RFG: SHOULD THE EU BE INVOLVED WITH PSI?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004518

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR NP, T, EUR, EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2013
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: RFG: SHOULD THE EU BE INVOLVED WITH PSI?

REF: A. STATE 254587


B. ROME 3926

C. ROME 3368

D. PARIS 6747

E. USEU TODAY 9/12/03

F. USEU TODAY EXTRA 9/11/03

Classified By: USEU Polmiloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.5 (b),(d)


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 10.

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Summary
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2. (C) At the September 16 meeting of the EU's Political and
Security Committee (PSC),PSC Ambassadors broadly supported
the case for EU involvement in, or association with, the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). They requested a
Council briefing -- to be delivered at the September 29
Brussels GAERC (meeting of EU FMs) -- on PSI and the EU's
role in that initiative. Council officials have requested
our view on including the EU in PSI. Department guidance
requested para 10. End Summary

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EU Says it Needs a Role in PSI
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3. (C) Key non-proliferation experts in the Council and
Commission say that the EU and member states support the PSI
principles (ref. A),see them as conducive to the EU's draft
non-proliferation Principles, and believe the EU should
somehow have a role in the new initiative because it has
competencies unavailable to EU member states on a bilateral
basis. Italian MFA DG for Political Affairs Giancarlo
Aragona made similar points to U/S Bolton on August 27 (ref.
B). On September 10 in Brussels, Solana's senior foreign
policy advisor, Council DG Robert Cooper, told EUR PDAS Ries
that he wants to work with the U.S. on finding ways to permit
all EU member states to "buy into" the PSI, without making
PSI membership too unwieldy. The option currently favored by
Cooper's principle policy planners, Antonio Tanca (Council
Secretariat's chief non-proliferation policy expert) and John

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Mattiussi (UK FCO non-proliferation policy expert seconded to
the Commission, but working also for Cooper),calls for an EU
observership which would allow the EU to consult with PSI on
Commission and Council Secretariat competencies, and assist
dual EU-PSI members to meet their PSI commitments. Tanca and
Mattiussi -- who also attended the September 3-4 Paris PSI
meetings as nominal members of the Italian delegation --
request USG views as they begin drafting their
recommendations.


4. (C) The EU supports PSI and the Statement of Interdiction
Principles because they align in the EU's eyes with its Basic
Principles for an EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of
WMD, released at the June 2003 EU Summit in Thessaloniki.
Mattiussi described the relationship between the PSI
Principles and EU Principles as "operationally consistent,"
and observed that the participation of EU member states in
PSI is adding momentum to the EU's own nonproliferation
objectives. (The EU's nonproliferation Principles are
available online at http://ue.eu.int/en/summ.htm) Moreover,
eight of the eleven PSI members are also EU member states
(Poland is acceding). This represents almost three-quarters
of the PSI, half of the EU at 15, and one third of the EU at

25. This significant numerical overlap means that PSI is a
high profile issue for the EU. It also means that EU norms
and exclusive institutional competencies will be important
factors in the success or failure of PSI, particularly once
interdictions begin.


5. (C) Dual EU-PSI members are reportedly pushing the EU on
inclusion in part because they fear any potential for
conflict between EU and PSI commitments. Interlocutors
stress that EU institutions have regulatory authority and
competencies in policy areas that make full PSI participation
by EU member states difficult without EU assistance. They
argue, for instance, that "Community" competencies in trade
and border management could impact the outcome of certain
interdictions -- perhaps not in the Pacific, but certainly in
and around European waters and in transit points like Malta
and Cyprus. "The effectiveness of PSI members in the EU is
decreased if the EU is not involved," Tanca said, "because
the EU has competencies in many areas affecting the ability
of EU members to fulfill PSI commitments." Italian MFA DG
Aragona also underscored this point to U/S Bolton during
their August 27 meeting in Rome (ref. B).


6. (C) Mattiussi, who was present at the September 16 PSC,
reports that only a few of the "smaller states" were "more
cautious" about an EU role in PSI. (Cooper said that some
non-PSI member states had "lingering suspicions" about the
initiative.) But Mattiussi assessed that these states would
come over to the majority view once they better understood
PSI and the issues at stake. Otherwise, all the EU's more
influential states and institutional organs were unanimous in
their desire to see the EU somehow involved in PSI. Asked
whether any of the EU-25 preferred universal PSI inclusion
for all EU member states bilaterally, instead of or in
addition to EU institutional involvement, Mattiussi said that
during the September 16 PSC discussion, member states "did
not raise the idea of 25 EU members in PSI."

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Delivering 25 Countries With Only One Observership
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7. (C) The perception of Tanca and Mattiussi is that the PSI
group "is almost too large already." Cooper agrees, and has
tasked Tanca and Mattiussi with drafting a paper on how to
get all EU member states on board without making the
membership too unwieldy. In their internal consultations
with EU and member state officials, Mattiussi and Tanca are
therefore stressing the U.S. concept of PSI as "an activity
rather than an organization" (Mattuissi says the UK also
adopted this phrase in a recently circulated paper). They
say that one purpose of the paper is to pre-empt any
suggestions that all 15(25) EU member states should be
included in PSI by instead focusing on PSI as an activity and
supporting observer status for the EU Troika (comprised of
current and upcoming Presidency countries, the Council
Secretariat, and the Commission). They seek a role for the

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EU that could deliver results from the EU-25 without adding
25 new delegations to PSI. The extent to which others share
this sentiment, however, is unclear. Tanca reports that in
recent non-proliferation coordinating group meetings,
Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Hungary -- "among others" --
have all asked EU partners when they would be invited to join
PSI.


8. (C) In the forefront of options being discussed is the
possibility of granting PSI observer status to the EU. Many
believe that as an observer, the EU could add value to PSI by
serving as a clearinghouse of EU competencies and a
facilitator of dual PSI-EU member capabilities. Tanca and
Mattiussi argue that this option would allow the EU to assist
dual EU-PSI members in meeting PSI commitments. They suggest
also that EU institutional elements involved in PSI would be
able to see pending PSI-EU conflicts in advance, and work
quietly within the EU and/or PSI contexts to smooth them over
before they become apparent to non-PSI insiders. The EU
would also be in a position to coordinate the
counter-proliferation efforts of non-PSI EU members, in
accordance with EU rules, and EU and PSI Principles.

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How it Might Work
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9. (C) The current favored option foresees something like a
two-thirds EU observership. When one of the 7(8) dual EU-PSI
members holds the EU presidency, the EU would observe and
consult in PSI proceedings as part of the EU presidency's
delegation. The precedent for this was set in Paris by the
participation in the Italian PSI delegation of Tanca and
Mattiussi (who alternated attendance). After the EU grows to
25 member states in May 2004, this would work one-third of
the time (when one of the enlarged EU's eight dual EU-PSI
members serves as EU Council Presidency). The remaining
two-thirds of the time the EU would have its own
Troika-format observer status in PSI. Other options have
been floated, but as PSI position drafters, Mattiussi and
Tanca favor this one because it puts what they see as a
minimal EU footprint on PSI while also allowing the EU to add
value.

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RFG: USG Views Sought
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10. (C) RFG: Tanca and Mattiussi are asking for USG views on
any form of EU participation in PSI, especially in the manner
outlined here. They appear to be acting on Cooper's
commitment to work with the USG as the EU explores ideas for
an EU role in PSI. Mission requests Department guidance on
what we can tell the EU about its bid for PSI participation.
Schnabel