Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA5566
2003-09-04 10:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY'S EU CANDIDACY: FOCUS NOW ON IMPLEMENTATION

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 005566 

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2008
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S EU CANDIDACY: FOCUS NOW ON IMPLEMENTATION


REF: A. ANKARA 4834

B. ANKARA 728

C. ANKARA 3974

D. ANKARA 5217

E. ANKARA 3738


Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch; reasons 1.5 b and d.


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 005566

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2008
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S EU CANDIDACY: FOCUS NOW ON IMPLEMENTATION


REF: A. ANKARA 4834

B. ANKARA 728

C. ANKARA 3974

D. ANKARA 5217

E. ANKARA 3738


Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch; reasons 1.5 b and d.



1. (C) Summary: European diplomats in Ankara say the GOT's
extensive human rights reforms have brought Turkey close to
meeting EU accession criteria; the EU will now focus on how
well the reforms are implemented. However, Turkey still
falls short of the criteria in some areas, and pro-EU
advocates in the GOT say further reforms are needed. End
Summary.



2. (U) Ankara-based diplomats from EU states credit the GOT
with passing broad, groundbreaking human rights reforms over
the past two years. Several of our contacts -- including
British, German, Dutch, Italian, and Swedish diplomats --
believe that with the July passage of the seventh EU-related
reform package (reftel A) the GOT has come close enough, on
paper at least, to meeting the political criteria for EU
accession that the EU has shifted its focus from Parliament
to the bureaucracy, where reform legislation is implemented.
"I'm amazed at what they've been able to pass in Parliament,"
said a German diplomat. "But now they have to implement it."
At the December 2004 Summit, our contacts say, the EU's
decision on whether to set a date to begin accession talks
with Turkey will depend heavily on GOT performance in
implementing the reforms it has adopted, though it will also
be influenced by events in Cyprus and politics within the EU
and its member states.



3. (C) Officials in the MFA and the Secretariat General for
EU Affairs, the GOT offices driving the EU-related reform
process, have gotten the message on implementation. Asligul
Ugdul, political affairs director at the Secretariat General,
said she recognizes that in some cases impressive-seeming
legislative reforms have been undermined by highly
restrictive implementing legislation. She said she is
working with MFA colleagues to develop a system for
monitoring reform implementation. At the same time, she
acknowledges that the GOT is not in full compliance with the
EU political criteria and will have to make further legal

changes.


--------------
Cyprus Settlement
--------------



4. (C) Officially, a Cyprus settlement is not a prerequisite
for a date to begin accession talks. The written criteria
only call on the GOT to "strongly support efforts to find a
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem." But many
Europeans have made it clear in private that they want a
settlement, or at least a major breakthrough toward a
settlement, before offering a date. Some GOT officials claim
they could solve Cyprus quickly, but only after the EU sets a
date; the EU wants to see a settlement first.



5. (U) The following is an analysis of where the GOT now
stands on each of the EU Political Criteria. As the EU
performs its upcoming evaluations, conclusions will depend in
part on the effectiveness of Turkish implementation and in
part on the subjective evaluations of the EU Commission and
member states. In the final analysis, although the accession
criteria are designed to set an objective standard, EU
accession decisions will remain political.


--------------
Economic Development of Southeast/IDPs
--------------



6. (U) The GOT has moved this criterion from the political
section to the economic section of its National Program for
EU membership. In part, this is a gambit to buy time -- the
economic criteria are to be met during accession talks, while
the political criteria are supposed to be fulfilled
beforehand. There is some logic to it as well, because
fulfilling this criterion involves long-term economic
development. It is not clear, however, whether the EU will
accept the idea of putting this issue on the slow track.



7. (C) This criterion also involves assisting the return of
IDPs who fled the southeast, or were forced out, during the
PKK conflict. The UN has recommended the GOT hold an
international conference to develop a return program meeting
international standards. MFA supports the idea, but the
Interior Ministry opposes. We will report on this in more
detail septel.


--------------
Torture
--------------



8. (U) The GOT has adopted a number of legal reforms relating
to torture. For example, thanks to recent reforms:
prosecutors no longer need the permission of a police
officer's supervisor in order to investigate an officer for
torture; torture sentences can no longer be suspended or
postponed; torture trials cannot break for summer recess; and
the statute of limitations for torture has been extended.
The challenge now is to implement the reforms.


--------------
Attorney Access
--------------



9. (C) Under a reform measure adopted in January, all
detainees now have the right to immediate attorney access.
Previously, detainees in State Security Court (SSC) cases
were denied attorney access for 48 hours. It is not clear
how thoroughly this has been implemented; human rights
activists accuse authorities of preventing some detainees
from contacting attorneys, and then falsely claiming the
detainees waived the right to consult with an attorney. This
reform is closely linked to anti-torture efforts -- since
most torture occurs in the first 24 hours of police
detention, immediate attorney access would constitute a
strong deterrent.


--------------
Discrimination/Cultural Diversity
--------------



10. (C) The main problem in this area is the Kurdish issue.
The GOT has adopted reforms lifting, in principle,
restrictions against Kurdish language courses and broadcasts.
However, in both cases the bureaucracy has drafted highly
restrictive implementing regulations that have made it
impossible for interested parties to establish courses or
broadcasts (reftels B-C). The GOT has also revised census
legislation used to prevent parents from giving their
children Kurdish names. However, Sezgin Tanrikulu, chairman
of the Diyarbakir Bar Association, claimed in a press
interview that authorities continue to enforce the previous
restrictions.


--------------
Freedom of Expression
--------------



11. (C) A number of reforms have been adopted to soften the
impact of various laws used to fight controversial speech.
More importantly, State authorities over the years have
become far less aggressive in pursuing and punishing speech
crimes. Still, existing law provides plenty of leeway for
going after those who "insult" the State or its institutions.



12. (C) This criterion requires Turkey to "remedy the
situation" of the thousands of prisoners currently jailed for
non-violent speech. The GOT has adopted legislation allowing
a retrial in a Turkish court for convicts who win their
appeals in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The
current, high profile trial of Leyla Zana and three other
former Kurdish MPs is the first retrial under this measure.
However, European and other outside observers have criticized
the proceedings as biased against the defendants (reftel D).


--------------
Freedom of Association/Assembly
--------------



13. (U) The GOT has passed various measures to loosen
restrictions on who can form and join an association, what
types of associations university students can form, and how
much advance notice is needed before holding a demonstration.
The reforms have also reduced somewhat the power of local
officials to ban or postpone demonstrations, and made it
easier for Turkish associations to add branches and join
international associations. Turkey still falls short of EU
standards in this area, but has probably made enough progress
to eliminate this as a stumbling block.


--------------
Freedom of Religion
--------------



14. (U) From the EU perspective, the key issue here is the
State's approach toward religions other than Islam. The GOT
interprets the 1923 Lausanne Treaty as applying to three
"minority" religious groups -- Greek Orthodox, ARMENIAn
Orthodox, and Jews. Parliament has adopted reforms designed
to allow the foundations of these Lausanne minorities to own
property. However, implementing regulations imposed onerous
conditions on applicants, and a hostile Foundations
Directorate has rejected many such applications.
Non-Lausanne religious minorities lack legal status and have
difficulty establishing houses of worship and practicing
their faith.


--------------
NSC Reform
--------------



15. (C) The GOT has made a number of changes to the structure
of the National Security Council. The number of civilian
representatives has been increased, constituting a majority;
the number of NSC meetings has been cut in half; regulations
have been changed to allow a civilian to be appointed NSC
Secretary General; and the legal duties of the NSC have been

SIPDIS
revised to emphasize the body's advisory nature. The EU
criteria are vague on this score, requiring that the NSC be
adapted "in order to align civilian control of the military
with practice in EU member states."


--------------
Judicial Reform
--------------



16. (C) The biggest problem in this area is Turkey's State
Security Court system, widely criticized for favoring State
interests over individual rights. The ECHR has consistently
overturned SSC convictions; in March, for example, the ECHR
ruled that jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan did not receive
a fair trial, in part because the SSC where he was tried in
1999 did not constitute "an independent and impartial
tribunal." However, there have been no significant changes
to the SSCs, despite talk among reform advocates of revising
or abolishing the courts.


--------------
Prison Conditions
--------------



17. (U) This does not appear to be a problem for EU
candidacy. The European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture, a Council of Europe body, regularly conducts
unannounced prison inspections in Turkey, and has not raised
fundamental concerns about conditions.


--------------
Police, Judicial Training
--------------



18. (C) The GOT has established human rights training for
police and Jandarma, in cooperation with the EU and other
outside donors. One of our Kurdish nationalist-Islamist
contacts said the Police Academy human rights training is now
much more advanced than anything offered at the universities.
In addition, the Justice Ministry is training judges and
prosecutors in how to implement the new reforms.


--------------
International Conventions, ECHR Compliance
--------------



19. (U) Turkey has ratified the required international
documents: the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and its Optional Protocol; the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and Protocol 6 of
the European Convention on Human rights.

20. (C) The EU has criticized Turkey for consistently failing
to respect ECHR rulings. Recent reforms, mentioned above,
allowing for a retrial in a Turkish court for those who win
their appeals in the ECHR should improve the GOT's record;
previously, successful appellants were entitled only to
financial compensation. However, Turkish judges are often
ignorant of, or hostile to, ECHR rulings. In one recent
case, a writer was taken to court for the re-publication of a
book, despite the fact that the ECHR ruled his previous
conviction for the original publication improper (reftel E).
The Justice Ministry is providing training to judges and
prosecutors on the ECHR.






















EDELMAN