RFG: SHOULD THE EU BE INVOLVED WITH PSI?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004518 SIPDIS DEPT. FOR NP, T, EUR, EAP E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2013 TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL EUN USEU BRUSSELS SUBJECT: RFG: SHOULD THE EU BE INVOLVED WITH PSI? REF: A. STATE 254587 ¶B. ROME 3926 ¶C. ROME 3368 ¶D. PARIS 6747 ¶E. USEU TODAY 9/12/03 ¶F. USEU TODAY EXTRA 9/11/03 Classified By: USEU Polmiloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.5 (b),(d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 10. -------------- Summary -------------- ¶2. (C) At the September 16 meeting of the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC),PSC Ambassadors broadly supported the case for EU involvement in, or association with, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). They requested a Council briefing -- to be delivered at the September 29 Brussels GAERC (meeting of EU FMs) -- on PSI and the EU's role in that initiative. Council officials have requested our view on including the EU in PSI. Department guidance requested para 10. End Summary -------------- EU Says it Needs a Role in PSI -------------- ¶3. (C) Key non-proliferation experts in the Council and Commission say that the EU and member states support the PSI principles (ref. A),see them as conducive to the EU's draft non-proliferation Principles, and believe the EU should somehow have a role in the new initiative because it has competencies unavailable to EU member states on a bilateral basis. Italian MFA DG for Political Affairs Giancarlo Aragona made similar points to U/S Bolton on August 27 (ref. B). On September 10 in Brussels, Solana's senior foreign policy advisor, Council DG Robert Cooper, told EUR PDAS Ries that he wants to work with the U.S. on finding ways to permit all EU member states to "buy into" the PSI, without making PSI membership too unwieldy. The option currently favored by Cooper's principle policy planners, Antonio Tanca (Council Secretariat's chief non-proliferation policy expert) and John SIPDIS Mattiussi (UK FCO non-proliferation policy expert seconded to the Commission, but working also for Cooper),calls for an EU observership which would allow the EU to consult with PSI on Commission and Council Secretariat competencies, and assist dual EU-PSI members to meet their PSI commitments. Tanca and Mattiussi -- who also attended the September 3-4 Paris PSI meetings as nominal members of the Italian delegation -- request USG views as they begin drafting their recommendations. ¶4. (C) The EU supports PSI and the Statement of Interdiction Principles because they align in the EU's eyes with its Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD, released at the June 2003 EU Summit in Thessaloniki. Mattiussi described the relationship between the PSI Principles and EU Principles as "operationally consistent," and observed that the participation of EU member states in PSI is adding momentum to the EU's own nonproliferation objectives. (The EU's nonproliferation Principles are available online at http://ue.eu.int/en/summ.htm) Moreover, eight of the eleven PSI members are also EU member states (Poland is acceding). This represents almost three-quarters of the PSI, half of the EU at 15, and one third of the EU at ¶25. This significant numerical overlap means that PSI is a high profile issue for the EU. It also means that EU norms and exclusive institutional competencies will be important factors in the success or failure of PSI, particularly once interdictions begin. ¶5. (C) Dual EU-PSI members are reportedly pushing the EU on inclusion in part because they fear any potential for conflict between EU and PSI commitments. Interlocutors stress that EU institutions have regulatory authority and competencies in policy areas that make full PSI participation by EU member states difficult without EU assistance. They argue, for instance, that "Community" competencies in trade and border management could impact the outcome of certain interdictions -- perhaps not in the Pacific, but certainly in and around European waters and in transit points like Malta and Cyprus. "The effectiveness of PSI members in the EU is decreased if the EU is not involved," Tanca said, "because the EU has competencies in many areas affecting the ability of EU members to fulfill PSI commitments." Italian MFA DG Aragona also underscored this point to U/S Bolton during their August 27 meeting in Rome (ref. B). ¶6. (C) Mattiussi, who was present at the September 16 PSC, reports that only a few of the "smaller states" were "more cautious" about an EU role in PSI. (Cooper said that some non-PSI member states had "lingering suspicions" about the initiative.) But Mattiussi assessed that these states would come over to the majority view once they better understood PSI and the issues at stake. Otherwise, all the EU's more influential states and institutional organs were unanimous in their desire to see the EU somehow involved in PSI. Asked whether any of the EU-25 preferred universal PSI inclusion for all EU member states bilaterally, instead of or in addition to EU institutional involvement, Mattiussi said that during the September 16 PSC discussion, member states "did not raise the idea of 25 EU members in PSI." -------------- -------------- Delivering 25 Countries With Only One Observership -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) The perception of Tanca and Mattiussi is that the PSI group "is almost too large already." Cooper agrees, and has tasked Tanca and Mattiussi with drafting a paper on how to get all EU member states on board without making the membership too unwieldy. In their internal consultations with EU and member state officials, Mattiussi and Tanca are therefore stressing the U.S. concept of PSI as "an activity rather than an organization" (Mattuissi says the UK also adopted this phrase in a recently circulated paper). They say that one purpose of the paper is to pre-empt any suggestions that all 15(25) EU member states should be included in PSI by instead focusing on PSI as an activity and supporting observer status for the EU Troika (comprised of current and upcoming Presidency countries, the Council Secretariat, and the Commission). They seek a role for the SIPDIS EU that could deliver results from the EU-25 without adding 25 new delegations to PSI. The extent to which others share this sentiment, however, is unclear. Tanca reports that in recent non-proliferation coordinating group meetings, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Hungary -- "among others" -- have all asked EU partners when they would be invited to join PSI. ¶8. (C) In the forefront of options being discussed is the possibility of granting PSI observer status to the EU. Many believe that as an observer, the EU could add value to PSI by serving as a clearinghouse of EU competencies and a facilitator of dual PSI-EU member capabilities. Tanca and Mattiussi argue that this option would allow the EU to assist dual EU-PSI members in meeting PSI commitments. They suggest also that EU institutional elements involved in PSI would be able to see pending PSI-EU conflicts in advance, and work quietly within the EU and/or PSI contexts to smooth them over before they become apparent to non-PSI insiders. The EU would also be in a position to coordinate the counter-proliferation efforts of non-PSI EU members, in accordance with EU rules, and EU and PSI Principles. -------------- How it Might Work -------------- ¶9. (C) The current favored option foresees something like a two-thirds EU observership. When one of the 7(8) dual EU-PSI members holds the EU presidency, the EU would observe and consult in PSI proceedings as part of the EU presidency's delegation. The precedent for this was set in Paris by the participation in the Italian PSI delegation of Tanca and Mattiussi (who alternated attendance). After the EU grows to 25 member states in May 2004, this would work one-third of the time (when one of the enlarged EU's eight dual EU-PSI members serves as EU Council Presidency). The remaining two-thirds of the time the EU would have its own Troika-format observer status in PSI. Other options have been floated, but as PSI position drafters, Mattiussi and Tanca favor this one because it puts what they see as a minimal EU footprint on PSI while also allowing the EU to add value. -------------- RFG: USG Views Sought -------------- ¶10. (C) RFG: Tanca and Mattiussi are asking for USG views on any form of EU participation in PSI, especially in the manner outlined here. They appear to be acting on Cooper's commitment to work with the USG as the EU explores ideas for an EU role in PSI. Mission requests Department guidance on what we can tell the EU about its bid for PSI participation. Schnabel