COLOMBIA: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

UNCLAS BOGOTA 011615 S/CT FOR REAP E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER SUBJECT: COLOMBIA: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: A. REF A: STATE 301352 ¶B. REF B: BOGOTA 10403 ¶C. REF C: BOGOTA 10048 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. Colombia continues its struggle against the country's three main terrorist organizations ) the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) -- all of which have been designated by the U.S. as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Although there were no reports of international terrorist acts in Colombia during 2003, there were and continue to be persistent actions by guerrilla groups endangering U.S. and Colombian government personnel and assets, and targeting congested public areas such as shopping malls, parks, and popular restaurants. The Government of Colombia does not support terrorists politically or financially; to the contrary, the Uribe administration continues to take a tough stance against terrorism. In 2003, President Uribe has increased military pressure on illegal armed groups and pushed forward an ambitious security agenda, which: 1) secured congressional passage of anti-terrorism legislation; 2) strengthened programs promoting the desertion and reintegration of illegal armed group members; and 3) engaged the GOC in demobilization negotiations with the AUC. The latter process has led to a recent mass demobilization of 855 paramilitaries in Medellin and another 155 in Cauca; another is planned for early 2004. End Summary. -------------- Terrorist Organizations Continue to Attack -------------- ¶2. In February, the country's largest terrorist organization (the approximately 16,000-member FARC) set off a major car bomb attack on Bogota's Club El Nogal. The bombing killed 34 and wounded over 160. One week later near Florencia, Caqueta Department, the FARC captured three U.S. contractors and killed another American and a Colombian - all crew members of a crashed U.S. aircraft; the three Americans continue to be held hostage. The FARC struck again on February 15 when a house bomb detonated in Neiva, Huila Department, killing sixteen and wounding over forty. In September, the ELN kidnapped eight foreign tourists visiting archeological ruins in the Sierra Nevada Mountains. One escaped, two were released in November 2003, but five remain captive at year's end. In October, November, and December 2003, the FARC set off a car bomb in San Andresito, an area of Bogota where contraband electronics are commonly sold and where the FARC and the AUC are known to extort shop owners and compete for turf, launched a rocket at a prominent Colombian business leader, fired another rocket at the military side of Bogota's international commercial airport, and tossed grenades at two restaurants frequented by Americans and other foreigners. Numerous other attacks have been thwarted in Bogota, due in large part to intelligence work performed by Colombian public security forces. Reflecting increased high level attention and funding, the GOC's ambitious security agenda has produced substantial achievements. In 2003, murders have decreased by sixteen percent, assassinations of trade unionists are down sixty-eight percent and kidnappings have been reduced by thirty percent from 2002. The Colombian military has completed phase 2A of its "Plan Patriota" national defense plan in the Cundinamarca area surrounding Bogota, which reaped significant successes, including the killing of at least five mid-level FARC commanders who operated in the area. ¶3. The following addresses ref A's specific questions: a. The GOC has taken the following actions in 2003 to support the global coalition against terrorism: -- The GOC continues to cooperate in blocking terrorist assets. The Financial Information and Analysis Unit (UIAF), similar in function to the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Unit (FINCEN),was created in 2001. UIAF collaborates closely with the Embassy's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC); -- President Uribe will have met his goal of installing a state security presence in every one of the country's 1098 municipalities by the end of 2003. This has been a major accomplishment toward reclaiming territory from terrorist organizations; -- President Uribe has submitted to Congress two important draft laws with significant public security implications: 1) the anti-terrorism bill; and 2) the conditional parole bill (ref B). The anti-terrorism bill, which was approved by Congress December 10, will increase the government's authority to conduct wiretaps, residential searches, and detentions. The conditional parole legislation is connected to the broader peace process, and provides the GOC with flexibility to waive prison sentences for combatants who agree to demobilize and support the GOC's anti-terrorism efforts; -- With USG assistance, the GOC expects to encourage this year upwards of 4000 illegal combatants to desert ) an increase of 84 percent from 2002. The program has yielded significant intelligence, which will help in capturing and prosecuting other illegal armed group commanders (ref C); -- On November 25, the GOC demobilized 855 paramilitaries from the AUC's Cacique Nutibara Bloc. In December, 155 paramilitaries in Cauca Department were demobilized. The next AUC demobilization is scheduled for early 2004 in northern Colombia; -- The USG's Anti-Terrorist Assistance (ATA) programs are training Colombian police and military anti-kidnapping units (GAULA). Kidnappings are an important means of revenue for the illegal armed groups, particularly for the FARC and ELN. DSS/ATA is implementing one of the largest USG anti-kidnapping assistance programs ($25-million) to help the GOC train and equip GAULA units; -- The GOC is also taking its own steps to strengthen its anti-terrorism capabilities. A newly-improved and expanded anti-terrorism unit has been set up in the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia). This unit was formally part of the narcotics section, but was separated out in 2003. The GOC has assigned additional prosecutors to the anti-terrorism unit to focus on prosecuting infrastructure attacks, particularly in oil producing areas such as Arauca and Casanare; and -- Plan Colombia has made significant strides in combating narco-trafficking, a key source of income for terrorist organizations. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that coca cultivation could be reduced by aerial eradication by as much as 50 percent this year (almost 130,000 hectares eradicated). The GOC sprayed approximately 2700 hectares of opium poppy this year. In August 2003, the U.S. resumed the Airbridge Denial Program, which assists the GOC in intercepting aircraft trafficking narcotics and arms. ¶B. The GOC has been particularly cooperative in cases and investigations involving Americans, such as the kidnapping of the contractors and the recent grenade attack in Bogota. ¶C. The US-Colombia extradition relationship continues to be one of the most successful in the world. The GOC has extradited 136 Colombian citizens to the U.S. since July 2000, mostly related to narcotics cases. Continued cooperation from the GOC's Foreign and Justice Ministries has led to the extradition of 88 persons during President Uribe's tenure (through November 14),64 in the year 2003. In May 2003, the GOC approved the extradition of Nelson Vargas Rueda, the first FARC member to be sent to the U.S. (Note: Vargas Rueda is accused of the 1999 kidnapping and murder of three American NGO activists working on behalf of Colombian indigenous groups. End Note.) Also extradited in May was Gerardo Herrera Iles, accused of taking foreign oil workers hostage, including U.S. citizens. ¶D. There is no impediment to extradition for terrorist acts occurring outside of Colombia. However, for terrorist acts that occur in Colombia involving American victims, there could be an impediment if the GOC initiates its own prosecution before the U.S. submits a request for extradition. The Colombian Code of Criminal Procedure and jurisprudence from the Colombian Constitutional Court prevents extradition of individuals who have been, or are being, prosecuted in Colombia for the same act or acts. Once a case has been opened in Colombia, even if it were later dismissed, double jeopardy could prevent the defendant from being extradited on those charges. Accordingly, the U.S. recently had to withdraw an extradition request for an Ejercito Liberacion Popular (ELP) defendant who was already being prosecuted in Colombia for the same act. ¶E. In addition to prosecution, the GOC has taken several other measures to combat terrorism: -- As in 2002, the GOC continues to speak out forcefully and often against terrorist organizations; -- The GOC continues to improve and expand its Informer Network, which trains civilians to assist police in crime prevention and alerting law enforcement to illegal armed group activity; -- A U.S. financed Rewards for Justice (RFJ) campaign has been initiated for information that leads to the capture, arrest, and prosecution of those persons involved in the hostage-taking of the three American contractors; and -- Despite severe national budget constraints, President Uribe continues to increase the amount Colombia spends on security. In 2003, the GOC allocated 4.0 percent of GDP to security ) up from 3.5 percent in 2002. It hopes to increase spending to 4.5 percent by 2006. ¶F. The GOC has sought to build international condemnation of Colombian terrorists. At the GOC's request, the Organization of American States (OAS) passed Resolution 837 condemning the bombing of El Nogal, specifically naming the FARC as the perpetrators. The GOC also requested and received UNSC condemnation of the attack. In mid-2003, the United Kingdom hosted a conference in London in which 24 countries voiced their commitment to support Colombian democracy and disapproval of the illegal armed groups. ¶G. The GOC has not provided any support for international terrorism, terrorists, or terrorist groups. ¶H. The GOC has not made any statements in support of terrorist organizations or terrorist-sponsoring states. ¶I. Comment: Colombia understands only too well the devastation caused by terrorism. From the day it assumed office on August 8, 2002, the Uribe Administration has demonstrated a firm resolve in fighting terrorism. The GOC is supportive of USG efforts to combat terrorist acts, target terrorist finances, and cooperate with extradition requests. We expect this highly productive USG-GOC cooperation to continue. BACA