DAS PASCOE'S NOVEMBER 21 TRIP TO ANKARA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007354

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2013
TAGS: AJ ARMENIA'>AM GG PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: DAS PASCOE'S NOVEMBER 21 TRIP TO ANKARA


(U) Classified by CDA Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons
1.5 (b) and (d).



1. (S) Summary: EUR DAS Lynn Pascoe visited Turkey on
November 21 for a series of meetings with MFA officials. In
all his meetings, Pascoe urged MFA officials to think about
the period leading up to the NATO Summit as a critical
opportunity to showcase Turkey's achievements before the
December 2004 EU decision on whether to grant Turkey a date
to begin accession negotiations. He told officials the U.S.
was ready to help in this effort. With U/S for Economic
Affairs Kilic, Pascoe discussed the upcoming Economic
Partnership Council (EPC) meeting, Iraq reconstruction, and
the Habur border gate. Pascoe encouraged the GOT to think
about how to improve the foreign investment climate and Habur
gate operations. U/S for Political Affairs Sensoy said the
GOT needed better information about progress on the action
plan against the PKK/KADEK in Northern Iraq; Pascoe briefed
him on the progress of the U.S. action plan. With Caucasus
DDG Tezgor, Pascoe reviewed his recent trip to the region and
encouraged the GOT to improve relations with ARMENIA and its
economic involvement in the region. End Summary.


Deputy U/S for Economic Affairs Kilic



2. (C) MFA Deputy U/S for Economic Affairs Alev Kilic said
Turkey was focusing on developing economic relations with the
Caucasus and Central Asia. Kilic viewed the Caucasus as part
of "greater Europe," and agreed with Pascoe without strong
economic ties to Europe the region could be manipulated by
unhelpful actors in Russia. Pascoe noted that Turkey had not
yet opened the border with ARMENIA, forcing trade to go
through Georgia's Ajara region. Kilic said "we do not see
ARMENIA as a good neighbor," adding that the issue was
political, not economic. Pascoe said his sense was that the
ARMENIAn government was enthusiastic about initiatives that
would increase activity at the border; Turkey should view
this as a a strategic imperative.



3. (SBU) Pascoe asked how the U.S. and Turkey could use the
upcoming December 2-3 Economic Partnership Council (EPC)
meeting and the NATO Summit to bolster U.S.-Turkey relations
and show Turkish achievements. Kilic said economic relations
needed strengthening but the GOT was uncertain about the way
forward. He asked for U.S. ideas about how to make Qualified
Industrial Zones (QIZs) work better. He also agreed with DCM
that Turkey needed to think about how to improve its foreign
investment climate.



4. (C) Kilic said Turkey would be raising the issue of how
to get more economic involvement in Iraq reconstruction,
including opening more border gates. DCM said activity at
the current gate was idle for 5-6 hours every day and that
lines of trucks on both sides were growing. This was
hampering the Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO)
effort to meet the deadline for winding down the Oil-for-Food
Program. Kilic said he had heard Habur was working at full
capacity and that FAO trucks were given priority. Pascoe
urged the Kilic to make sure the GOT took action on the
border gate issue.



5. (SBU) DCM urged Kilic to have the GOT send a senior
prosecutor to the December 11-12 preparatory meeting for the
Southeast Europe Prosecutors Working Group; Kilic said the
GOT supported the Group and he would check to ensure the GOT
sent a representative.


Deputy U/S for European Union Affairs Bozkir



6. (C) Pascoe told Deputy U/S for European Union Affairs
Volkan Bozkir that the months leading up to the NATO Summit
would be a good opportunity for Turkey to highlight its
reforms and achievements and that the U.S. was prepared to be
helpful. This would be the critical period in the run up to
the EU's December 2004 decision about giving Turkey a date to
begin accession negotiations. Bozkir expressed appreciation
for U.S. support. He said the government had passed the
"critical mass" of laws needed to satisfy the Copenhagen
Criteria and was now focusing on implementation. On Cyprus,
Bozkir said the GOT wanted a solution, but Cyprus was not
part of the political criteria. He expressed concern that
the EU's emphasis on Cyprus would strengthen Turkey's
domestic critics of EU accession who argue that the EU was
looking for excuses not to admit Turkey. He predicted that
the GOT would not be able to continue the reform process if
it did not get a date in December 2004.


Deputy U/S for Political and Security Affairs Sensoy



7. (S) Deputy U/S for Political and Security Affairs Nabi
Sensoy said the GOT had a clear idea of the U.S. action plan
against the PKK/KADEK in Iraq. However, he said that the GOT
was unhappy with the information exchange about progress on
the plan and that "frustration is building." The GOT needed
concrete information about progress on the action plan.
Sensoy expressed appreciation for U.S. recognition of the
so-called "KHK" as another iteration of the PKK/KADEK
terrorist organization. Sensoy said that Turkey would work
to create the conditions to encourage those in the Makhmour
refugee camp to return to Turkey, and he reviewed the
timetable laid out in his recent discussions with PRM A/S
Dewey.



8. (S) Pascoe noted that the GOT had expressed no
dissatisfaction with progress on the action plan during the
recent High Level Defense Group (HLDG) meeting in the U.S.;
on the contrary, DCHOD Basbug had made positive statements.
He noted that the U.S. had recently made a show of force
against the PKK after U.S. forces came under PKK fire. The
U.S. was preparing courses of action (COAs) against the PKK
that should be ready soon. The question was now one of
timing and opportunity for execution of the COAs.


Deputy DG for Caucasus Tezgor



9. (C) Pascoe reviewed his recent trip to the Caucasus with
Caucasus Department Deputy Director General Tezgor. Tezgor
expressed appreciation for Pascoe's readout. Tezgor said he
was continuing to have had productive discussions with the
ARMENIAns; the two countries were working on "step-by-step"
improvements in relations with measure such as increased
charter flights, NGO and journalist exchanges, and joint
restoration of historical monuments. However, Tezgor said
that Turkey would not open the border until ARMENIA made some
concession on Nagorno-Karabakh (NK),such as a partial
withdrawal from the occupied territories. Pascoe said the
Kocharian would want a concession on NK status before any
withdrawal. Tezgor said ARMENIA would have to take the first
step, perhaps by officially recognizing the Turkey-ARMENIA
border.



10. (C) Pascoe pointed out the size difference between
Turkey and ARMENIA: Turkey had no realistic fear of border
problems and could not realistically expect a much smaller
country to take the first steps. On NK, the GOT could help
by preparing public opinion for a settlement. He told Tezgor
the U.S. would seek ways in which to keep Turkey better
informed about the Minsk Group process.



11. (C) Tezgor worried about increasing Russian influence in
the Caucasus. Pascoe said the U.S. was aware of the Russian
push and was active in the Caucasus. He told Tezgor the U.S.
was continuing to train Georgian forces, would step up
military cooperation with ARMENIA over the next few months,
would push for PfP funding in the region, and would seek to
get the EU more involved. He said Turkey was a good
counterweight to Russia and that Turkey should seek to
increase its economic activity in the region.



12. DAS Pascoe was unable to clear this message before his
departure.
DEUTSCH