HUMANITARIAN PLANNING TEAM DISCUSSIONS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 10 ANKARA 000964

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR PRM - RGREENE, EUR/SE AND NEA/NGA
NSC FOR QUANRUD AND BRYZA
DEPT PASS USAID FOR BHR/OFDA - WGARVELINK/RLIBBY AND FFP
EUCOM FOR J3, J4, J5 AND POLAD
CENTCOM FOR J3, J5 AND POLAD
GENEVA FOR RMA


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2013
TAGS: EAID IZ MOPS OTRA PREF PREL TU
SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN PLANNING TEAM DISCUSSIONS ON
CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITH GOT AND HUMANITARIAN
ORGANIZATIONS (SBU)

REF: A. ANKARA 763

B. ANKARA 946


(U) Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Deutsch for
reasons 1.5(B) and (D).


Summary
--------------



1. (C) During its January 27 to 29 visit to Ankara, the U.S.
Humanitarian
Planning Team (HPT) discussed contingency planning for a
possible humanitarian
crisis arising from the situation in Iraq with the GOT,
representatives of the
KDP and PUK administrations in northern Iraq, a
representative of the Iraqi
Turkmen Front, and international organizations. While the
GOT was receptive to
our offer to consult and to assist, it is hesitant to
establish crisis
coordination centers to begin to implement its planning.
MFA is also wary of
providing NGOs access to Iraq through Turkey, though it is
establishing a mechanism to register and define the
activities of relief NGOs.
MFA insisted that NGOs will have to coordinate their
activities with the Turkish Red Crescent and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). KDP and PUK
representatives described their contingency planning,
claiming that their
administrations have the capacity to run the Oil for Food
(OFF) ration distribution system and other humanitarian
assistance programs when the UN evacuates, if adequate
funding and other resources are provided. The Turkish Red
Crescent
told us that it had the mandate to coordinate all relief
efforts in the
northern Iraq buffer zone, a position disputed by the local
representative of
the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies. UN
agencies described contingency planning and limited
pre-positioning of relief
supplies by UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP, and said they were
negotiating a legal
framework with the GOT to allow UN agencies to provide relief
to Iraq via
Turkey. End Summary.





2. (C) The Humanitarian Planning Team (HPT) delegation
included: Richard
Greene, PDAS, State/PRM; William Garvelink, Deputy Assistant
Administrator,
USAID; Andrew Wyllie, PRM/ANE; Roger Corneretto, JCS; David
Tarantino, DOD/OSD;
Major Ray Eiriz, CENTCOM; Ron Libby, USAID/OFDA; Greg
Austreng, USAID/OFDA; and
Todd Horne, USAID/OFDA. Representatives of EUCOM, the Office
of Defense
Cooperation (ODC) and Emboffs also attended the meetings.
HPT held separate
meetings with a GOT interagency group led by MFA; and
representatives of: the
Turkish Red Crescent; the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK);
the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP); the International Federation of Red
Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (IFRC); the American Red Cross; Iraqi
Turkmen Front (ITF);
the Turkmeneli Foundation; and a joint meeting with most
elements of the UN,s
country team in Turkey.


HPT,s Message
--------------



3. (C) Greene and other members of the HPT provided
interlocutors with an
overview of U.S. contingency planning and key humanitarian
objectives. While
emphasizing that the Administration has not made a decision
to use force in
Iraq, HPT emphasized the importance of:


-- Incorporating humanitarian assistance (HA) concerns into
military planning,
particularly with respect to limiting damage to HA
infrastructure and creating
safe areas in which relief organizations can work. Rapid
restoration of the
Oil for Food (OFF) ration distribution system and pipeline
following any military operations is particularly
important. These measures are intended to help persuade
vulnerable populations not to
leave their homes, minimizing the scope of the relief effort;


-- Building an HA coalition between and within the USG, UN
agencies, other
international HA organizations, NGOs, other donor
governments, and governments
in the region. Coordination mechanisms such as the
Humanitarian Operations Center currently being established in
Kuwait and the UN,s Joint Logistics Center (JLC) are key;


-- Pre-positioning assets and personnel to respond to a
crisis, including AID
Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs);


-- Identifying relief funding requirements and sources;


-- Obtaining safe and timely access for HA organizations to
crisis locations;


-- Limiting adverse impact for Iraq,s neighbors;


-- Learning the lessons of the 1991 humanitarian crisis.



4. (C) Variables affecting the ability to respond to a crisis
include: the
intensity and duration of possible military operations;
damage to HA
infrastructure; international support for relief; access to
vulnerable
populations; and the unpredictable response of the Iraqi
regime, including the
possibility that chemical and biological weapons, or the
threat thereof, might be used to create fear and panic.


Discussion of Contingency Planning with the GOT
-------------- --



5. (SBU) On January 28, the HPT met with an interagency
group, including
representatives of MFA, the Turkish General Staff (TGS),the
Prime Ministry,s
Emergency Management General Directorate, and the Turkish Red
Crescent (TRC).
Tunc Ugdul, MFA Deputy Director General for International
Political
Organizations, led the Turkish delegation.



6. (C) Ugdul began by reading from a prepared statement
outlining Turkey,s HA
preparations and concerns. He noted the GOT,s concerns
about the economic
impact of a war in Iraq on the Turkish economy, and contended
that Turkey faced
the 1991 refugee/internally displaced person (IDP) crisis on
its own. Turkey
has done contingency planning both on an internal,
interagency basis and with
international organizations. The GOT plans to establish 18
&humanitarian aid
collection zones8 in northern Iraq and Turkey which could
handle up to 276,000
refugees/IDPs. Turkey plans to repatriate displaced persons
as soon as the
security situation would permit this.



7. (C) TRC has pre-positioned some resources, but there are
gaps in TRC,s
ability to respond in the event the full 276,000 persons need
relief, in part
because TRC is not supposed to dedicate more than 60 percent
of its capacity to
any single crisis. Ugdul noted that TRC has 30,000 tents
which can shelter
only about 160,000 people. MFA is meeting regularly with
UNHCR, which has
begun to shift relief supplies (tents, blankets, bedding,
kitchen equipment)
into Turkey. The GOT has designated airports to bring in
relief supplies.
Ugdul also noted that 60 percent of the Iraqi population is
entirely dependant on the
OFF ration to meet their monthly household needs and
emphasized GOT,s concern about disruption to that
distribution system. Greene responded that major
international organizations desperately need additional
funding in order to respond to a potential crisis in the
region, and that the USG planned to not only contribute, but
also to mobilize other
donors.



8. (C) Humanitarian Access: HPT emphasized the importance of
allowing humanitarian access
across Turkey,s frontier to deliver relief, and emphasized
the important role that NGOs could play in the delivery of
humanitarian assistance, particularly since the UN agencies
rely heavily on NGOs in the implementation of their own
assistance programs. Providing safe and early access for
humanitarian agencies is a key element in our ability to
persuade Iraqis not to leave their homes.



9. (C) Ugdul responded that GOT was still considering how to
deal with NGO
requests for access, but that it planned to establish a
registration process
for NGOs and to craft memoranda of understanding defining the
activities of
those which could enter Iraq from Turkey. Ugdul and Head of
Department Feza
Ozturk underlined the need for NGOs to coordinate their
activities with TRC and
UN agencies, while acknowledging that the International
Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) would have the mandate for HA in areas of
military conflict. MOUs
would be signed only if there is a need for NGO assistance in
the Turkish-run
camps. Ugdul and Ozturk insisted that multiple NGOs would
not be permitted
entry if their efforts duplicated existing relief. Ozturk
said that, according
to the Geneva conventions, the commander of a military
occupation force has the
right and responsibility to determine which NGOs are
permitted in the area. He
added that the UN,s World Food Program (WFP) would face no
access barriers from
the Turkish authorities, but pointed out that UN agencies in
Turkey have no
mandate to operate outside Turkish borders and that this
problem would have to
be resolved. NGO applications for work in Iraq beyond
Turkish-run camps would
be considered on an ad hoc basis. Four (unnamed) NGOs,
including two from
Turkey, had applied for access, but none have yet been
granted it. HPT
requested a speedy review of NGO applications and
consideration for those
intending to supply areas beyond Turkish-run camps.



10. (C) Deconflicting Military/Civilian Operations: In
response to the GOT,s
remarks on military and civilian designations for transport
hubs and routes,
HPT pointed out that military locations could be shared with
civilian
authorities to move HA provided the military retained overall
control of those
locations. For example, an airport designated for military
use could accept humanitarian supplies, provided the military
retained overall control of the facility and its operations.
HPT proposed that these details be discussed in
technical-level meetings.



11. (C) HPT raised the importance of coordination between
civilian and military
planners in both our governments, as well as between them and
international
organizations and NGOs, pointing to the positive example of
the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) being established in
Kuwait. HPT proposed establishing a similar mechanism in
Turkey to deconflict civilian and military operations and
share information bilaterally and with other humanitarian
relief providers. Ideally, any mechanism in Turkey would be
plugged into the HOC in Kuwait.



12. (C) MFA responded that the GOT had plans to establish
crisis/coordination
centers in the Prime Ministry, MFA, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep and
Van in the event
of a conflict in Iraq. MFA has also identified 42 diplomats
to staff these
centers. However, the GOT is reluctant to establish them
now, claiming that
this could alarm the public by implying that war is
inevitable. Ozturk
suggested that the primary communications link on HA issues
be established
between the U.S. Embassy and MFA, and offered himself as the
point of contact.
HPT agreed, and Embassy,s Mission Disaster Relief Officer
(MDRO) was
designated as the U.S. POC. HPT noted that MDRO would be
assisted by AID,s
DART team, by EUCOM and possibly other USG elements in the
near future.



13. (C) HDRs: HPT members stated that local procurement
would be an important
element in the U.S. delivery of relief supplies, but that
there were items )
including one million humanitarian daily rations (HDRs) )
that we would like to
import for pre-positioning in Turkey. A request to
pre-position HDRs had not
been approved pending a request from the Turkish General
Staff for further
information on the request (reftel).



14. (C) CBW: Fatih Evren, TRC,s General Director, asked how
the USG planned to
respond if Saddam Hussein were to use CBW to create a
humanitarian crisis. HPT,s military members responded that
the U.S. military has planned extensively for this
possibility by taking steps in any conflict to limit the
GOI,s ability to use weapons of mass destruction and by
containing the extent of damage if these weapons are in fact
used. HPT recognizes that civilian organizations do not
have the equipment and expertise to protect themselves from
CBW attack and that widespread use of CBW would have serious
implications for the humanitarian relief plan. The U.S.
military, within the limits of its resources and
capabilities, aims to take appropriate action to enable
civilian organizations to safely assume
relief efforts as quickly as possible.



15. (C) The Turks asked if the USG had any plans for
&internment of the
civilian population8 and said one assumption of Turkish
planning is a mass
movement of IDPs toward the Turkish frontier. Greene
responded that the USG
would not forcibly stop civilian movement. Rather, our
strategy is to
enable Iraqis to avoid having to flee their homes due to a
lack of assistance by ensuring speedy access for relief
providers.


Joint Meeting with PUK and KDP Representatives
-------------- -



15. (C) The HPT delegation discussed the humanitarian
situation with Bahros
Galali and Shusti Mehedin, of the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK),and
Safeen Dizayee, Hoshyar Siweyti, Karim Sinjari, Cemal Hamit,
Chusty Asad, of
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) on January 28. KDP and
PUK
representatives outlined major differences between the
current situation and
that of 1991: almost all of the 5,000 villages destroyed by
the regime in
1987-89 have been rebuilt and reconstruction in the north
has gone well beyond
those villages; the local administration is not answerable to
Baghdad and the
population trusts it; there are UN and NGO structures, along
with the OFF; the
local population does not want to repeat the experience of

1991.



16. (C) KDP representatives told HPT that they had
established a structure to
deal with a possible humanitarian crisis, including an
emergency committee
reporting to the KDP &Interior Minister8 Karim Sinjari and
committees in major
cities, subdistricts and villages to coordinate activities
with NGOs. KDP and
PUK have also begun to identify 17 camp sites for IDPs (10 in
the KDP region, 7
in the PUK region). KDP representatives said they do not
expect many Kurdish
IDPs, but others in central and southern Iraq could move to
the north. They
registered strong concern that the UN agencies and the ICRC
in Iraq were not
prepared to respond to a crisis.



17. (C) Echoing many of the KDP,s points, PUK
representatives told us that its &
Prime Minister8 chaired an emergency committee on
humanitarian assistance. PUK
predicts that 500,000 Iraqis from the center and south will
come to the north
and is planning on seven camps, each capable of handling
100,000 DPs, to deal
with that contingency. They also cited the need for funds to
stock emergency
supplies. Noting the UN,s plans to evacuate expatriate
staff in the event of
war, PUK expressed the belief that this would bring the 986
program to a halt
given that national staff of the UN agencies do not have the
authority to run
the program. International NGOs in northern Iraq, on the
other hand, intend to
remain. PUK told us that, while they expected most IDPs to
be cared for within
Iraqi, they hoped neighboring states would not close their
borders to displaced
Iraqis.



18. (C) KDP representatives expressed concern with deficits
in rations
authorized by Baghdad, stating that they had not received
their January flour
ration, the fuel ration had been cut by more than half, and
that they had
received only 30 percent of their medicine allocation. They
also cited serious
shortfalls of medical supplies and equipment (especially
ambulances, vaccines),
fuel, food and shelter to cope with an influx from outside
the KDP area. KDP
asserted that the authorities have limited amounts of food in
warehouses for the local population, but no surplus for IDPs
from elsewhere in Iraq and that food rations for as
many as one million persons might be needed. They stated
that there was
milling capacity in Erbil and Sulimaniye, but that this was
contingent on
adequate fuel supplies to power electricity generators.
About 17,000 to 18,000
tons of wheat are need to feed one million people. They said
that UN agencies
had not responded to their requests to provide supplies and
asked the USG to
fill these gaps. Both KDP and PUK stated that they were
concerned about their
inability to cope with the humanitarian and medical needs
that could be
generated by use of CBW and asked for U.S. assistance in this
area. They said
that they had no gas masks or capability to detect/diagnose
CBW effects. Both
groups stated that if their funding and supply shortfalls
were met, local
administrations had the ability to manage relief operations
in consultation
with the UN and NGOs.



19. (C) HPT requested that KDP and PUK representatives
provide humanitarian
mapping information, and outlined U.S. plans to contribute to
the UN,s funding
appeal. KDP and PUK representatives will provide
humanitarian mapping information.



20. (C) PUK and KDP representatives said they did not expect
many IDPs to cross
the Turkish or Iranian borders. They told HPT that the GOT
had not consulted
them on plans for Turkish camps. They expressed concern that
if the USG
prepositions supplies outside Iraq, these materials might not
get to the
population that needs them as neighboring governments play
politics. They
requested that the USG pre-position supplies in northern Iraq.


Turkish Red Crescent
--------------



21. (C) Meeting with the HPT, TRC President Ertan Gonen said
that, using 60
percent of its capacity, TRC could shelter and feed 80,000 to
100,000 IDPs in a
10-kilometer buffer zone in northern Iraq. Note: In other
channels, the Turks
have posited a zone that goes significantly beyond 10 km.
End Note. If
ordered to do so by the GOT, TRC could, by dedicating all of
its resources to
the border area, take care of 250,000 to 300,000
refugees/IDPs. Gonen said
that he wanted to share the costs of pre-positioning stocks
with the UN
agencies. In response to a question from HPT about unmet
needs in the
contingency plan, Gonen replied that TRC had a shortage of
tents.



22. (C) Gonen maintained that TRC will coordinate all relief
efforts along
Turkey,s border with Iraq, including the buffer zone, and
that ICRC had the
responsibility for coordinating NGO access in any zone of
conflict. He claimed
that ICRC, IFRC and the GOT had agreed on these arrangements.
Gonen
insisted that all supplies going through Turkey be given to
the TRC and that
TRC would run the IDP camps in northern Iraq. Greene
responded that it was not
our understanding that ICRC had taken on the NGO coordination
mandate, and that ICRC,s role would likely be very limited
in duration given the likelihood of a short period
of military operations. Garvelink stated that USG
pre-positioning was underway
at warehouses in Italy and that the DART team would follow up
on our ability to
fill gaps in supplies.


IFRC and American Red Cross
--------------



23. (C) HPT discussed the HA situation on January 29 with
Carl Naucler, Head of
Delegation, International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies
and Ian O'Donnell, Head of Delegation, American Red Cross.
Naucler opined that
few Iraqis would try to cross into Turkey. While he said
IFRC was prepared to
work with TRC on Turkish territory, he emphasized that the
organization would
not support TRC operations in northern Iraq and recommended
that HPT discuss
the issue of TRC,s intentions with the ICRC.


Iraqi Turkmen Front
--------------



24. (C) Dr. Mustafa Ziya, Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF)
Representative, and Hasan
Osman, Turkmeneli Foundation, told HPT that the ITF had
planned for a camp
which could accommodate 5,000 persons in Koi Sanjak near the
old cease-fire
line between the PUK and KDP regions. The Turkmen have
received funding from
the TRC, GOT and some Turkish and foreign NGOs. Ziya
expressed concern about
the possibility that the GOI would destroy the Kirkuk/Mosul
oil fields,
creating a humanitarian disaster that could generate as many
as one million
IDPs in northern Iraq. He also said that the ITF and PUK
were cooperating in
the distribution of aid to IDPs in the PUK area.


UN Agencies
--------------



25. (C) HPT discussed UN contingency planning and UN
relations with Turkish
authorities with Alfredo Witschi-Cestari, UN Resident
Coordinator in Turkey,
Gesche Karrenbrock, UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Representative, John
Murray, World Food Program, and Edmond McLoughney, United
Nations Children,s
Fund Representative.



26. (C) Witschi-Cestari stated that the UN agencies planned
to preposition
supplies and set up an office in Silopi, and to establish a
crisis coordination
center in Diyarbakir. In the event of military action, UN
expatriate staff
will evacuate and coordination of activities will take place
from Cyprus, but
the UN,s intention is to return to Iraq as quickly as the
security situation
allows.



27. (C) Mandate for Iraq: Witschi-Cestari highlighted the
absence of a mandate
for either GOT or UN Turkey activities in Iraq, saying that a
clear legal framework was necessary to provide relief to Iraq
via Turkey. The UN will need Security Council approval for
it to operate in Iraq, particularly in an area controlled by
us while the current regime is still in place. The UN and
the GOT are working on an MOU which would allow the UN to run
a supply pipeline through Turkey into northern Iraq and
possibly run cross-border operations. This MOU would indeed
include considerations for NGOs. Witschi-Cestari
characterized the GOT as cooperative on humanitarian
planning, but he said the GOT has not gone on a crisis
footing yet and is resisting establishment of a crisis
center. He
added that the UN agencies had not discussed the issue with
the Turkish
military and asked for U.S. help in establishing contact with
them.



28. (C) UNICEF: McLoughney stated that UNICEF played a large
role in OFF
procurement, especially in northern Iraq, and that UNICEF had
pre-positioned
some supplies there, including winter clothes for children.



29. (C) WFP: Murray reported that WFP was working with MFA
to reestablish an
official presence in Turkey, but faced some hurdles in the
Turkish
bureaucracy. WFP has a logistics office in Ankara, a field
office in Silopi
(and is also seeking warehouse space there) and is operating
warehouses in
Iskenderun and Gaziantep to store high energy biscuits and
vegetable oil. WFP
has also arranged to draw on strategic wheat stocks from the
Syrian
Government. WFP asked the GOT to consider a similar
arrangement, but has not
yet received a response. WFP is concerned about transport
restrictions on the
road from Gaziantep to the Syrian border. WFP,s planning is
based on the need
to feed 80,000 refugees in Turkey as well as an additional
50,000 in northern
Iraq. Karrenbrock said that UNHCR is working closely with
TRC to prepare to
handle a crisis on this scale, with a target of basic
preparedness by February

15. For the whole of Iraq, WFP is undertaking
pre-positioning of rations to
support 900,000 persons for 10 weeks.



30. (C) NGOs: Karrenbrock stated that UNHCR was establishing
contacts between
NGOs, TRC and MFA. She opined that NGOs would be able to
work in both Turkey
and Iraq once the mandates for all parties were made clear.
Witschi-Cestari
pointed out that, while the GOT was still wary of NGOs, the
Turks had become
much more receptive to foreign help following their help in
responding to the
1999 earthquakes.



31. (C) Humanitarian Mapping: Witschi-Cestari said that he
was aware of the
U.S. initiative to collect information on humanitarian sites
and personnel in
Iraq and that UN provision of information on this was
centralized at UNSECOORD. He added, however, that the
individual agencies would verify the completeness of
information with UNSECOORD.


Embassy Follow-up
--------------



32. (C) Post,s MDRO is working closely with other Mission
and ODC elements to
follow-up on the humanitarian issues raised in the HPT visit,
and particularly
to help AID,s Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)
establish a presence in
Ankara and possibly Diyarbakir. Embassy will continue to
meet with MFA and other GOT elements to follow up on a range
of issues, including: stepped-up HA consultations
bilaterally and with international humanitarian organizations
and NGOs and the Turkish military; urging the GOT to
establish a crisis coordination center; pressing for
Turkey,s support for unimpeded access into Iraq for UN
agencies and NGOs delivering relief; and pre-positioning of
1million humanitarian daily rations (HDRs) in Turkey, among
other issues. We have already held a followup meeting with
MFA (ref B).
PEARSON