SCENESETTER FOR TURKISH FONMIN GUL'S JULY 24 VISIT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 ANKARA 004552

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR TURKISH FONMIN GUL'S JULY 24 VISIT
TO WASHINGTON


REF: 02 ANKARA 6339


Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson. Reason: 1.5 (b)(d).



1. (C) Summary: F.M. Gul comes to Washington as we try to
pull Turkey into a more fully helpful role in Iraq. The last
year has shaken the confidence of the Turkish public,
politicians, and military in the strength of the relationship
with the U.S., just as it has shaken our confidence in the
Turks. While we have been able to manage the issue of the
July 4 incident, it is likely to fester for a long time in
the minds of many Turks as a humiliation to the military, and
could thus continue to affect U.S.-Turkey security
cooperation broadly. In part, our problems come from
divergent views on Iraq, particularly the security threat
from various possible development in northern Iraq. However,
in large part they are also a function of Turkish domestic
politics. The ruling AK Party is seen as a threat to the
existing order of Turkey that the military and much of the
Establishment is trying to defend -- and the military is seen
as a barrier to the changes AK and others would like to make
in Turkey. The relationship with the U.S., the reforms
needed for the EU and even the range of Iraq issues have been
approached, frequently, by both sides in the context of the
relationship between the military/traditional Establishment
and AK, rather than on their merits. In reacting to the July
4 incident, P.M. Erdogan and Gul maintained a measured
approach, while the TGS, under pressure from military
hard-liners, refused any responsibility and stirred national
outrage. The implications of the internal political dynamic
for the wider issue of GOT Iraq policy are considerable.
Civilian authorities would like to complete a transformation
of Iraq policy away from the historic northern-Iraq centered
obsession and fear of a Kurdish state -- a change in focus
that stems in part from efforts by the MFA and other civilian
authorities to wrestle control over Turkey's Iraq policy from
the Turkish military. Following on the July 18th visits of
CMDRUSEUCOM and CMDRUSCENTOCM, we have cooperative
perspectives for Iraq stabilization force, terror action, and
greater transparency and liaison before us. This visit needs
to reinforce the direction, but we cannot press hard on the
stabilization force contribution at the risk of being
counterproductive. It will also be important to present
positive and operational response to Turkey's offers of
civilian humanitarian assistance. End summary.


--------------
The Domestic Context
--------------



2. (C) Gul, Erdogan, and the rest of the AK leadership have
maintained a measured approach to the incident in Iraq in
order to protect our bilateral relationship and to press its
proposed reform package to loosen the TGS's grip on Turkish
policy. However, to keep their political opponents off
balance, they have publicly been supportive of the military.
The hard-liners saw the event as a way to resist AK's effort
and weaken its standing by attacking it as an American
"supporter." Thus, the AK stance contrasts starkly with the
reaction from the military, President Sezer, and opposition
CHP, all of whom have used the press to castigate both AK for
being "too soft" and the U.S. for its actions. After the
release of the joint statement the Turkish press focused on
the absence of an apology.



3. (C) U.S.-Turkey tensions fit into a complex competition
between AK and the military. They portray themselves as
having opposed visions of Turkey's future. Within each group
there are tensions too. There are increasing signs of
discontent among hard-liners in the senior military
leadership, who are trying to force TGS chief Ozkok into a
more confrontational stance toward the USG as a way to rally
nationalism and counter AK. The difference between the AK
Government and the Establishment on this front highlights a
basic gap in Turkey between those -- led in the first
instance by the military hawks -- who support an order linked
to a rigid, statist-oriented view of what Ataturk wanted for
the Republic of Turkey, and those who say they want a more
open, EU candidacy-linked, conservative Turkey, with greater
opportunity for Islamic influences, to prevail. In this
political competition there are also question marks regarding
AK's: 1) ultimate social, political, and economic intentions
domestically; and 2) its ability to run a competent
government and willingness to respond to U.S. interests. The
domestic competition is often more important to the TGS or AK
than the issues being addressed, and many U.S.-Turkey
questions are dealt with as fodder as much as on their
merits.


--------------
Turkish Military
--------------



4. (S) Contacts in the MFA, press, and among national
security analysts think the Turkish military misjudged
Turkey's equities in Iraq after the end of operations and
that TGS's efforts to use the Turkmen issue as a wedge
against U.S. policy was a mistake. TGS D/CHOD Buyukanit,
regarded as one of the senior officers pushing a harder line
against the US during the Iraq war, also admitted that the
Turkish military had misplayed its hand on Iraq. While
arguing that both sides had made mistakes and defending
(without great conviction) TGS's attempts to persuade the
Parliament to pass the March 1 troop deployment resolution,
Buyukanit had said -- before the July 4 incident -- that TGS
was ready to move forward with the U.S. TGS supported the
recent Cabinet decree to allow the U.S. and other coalition
partners to use Turkish bases and ports for operations
consistent with UNSCR 1483, including a positive response in
principle to EUCOM's request to station up to 10 tankers and
1 ISR aircraft at Incirlik in support of OEF and OIF
operations (EUCOM is in the process of reviewing TGS's
operating guidelines for the deployment and stationing of the
aircraft, but we are taking a slow approach in the wake of
the detention of TSF in Iraq).



5. (C) TGS asserts privately and publicly that it supports
Turkey's EU candidacy and wants to adopt stances on important
issues (i.e. non-military approach to PKK/KADEK) that would
help Turkey vis-a-vis the EU. However, top military officers
also have recently publicly criticized the EU and taken
measures to delay EU-related reforms. Many continue to
believe that TGS was behind President Sezer's recent decision
to veto an article of the GOT's 6th EU-related reform package
and that the Turkish military will continue to resist all
efforts by AK to lessen the military's control over what it
considers to be its sacred role in protecting Turkey's
"secular" status and national security interests.



6. (S) On the TGS horizon is the August Supreme Military
Council (YAS). Among the four-star ranks, both the Navy and
Air Force commanders retire this year, as will the commanders
of the First and Third Turkish Armies, and the National
Security Council Secretary General. The YAS could allow
Ozkok, who is beginning the second year of his four-year tour
as Chief of the Turkish General Staff, the first real
opportunity to shape his own leadership team. Last year,
contrary to tradition, the outgoing chief made all the
general officer assignment and promotion selections. Ozkok,
however, may be constrained by the hard-liners and other
traditionalists with whom he is contending on a number of
issues.


--------------
Iraq: Signs of a Shift In Policy
--------------



7. (S) The detention of TSF by the U.S. military in northern
Iraq on July 4 has raised suspicions on both sides of the
other's intentions. CDR EUCOM Gen. Jones reiterated our
concerns to Ozkok July 18; while Ozkok stuck to the TGS
position on the issue, he added that he would punish any
"lack of discipline" he found among the TSF elements
involved; he added that visible cooperation was the best way
to move ahead. While letting Gul know we want the matter
behind us, we should reiterate to him that U.S. forces had
solid information and found concrete evidence. We should
also press for an outcome of the Iraq discussion which
underscores that the U.S. and Turkey are jointly focused on
Iraq's recovery and democratization country-wide.



8. (S) Turkey's civilian authorities would like to complete a
transformation of Iraq policy away from the historic
northern-Iraq centered obsession with border security, fear
of a Kurdish state, and Turkish military presence towards a
more Baghdad-oriented policy based primarily on trade and
assistance. This change in focus, to the extent it has been
realized, appears to stem in part from efforts by the MFA and
other civilian authorities to wrestle control over Turkey's
Iraq policy from the Turkish military. During a recent
one-on-one with the Ambassador, MFA U/S Ziyal said he had
asked P.M. Erdogan after the end of combat operations in Iraq
to transfer authority over the issue of northern Iraq (and
Iraq) from the TGS to the MFA.



9. (SBU) The Turks have taken a number of concrete steps in
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction since the
Secretary's April visit to Turkey. Turkey has become a hub

SIPDIS
for facilitating the flow of humanitarian assistance to
northern Iraq. The World Food Program has shipped 341,000
tons of food through Turkey since March. Turkey is also the
world's biggest supplier (in value terms) to WFP. Turkey
recently allowed an energy barter arrangement organized by
Delta Petroleum to go forward. This will enable coalition
authorities to supply essential energy supplies to the Iraqi
people. Indeed, Turkey has an opportunity to build strong
trade links with Iraq. During his Washington meetings in
June, MFA U/S Ziyal raised Turkey's interest in building a
second border crossing to relieve the burden on the Habur
Gate (now handling some 2000 vehicles daily). Bottlenecks in
processing vehicles continue on both sides of the border,
with the KDP continuing to charge some (including UN)
vehicles fees and the GOT carefully scrutinizing incoming
trucks to limit fuel smuggling. The Turks have applied to
reestablish THY commercial air links with Iraq when that
becomes feasible. We hope that the visit will allow us to
begin to operationalize further civilian reconstruction
cooperation as offered by Ziyal that CPA views favorably.


--------------
Relations with Iraqi Kurds
--------------



10. (C) The MFA has portrayed the mid-May visit to Iraq by a
three-person MFA delegation as improving Turkish-Kurdish
relations. The Turkish delegation found both KDP leader
Barzani and PUK leader Talabani willing to take concrete
steps to improve relations. The MFA delegation proposed a
number of confidence-building measures designed to improve
relations, including: (1) more equitable and transparent
duties charged to Turkish businesses crossing the border; (2)
softening of rhetoric between Kurdish and Turkmen groups in
Iraq; (3) establishment of Turkish-Kurdish joint ventures in
the north; and (4) establishment of "one-stop shopping" in
key northern Iraqi cities for Turkish business groups.
Barzani reportedly committed in principle to taking steps to
improve Kurdish-Turkmen relations, but said he could not
"change course overnight." He said the KDP would explore
taking incremental steps toward improving relations, and said
that that much would depend on the actions of the Turkmen.
The KDP and PUK leaders also reportedly heeded Turkey's
request to refrain from calling for the end of the Peace
Monitoring Force and the withdrawal of the Turkish
participating troops at least until the end of the year to
give the Turkish military time to "feel more comfortable"
with the overall security situation on the ground in Iraq.



11. (C) The GOT remains concerned about what it perceives to
be undue Kurdish influence on coalition authorities in
northern Iraq. They have strongly objected to coalition
plans to disarm all groups except the Kurds, which they
believe gives the Kurds too much power over the other ethnic
groups, particularly the Turkmen.


--------------
Turkmen in Iraq
--------------



12. (C) While the GOT remains concerned about the fate of
Turkmen, the frequency and tone of Turkish "complaints" of
mistreatment of the Turkmen by other Iraqi groups have
declined significantly. GOT officials appear to have made a
conscious decision to change the way they talk about the
Turkmen. The nearly daily reports of Kurdish efforts to
marginalize Turkmen have been replaced by statements about
the importance of ensuring proportionate representation for
all Iraqi groups in local and central decision-making bodies.
The MFA regularly talks about the need for the Iraqi Turkmen
Front to become a real political party, to not be seen as a
tool of Ankara, and to integrate itself into the political
process in Iraq. The GOT continues to look to the U.S. to
help ensure proper Turkmen representation on key leadership
councils in the north as well as in the IIA.


--------------
PKK/KADEK
--------------



13. (S) The Turks remain interested in working with us on
collaborative planning to address the PKK/KADEK presence in
the north; TGS Chief Ozkok reiterated this July 18 to CDR
CENTCOM Gen. Abizaid. Nevertheless, recent developments
might complicate the modalities of such cooperation. The
GOT's draft law to reintegrate PKK/KADEK militants and their
leadership in exchange for a PKK/KADEK agreement to lay down
their arms and return to Turkey appears now to have been
watered down owing to resistance from parts of the military
and the traditionally hard-line civilian staff of the Turkish
NSC. In the wake of widespread press speculation -- fomented
in the first instance by a well-known conduit for hard-line
military views -- the MFA has expressed concern to us about
Iraq Governing Council member Mahmoud Othman's alleged
PKK/KADEK ties. It is likely that Gul will raise this with
the Secretary. We have not uncovered any information
suggesting his support for PKK/KADEK and have told the GOT to
share the evidence.


--------------
Stabilization Force for Iraq
--------------



14. (C) TGS Chief Ozkok and MFA U/S Ziyal told CDR CENTCOM
Gen. Abiziad and Gen Jones July 18 that they welcomed the
chance to begin thinking in earnest about the modalities of a
Turkish contribution to the Stabilization Force -- in Ozkok's
view, preferably under NATO auspices -- but warned that
public opinion and politics could make approval difficult.
Given the sennsitivities involved, we should avoid creating
the impression with Gul that we are pushing too aggressively
on this front. Rather, we need to let the planning process
move forward towards the right answer from the Turks.


--------------
Middle East Roadmap
--------------



15. (C) The GOT wants to use its excellent relations with
Israelis and the Palestinians as a vehicle for its larger
ambitions in the region. P.M. Erdogan told President Bush
May 14 he would send F.M. Gul to Israel and Palestine "soon;"
we understand from an AK party deputy chairman that a Gul
visit is now more front and center given AK's recognition of
the importance of such a visit for Turkey's relations with
the U.S. TGS CHOD General Ozkok went to Tel Aviv July 3 and
Israeli President Katzav visited Turkey July 8-9. Israeli
F.M. and DefMin have been to Ankara in the last two months as
well. An MFA official also has told us the idea of
supporting Abu Mazen at the expense of Arafat "poses certain
problems for the AK party and P.M. Erdogan." We have had
similar intimations from AK M.P.s. During his meetings in
Washington, Gul expects to hear the current status of play
and Administration views of how Turkey can best contribute.


--------------
Syria/Iran
--------------



16. (C) The Turks remain disturbed by what they see as unfair
criticism from Washington that they are "soft" on Syria and
Iran. GOT officials have argued that Washington's perception
that Turkey's relations with Syria and Iran was inconsistent
with USG policy were "totally unfounded" and denied that
Turkey was pursuing a strategic partnership with either
country. The GOT argues that Turkey shares the same values
and goals in the Middle East as the U.S. (stability,
democracy and prosperity),and Gul delivered a call for
democracy and reform in the Islamic world at the June OIC
Summit in Tehran. MFA has gone so far as to argue that the
U.S. message on Syria that we conveyed to FM Gul prior to his
May visit to Syria was "softer" than the message Gul
delivered. Turkey shares our concern about Iranian support
for terrorists (including the PKK/KADEK) and WMD programs).
If the GOT's perception is accurate and Washington does
believe that Turkey is "soft" on Syria and Iran, we recommend
that the Department make clear what Turkish actions have led
to this conclusion and what Turkey needs to do to prove that
it shares U.S. concerns and objectives regarding Syria and
Iran. Turkey should be cautioned that Iranian
destabilization tactics in the region will be met with equal
and appropriate countermeasures and the USG expects its full
support should events come to this. On this latter point,
however, we can expect Gul, who sees Iran as a much tougher
nut to crack than Iraq, to be ultra-cautious about endorsing
active measures against Iran.



17. (C) IAEA chief Mohammed El Baradei's findings as a result
of his latest visit to Tehran to discuss the capabilities of
the recently tested Iranian surface-to-surface Shahab-3
ballistic missiles is a potential source of worry for both
the GOT and the US. Turkey shares the USG's concerns
regarding Iran's nuclear program, and has fully supported the
USG in its call for total Iranian compliance with IAEA's
inspection process and safeguard requirements. Nevertheless,
Turkey exhibits a preference for appearing to cooperate with
Iran while, at the same time, seeking to hide behind USG
cover to constrain Iran's nuclear capabilities. It will be
important to remind Turkey of the necessity to present a
public, unified stance regarding Iranian nuclear
capabilities.


--------------
Cyprus
--------------



18. (C) Although the AK government has retreated from its
much more forward-leaning initial approach in the face of
concerted political pressure from the military, presidency,
MFA bureaucracy, and "TRNC President" ReDenktash, senior AK
officials tell us this was a tactical retreat and Erdogan
intends to solve the problem before Cyprus's entry into the
EU May 1, 2004. AK owes Denktas nothing politically, and we
understand that the GOT is willing to use the Annan III Plan
as the basis for renewed negotiations, but wants adjustments
on land and the numbers involved in population shifts between
the two sides. It would be useful to emphasize to Gul the
benefits to U.S.-Turkish relations from GOT acceleration of
the negotiations and a settlement.


--------------
ARMENIA
--------------



19. (C) The AK government is much less wedded to Aliyev and
tying improvement of relations with ARMENIA to a settlement
in Nagorno-Karabakh, but remains under sniper fire from
entrenched anti-ARMENIAn interests. AK officials tell us
they recognize the trade and development benefits to Turkey
from opening the border. We understand there may be secret
F.M.-level contacts continuing at this time. However, AK
officials have made it clear that passage of any ARMENIAn
genocide language, even by only one chamber of Congress, will
set progress back significantly.


--------------
EU Candidacy
--------------



20. (C) Since coming to power in the November elections, the
ruling AK Party has made EU membership a top priority. The
GOT in January adopted two EU-related legislative reform
packages designed to crack down on torture and remove
barriers to free expression, association, and fair trial.
Parliament adopted another package June 19, the sixth package
in the past two years, and the GOT plans to pass a seventh
package before a parliamentary recess in August. Our
contacts have confirmed press reports that the seventh
package will be focused on limiting the military's political
influence, including measures that will change the structure
of the National Security Council. However, the pro-EU,
pro-reform AK government faces opposition from nationalistic
opponents in the bureaucracy and parts of the military. In
several instances, bureaucratic institutions have undermined
reform legislation by developing highly restrictive
implementing regulations. For example, Parliament lifted
restrictions on Kurdish language broadcasting, but the
subsequent Radio and Television Board regulation set strict
time limits and restricted such broadcasts to state-owned
media outlets. In addition, our European contacts say that
while the GOT has made impressive legal reforms, Turkey's
standing in the EU has also been undermined by recent actions
such as the closing of the pro-Kurdish HADEP party and
indictment of its sister party, DEHAP, and the recent police
raid of the Human Rights Association's Ankara offices.


--------------
Child Custody
--------------



21. (C) The Hague Convention on Child Abduction requires the
expeditious return of a child to its country of residence so
the courts in that country can decide on custody. Turkey has
been a signatory to the Hague Convention since August 2000.
During that period of time, we are unaware of any children
being returned to any country without the agreement of the
abducting parent. There are systemic problems: 1) Court
meets for 10 minutes monthly and does not focus on Hague
issues; 2) judges do not understand the Hague Convention
requirment and rule on custody rather than Hague issues,
thereby requiring a lengthy appeal process; 3) the legal
process lasts between 2-3 years total; and 4) the Ministry of
Interior does not focus resources on finding the abducted
child and the parent. The US currently has four applications
pending for return of a child to the US. In one case the
child has now been in Turkey over a year due to the slow
court process and the judge used that delay to rule the child
should stay in Turkey. In another case, the Government of
Turkey has been unable to locate a child abducted to Turkey
in October 2002. Due to physical abuse by the abducting
father, the Turkish court ordered the child returned to the
mother immediately. The Interior Ministry places a low
priority on these types of cases and has been unable to
locate the child.


--------------
Human Trafficking
--------------



23. (C) We have discussed with the GOT at various levels the
need to show progress on Trafficking in Persons (TIP) by
September in order to avoid facing sanctions as a consequence
of Turkey's Tier III ranking in the TIP report. GOT
officials have been highly defensive on the issue, insisting
that the report is unfair and that they are already taking
adequate measures.


--------------
Article 98
--------------



24. (C) GOT contacts have repeatedly maintained that, in
principle, they share our concerns about the International
Criminal Court (ICC) and favor reaching an Article 98
agreement with us. However, given their status as an EU
candidate country, they believe it is not in their interest
to sign an agreement until the U.S. and EU resolve their
differences on the issue.


--------------
The Economy
--------------



25. (SBU) The economy is sending mixed signals. On the one
hand, there are solid signs of growth and declining
inflation. On the other hand, after having rallied strongly
in the aftermath of the Iraq operation, particularly once the
USG announced it would provide $1 billion in financial
assistance, markets have stalled due to the lack of investor
confidence in the government's commitment to reform. Markets
are particularly concerned about continuing delays in the
Government's implementation of its IMF-backed reform program.
As a result, interest rates on the extremely large
government debt remain high, and the economy remains
vulnerable to a sharp depreciation of the currency, which
would put the entire program and economic stability at risk.
We need to stress the importance of Turkey flawlessly
implementing its commitments under the IMF-backed program (to
the IMF). Disbursement of USD 1 billion in U.S. assistance
-- which Gul might raise -- is contingent on continued
implementation of the IMF program.



26. (SBU) In June, MFA U/S Ziyal and U/S Larson agreed to
convene a fall meeting of the Economic Partnership Commission
(EPC),which was established in early 2002 to find ways to
enhance the bilateral economic relationship. The meeting
will be an opportunity to press a broad economic agenda
including structural reform, reduction of trade barriers
improving the investment climate, and enhancing regional
economic cooperation.
PEARSON