution at the UNGA, saying that all member states had agreed that the EOV should strongly condemn the human rights situation in Cuba. (EU member states voted unanimously in favor of the resolution condemning the U.S. embargo.) The EOV concentrates its criticism of the Cuban human rights record in two paragraphs out of the ten-paragraph EOV: "The European Union strongly condemns the serious deterioration of the human rights situation in Cuba. The increase in violations of human rights has raised an international wave of protests and condemnations and has increased the concern of the European Union about the political situation in Cuba....The European Union urges the Cuban authorities to bring about speedy, lasting and substantial improvements in the situation, in particular with a view to ensure the full respect for all human rights. In that connection, the European Union calls for the immediate release and full re-integration into society of all prisoners of conscience. We appeal to the Cuban authorities to cooperate fully with international human rights bodies and mechanisms. The European Union reaffirms its declaration made by the Presidency on 5 June 2003." One paragraph also addresses the need for economic reform in Cuba, another outlines the objectives of the EU Common Position on Cuba, and another paragraph criticizes the GOC restrictions imposed on EU embassies. COMMENT: EU WAVERING, WE SHOULD WEIGH IN -------------- ¶9. (C) It is clear to us that EU Cuba policy is still captive to differences among member states and somewhat immobilized by uncertainty about how to react to Cuban measures against EU diplomats. The EU's natural discomfort about getting tough with Cuba has been exacerbated by the Cubans' harsh response to the EU punitive measures announced in June. Although the injunction to invite dissidents remains in place, the Austrian decision in Havana not to celebrate its national day is an indication that EU embassies on the ground may have different views. It appears also that the EU has rejected the idea of adding to the punitive measures by, for example, restricting Cuban official visits to Europe. That said, the EU has reaffirmed publicly and privately its intention to continue its retaliatory response to the March crackdown. We should (1) work with sympathetic member states such as Spain and Italy to consolidate the little bit of progress made by the EU since June; and (2) take advantage of the EU's current uncertainty by offering them specific ideas on working with us to help dissidents while also continuing to push them -- carefully -- to increase incrementally their pressure on Cuba. END COMMENT. FOSTER