U/S GROSSMAN FORCE POSTURE CONSULTATIONS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007612 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2013 TAGS: MARR PREL TU SUBJECT: U/S GROSSMAN FORCE POSTURE CONSULTATIONS WITH TURKEY AND MORE REF: USNATO 1254 (U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reason: 1.5 (b) and (d). ======= Summary ======= ¶1. (C) In meetings with FM Gul, DCHOD GEN Basbug and others from MFA and TGS, U/S Grossman initiated consultations with the Turks on the US global posture review. He emphasized that this effort to move to a post-Cold War posture would be in accordance with our international security commitments and would make the defense of US and its Allies more effective through the better use of capabilities. Turkish interlocutors were appreciative of US efforts to consult. U/S Grossman also took the opportunity to express condolences for the Istanbul bombings, to press for a solution on Cyprus, and to encourage further cooperation on Iraq and terrorism. End Summary. ============ Briefing TGS ============ ¶2. (C) In a tete-a-tete with TGS Deputy Chief Ilker Basbug, U/S Grossman expressed appreciation for cooperation with Turkey in a variety of areas. He underscored that force realignment was about the end of the Cold War and the US needing to change its posture, pushing more capabilities, instead of numbers, forward. He also emphasized that this exercise was not a diminishment of our commitment to NATO and our Allies, a point which needed to be conveyed to the public. U/S Grossman did not envision "great changes" at Incirlik AB and noted the US wanted flexible arrangements on using it. He also said there might be opportunities for more training -- possibly using ground forces. This is a real consultation -- we had decided that we would change our force posture, but how and where would depend on consultations. ¶3. (C) Grossman raised Cyprus with Basbug, noting that Turkey had legitimate concerns, but there was an opportunity to make progress. Basbug replied that the outcome of elections would be crucial, but agreed that something needed to be done to get a fair, lasting, final outcome. We needed a solution - but we may differ on approaches. Basbug acknowledged that when the southern part of Cyprus becomes a member of the EU, life would become more difficult for the GOT. ¶4. (C) Afterward, Basbug, TGS/J5 Lt. Gen. Babaoglu, U/S Grossman and Ambassador Edelman joined the rest of the delegation and representatives of TGS/J5 and TGS/J3 to brief the TGS on US thinking about the US posture review. U/S Grossman outlined the broad framework along the lines of his and USD(P) Feith's Dec 5 presentation to the North Atlantic Council (ref A). He emphasized how change will be in parallel with NATO's own transformation and should strengthen the trans-Atlantic Alliance. He repeated to the group that this was the opening round of genuine consultations, and that another round to discuss more specifics should occur early in the new year. TGS/J5 Strategy Chief MG Arslan observed that this round was strategic in scope and indicated Turkey would like more on the US's vision for the region prior to discussing specifics in Turkey. ¶5. (C) DASD Hoehn next explained the three-tier approach the USG envisaged regarding our forces' footprint: main operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations. He noted that Incirlik was a good example of a FOS that works well for both countries and should continue. We wanted to ensure the proper legal framework was in place, including an Article 98 agreement. Beyond Incirlik, he continued, many of the things Basbug and his staff discussed the previous week with EUCOM Deputy Commander Gen. Wald -- training ranges and centers of excellence -- were exactly where we should be going. In all this, Hoehn concluded, it was important that we had a shared view of the challenges ahead: terrorism, WMD, threats, and utilizing new military technologies. ¶6. (C) RADM Goodwin then explained how EUCOM intended to push capabilities forward. The new structure would move our presence away from its current heavy footprint, focusing instead on smaller, rapidly deployable units, with more assets located along major transportation routes, and with a shift of operations and training to the south and east. U/S Grossman added that the reason he came to Turkey first was not because it would see much change in our presence here, but because Turkey was in the middle of this shift south and east. ¶7. (C) In response to questions, U/S Grossman explained that new technology meant some functions no longer needed to be accomplished forward, but could be done farther back. The shift south and east was not necessarily indicative of where we expected terrorism to strike next, but a recognition that a Soviet invasion is no longer a possibility. DASD Hoehn added that locations would also be selected with an eye towards which partners we wanted to work with. U/S Grossman added that the shift would also underscore our commitment to the Article 5 obligations we have to the new NATO members. ¶8. (C) Basbug summarized his understanding of the messages the US was sending: (1) consultations were only beginning; (2) no big changes were expected in the US presence in Turkey, which meant the US was happy with the present arrangements; and, (3) the door was open to do more, such as additional training facilities in Turkey for US forces. Grossman clarified that there were details in the arrangements at Incirlik that could be improved; the base remains important to us and we want our ability to operate there to continue and be flexible, such as an agreement to move U.S. forces through Incirlik back from Iraq. He encouraged the general to combine his second and third points and look at what more could be done with US forces at Incirlik. ============ Briefing MFA ============ ¶9. (C) Consultations at MFA largely reflected those at TGS. After offering condolences for the November Istanbul bombings, U/S Grossman noted that the purpose of his visit was to consult about changes in the US global force posture. The changes for Turkey would probably be small, but the US wanted Turkey to know what it was planning. The changes were intended to adapt capabilities to meet the post-Cold War challenges of terrorism, WMD and new technologies, but the US's basic commitments to our allies would remain unaffected. We wanted to do more with like-minded countries. U/S Grossman emphasized the US had decided to make changes but wanted to consult Allies about how to go about them. ¶10. (C) DASD Hoehn echoed the point that the US wanted to hear Turkey's views about how to adapt forces to new challenges. In Europe there would be less emphasis on heavy forces and big numbers, and more emphasis on capabilities and arrangements with allies. Hoehn expressed the USG's appreciation for access to Incirlik AB, which had been crucial during OEF and OIF and would continue to be important in the future. The US hoped for a positive response to our request to use Incirlik to rotate personnel into and out of Iraq. RADM Goodman described how EUCOM thought it would restructure its footprint. The US would focus on brigades, expand special operations, and shift our force pattern south and east, locating along transportation routes. ¶11. (C) MFA U/S Ziyal expressed appreciation for the close consultations ("this is a healthy approach") and emphasized the importance of the US-Turkey relationship. At the same time, he noted, Europe was developing ESDP; mutual defense arrangements and involvement of non-NATO allies were important for Turkey. He noted Turkey's proximity to the regions into which the US was shifting and offered Turkey's help in regional public diplomacy. Ziyal foresaw no problems on future cooperation on training and said Turkey was willing to continue the mutually beneficial arrangements at Incirlik. Grossman pressed for a positive answer to our request to use Incilik for troop transits. He agreed that the two sides needed to work on the legal framework for US forces in Turkey. ¶12. (C) U/S Grossman predicted that the public diplomacy challenge would be to show how the trans-Atlantic link was strengthened by the coming changes. NATO/EU defense cooperation would be essential. The challenge was to get the NATO/ESDP relationship right: NATO should be the first recourse, then Berlin-plus, and finally autonomous EU operations. =================== Meeting with FM Gul =================== ¶13. (C) Afterward, U/S Grossman, Ambassador Edelman, RADM Goodwin and DASD Hoehn met with FM Gul. U/S Grossman noted that he was pleased with pace and level of US-Turkish consultations, with Gul's discussions with Powell, GEN Pace and other military visitors. He was looking forward to PM Erdogan's visit on Jan. 28 leading up to the NATO Summit in June. This was an opportunity for Turkey and for US to further enhance relations and cooperation. U/S Grossman expressed his condolences for the November bombings in Istanbul and thanked Gul for the GOT's support and assistance in protecting US citizens. He also expressed thanks for help in Afghanistan and Iraq. ¶14. (C) U/S Grossman noted that Cyprus would be high on the agenda between then and May, and that we need to exert maximum pressure between now and then. He noted it would be important for Turkey's prospects for EU membership. ¶15. (C) U/S Grossman briefed on global force posture consultations. Gul agreed that the new force posture was understandable given that Europe was more stabilized. He echoed that areas of conflict are moving east; Turkey used to be on the Eastern border of NATO - now more centrally located. Understanding that the US wanted to use its forces to promote democracy and freedom, Gul argued that Turkey was the best partner for these efforts. Turkey wanted all people in the area to enjoy democracy and transparency because the deficit of democracy in the area was the key to its troubles. U/S Grossman agreed about US-Turkish cooperation in this area. President Bush's speech in London explained that our challenge is to give people more of a chance to live their lives in freedom. This will be an important theme for Istanbul Summit - Turkey's transformation, its seven packages of EU harmonization measures, as well as its human rights and economic reforms. Gul said the GOT was keen to prove that a Muslim country can be accountable, transparent and modern. If this were realized under the AK Party government, it would be important for the whole Muslim world. U/S Grossman added that both countries want to be successful models and beacons. ¶16. (C) Gul noted that Iraq was still the main issue. On one hand the problems were serious, on the other normalization was proceeding, as basic needs were being met increasingly. Gul then raised the situation in Kirkuk, noting his understanding from the press that the Arab population there was being forced to resettle -- Arab settlement came under Saddam's regime, but resettlement by force is bad. Changing the demographic structure of the region by force was wrong. He noted that Kirkuk was not originally Kurdish either, and it was good to have mainstream Arabs there as part of the solution. U/S Grossman said he would look into the situation. ¶17. (C) Gul then turned to terrorism. He recalled his public statements saying that the terrorists did not just hit Istanbul, they hit Islam. Fortunately the GOT quickly identified the terrorists, whose understanding of religion - a Wahhabi/Salafi theory -- was very strange and had no grassroots support in Turkey. It was a small cell, imported from outside, which would make it easier for the GOT to root them out and to prevent further attacks. ¶18. (U) This cable has been cleared by U/S Grossman. EDELMAN