ACTING VS. PKK/KADEK IN IRAQ BEFORE POTUS-ERDOGAN:

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007724

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2013
TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS ETRD SNAR PINR IZ TU
SUBJECT: ACTING VS. PKK/KADEK IN IRAQ BEFORE POTUS-ERDOGAN:
A MENU OF DELIVERABLES

REF: ANKARA 6231


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman. Reasons 1.5 b and
d.



1. (S) In anticipation of the January 28 meeting between
President Bush and Prime Minister Erdogan, Post submits a
list (see paras 2-5) of possible actions the USG could take
against the PKK/KADEK/KHK in northern Iraq that the President
could cite as completed deliverables in that meeting. The US
has designated the PKK/KADEK a terrorist organization and is
in the process of adding new names and aliases of the
organization to our terrorism list. The President has stated
that Iraq will no longer be a safehaven for terrorists, yet
4,500 PKK operatives continue to find sanctuary in the
mountains of northern Iraq. Our NATO Ally Turkey considers
these terrorists a significant national security threat. We
have agreed with Turkey on an action plan to use all elements
of statecraft to eliminate that threat. However, to date,
the Turks believe that the President's commitment has not
been followed up by concrete actions against the PKK, and
that little or nothing meaningful has been done on the action
plan, causing persistent tension in US-Turkey relations.
Turkish press has suggested that if the US fails to move
against the PKK in northern Iraq, Turkey will be compelled to
take unilateral action. We believe there are a number of
significant steps short of military engagement that the USG
could take against the PKK before the President's meeting
with PM Erdogan that would be meaningful and perceived as
such by both Turkey and the PKK/KADEK. Post believes it is
imperative that some visible action against the PKK be
undertaken by the USG as soon as possible, and certainly
before the President's meeting with PM Erdogan.



2. (S) Actions We Can Undertake Outside Iraq:


-- Aggressive diplomacy to establish widespread
acknowledgment that the PKK/KADEK/KHK is a terrorist
organization, including designation by the EU and Turkey's
and Iraq's neighbors of the PKK/KADEK/KHK as a terrorist
organization;
-- Financial steps to cut off PKK/KADEK KHK funding sources,
including pressing Europeans -- once they designate the
PKK/KADEK/KHK as a terrorist organization -- to take action
to cut off funding from Europe;
-- High-level public statements, including from the White
House stating that the PKK/KADEK/KHK are terrorists, that the
US will not negotiate with terrorists, that the PKK/KADEK/KHK
have no future in Iraq, that PKK/KADEK/KHK elements in Iraq
should take advantage of the Turkish Reintegration Law now,
and that there will not be an option for PKK/KADEK/KHK
terrorists to remain in Iraq.
-- Information operations reflecting such statements in
northern Iraq, Europe and states neighboring Iraq.



3. (S) Actions We Can Undertake Inside Iraq:


-- Seek statements from the CPA and Iraqi Governing Council
and Iraqi Ministers along the lines mentioned above;
-- Secure a finding making the PKK/KADEK/KHK and its front
organizations illegal in Iraq closing their front offices.
-- Have CENTCOM issue a directive to coalition forces to
arrest any PKK/KADEK/KHK member encountered and immediately
inform Turkey of the arrest/inquire if GOT wants the prisoner
transferred to Turkish custody . CJTF-7 should have
Standard Operating Procedures along these lines for dealing
with the surrender of any PKK/KADEK/KHK members;
-- Transmit statement suggested in para 2 via broadcasts in
northern Iraq and via leaflets distributed throughout
northern Iraq;
-- Conduct regular Iraqi border patrols in all border areas
accompanied occasionally (perhaps weekly) by a show of force
by coalition military forces;
-- Engage KDP and PUK to secure a commitment that they will
not turn captured PKK/KADEK/KHK members loose or facilitate
their transit or resupply.



4. (S) Actions We Can Undertake in Turkey:


-- Explore possibility of getting DEA to offer additional
assistance to Turkey to reduce the transfer of PKK/KADEK/KHK
drug-related money across the Turkish border to Iraq;
-- Explore with the GOT other ways to help Turkey patrol and
protect its border, including to prevent smuggling (which
would constrain PKK financial and materiel supply);
-- Consider provision of technical means to Turkey for
detecting movement/providing early warning along the
Iraq-Turkey border (e.g. aerostat balloons);
-- Support extradition requests from Turkey of named
PKK/KADEK/KHK members in Iraq wanted for serious crimes in
Turkey.



5. (S) In considering the steps suggested above, we must
ensure that we do not undermine progress being made on the
return of Turkish refugees from Iraq's Makhmour camp. The
UNHCR circulated a draft tripartite agreement on this matter
December 12. The Makhmour population is overwhelmingly
comprised of bona fide civilian refugees, and should not be
lumped together with action intended for PKK/KADEK/KHK
terrorists. Makhmour issues should be treated as a separate
subset in USG considerations. We need to consider and
discuss with UNHCR:


-- How to separate out the 200 or 250 PKK/KADEK/KHK in
Makhmour from the 9,500 refugees.


-- The consequences of arresting said 200 or 250 terrorists,
whether by Iraqi police, US forces or others.


-- What would be done with those arrested or otherwise
separated out.



6. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN