SCENESETTER FOR GENS. ABIZAID AND JONES' JULY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 004477

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENS. ABIZAID AND JONES' JULY
18-19 VISIT TO ANKARA


Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch. Reason: 1.5 (b)(d).



1. (S) Summary: Your visits come as we try to close the
July 4 incident and pull Turkey into a more fully helpful
role in Iraq. The last year has shaken the confidence of the
Turkish public, politicians, and military in the strength of
the relationship with the U.S., just as it has shaken our
confidence in the Turks. While we have been able to manage
the issue of the July 4 incident, it is likely to fester for
a long time in the minds of many Turks as a humiliation to
the military, and could thus continue to affect U.S.-Turkey
security cooperation broadly. In part, our problems come
from divergent views on Iraq, particularly the security
threat from various possible development in northern Iraq.
However, in large part they are also a function of Turkish
domestic politics. The ruling AK Party is seen as a threat
to the existing order of Turkey that the military and much of
the Establishment is trying to defend -- and the military is
seen as a barrier to the changes AK and others would like to
make in Turkey. The relationship with the U.S., the reforms
needed for the EU and even the range of Iraq issues have been
approached, frequently, by both sides in the context of the
relationship between the military/traditional Establishment
and AK, rather than on their merits. In reacting to the July
4 incident, P.M. Erdogan and F.M. Gul maintained a measured
approach, while the TGS, under pressure from military
hard-liners, refused any responsibility and stirred national
outrage. The implications of the internal political dynamic
for the wider issue of GOT Iraq policy are considerable.
Civilian authorities would like to complete a transformation
of Iraq policy away from the historic northern-Iraq centered
obsession and fear of a Kurdish state -- a change in focus
that stems in part from efforts by the MFA and other civilian
authorities to wrestle control over Turkey's Iraq policy from
the Turkish military. End summary.


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The Domestic Context
--------------



2. (C) F.M. Gul and P.M. Erdogan have maintained a measured
approach to the incident in Iraq in order to protect our
bilateral relationship and to press its proposed reform
package to loosen the TGS's grip on Turkish policy. However,
to keep their political opponents off balance, they have
publicly been supportive of the military. The hard-liners
saw the event as a way to resist AK's effort and weaken its
standing by attacking it as an American "supporter." Thus,
the AK stance contrasts starkly with the reaction from the
military, President Sezer, and opposition CHP, all of whom
have used the press to castigate both AK for being "too soft"
and the U.S. for its actions. After the release of the joint
statement the Turkish press focused on the absence of an
apology.



3. (C) U.S.-Turkey tensions fit into a complex competition
between AK and the military. They portray themselves as
having opposed visions of Turkey's future. Within each group
there are tensions too. There are increasing signs of
discontent among hard-liners in the senior military
leadership, who are trying to force TGS chief Ozkok into a
more confrontational stance toward the USG as a way to rally
nationalism and counter AK. The difference between the AK
Government and the Establishment on this front highlights a
basic gap in Turkey between those -- led in the first
instance by the military hawks -- who support an order linked
to a rigid, statist-oriented view of what Ataturk wanted for
the Republic of Turkey, and those who say they want a more
open, EU candidacy-linked, conservative Turkey, with greater
opportunity for Islamic influences, to prevail. In this
political competition there are also question marks regarding
AK's: 1) ultimate social, political, and economic intentions
domestically; and 2) its ability to run a competent
government and willingness to respond to U.S. interests. The
domestic competition is often more important to the TGS or AK
than the issues being addressed, and many U.S.-Turkey
questions are dealt with as fodder as much as on their
merits.


--------------
Iraq: Signs of a Shift In Policy
--------------



4. (S) Turkey's civilian authorities would like to complete a
transformation of Iraq policy away from the historic
northern-Iraq centered obsession with border security, fear
of a Kurdish state, and Turkish military presence towards a
more Baghdad-oriented policy based primarily on trade and
assistance. This change in focus, to the extent it has been
realized, appears to stem in part from efforts by the MFA and
other civilian authorities to wrestle control over Turkey's
Iraq policy from the Turkish military. During a recent
one-on-one with the Ambassador, MFA U/S Ziyal said he had
asked P.M. Erdogan after the end of combat operations in Iraq
to transfer authority over the issue of northern Iraq (and
Iraq) from the TGS to the MFA. However, the detention of TSF
by the U.S. military in northern Iraq on July 4 has raised
suspicions on both sides of the other's intentions.



5. (SBU) The Turks have taken a number of concrete steps in
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction since the
Secretary's April visit to Turkey. Turkey has become a hub

SIPDIS
for facilitating the flow of humanitarian assistance to
northern Iraq. The World Food Program has shipped 341,000
tons of food through Turkey since March. Turkey is also the
world's biggest supplier (in value terms) to WFP. Turkey
recently allowed an energy barter arrangement organized by
Delta Petroleum to go forward. This will enable coalition
authorities to supply essential energy supplies to the Iraqi
people.



6. (C) Turkey has an opportunity to build strong trade links
with Iraq. During his Washington meetings in June, MFA U/S
Ziyal raised Turkey's interest in building a second border
crossing to relieve the burden on the Habur Gate (now
handling some 2000 vehicles daily). Bottlenecks in
processing vehicles continue on both sides of the border,
with the KDP continuing to charge some (including UN)
vehicles fees and the GOT carefully scrutinizing incoming
trucks to limit fuel smuggling. The Turks have applied to
reestablish THY commercial air links with Iraq when that
becomes feasible.


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Relations with Iraqi Kurds
--------------



7. (C) The MFA has portrayed the mid-May visit to Iraq by a
three-person MFA delegation as improving Turkish-Kurdish
relations. The Turkish delegation found both KDP leader
Barzani and PUK leader Talabani willing to take concrete
steps to improve relations. The MFA delegation proposed a
number of confidence-building measures designed to improve
relations, including: (1) more equitable and transparent
duties charged to Turkish businesses crossing the border; (2)
softening of rhetoric between Kurdish and Turkmen groups in
Iraq; (3) establishment of Turkish-Kurdish joint ventures in
the north; and (4) establishment of "one-stop shopping" in
key northern Iraqi cities for Turkish business groups.
Barzani reportedly committed in principle to taking steps to
improve Kurdish-Turkmen relations, but said he could not
"change course overnight." He said the KDP would explore
taking incremental steps toward improving relations, and said
that that much would depend on the actions of the Turkmen.
The KDP and PUK leaders also reportedly heeded Turkey's
request to refrain from calling for the end of the Peace
Monitoring Force and the withdrawal of the Turkish
participating troops at least until the end of the year to
give the Turkish military time to "feel more comfortable"
with the overall security situation on the ground in Iraq.



8. (C) The GOT remains concerned about what it perceives to
be undue Kurdish influence on coalition authorities in
northern Iraq. They have strongly objected to coalition
plans to disarm all groups except the Kurds, which they
believe gives the Kurds too much power over the other ethnic
groups, particularly the Turkmen.


--------------
Turkmen in Iraq
--------------



9. (C) While the GOT remains concerned about the fate of
Turkmen, the frequency and tone of Turkish "complaints" of
mistreatment of the Turkmen by other Iraqi groups have
declined significantly. The military has tried to play the
Turkmen card for several years, but civilian officials appear
to have made a conscious decision to change the way they talk
about the Turkmen. The nearly daily reports of Kurdish
efforts to marginalize Turkmen have been replaced by
statements about the importance of ensuring proportionate
representation for all Iraqi groups in local and central
decision-making bodies. The MFA regularly talks about the
need for the Iraqi Turkmen Front to become a real political
party, to not be seen as a tool of Ankara, and to integrate
itself into the political process in Iraq. The GOT continues
to look to the U.S. to help ensure proper Turkmen
representation on key leadership councils in the north as
well as in the IIA. They have expressed disappointment that
only one Turkmen, who is not part of the ITF leadership, was
named to the Governing Council.


--------------
EU Candidacy
--------------



10. (C) Since coming to power in the November elections, the
ruling AK Party has made EU membership a top priority. The
GOT in January adopted two EU-related legislative reform
packages designed to crack down on torture and remove
barriers to free expression, association, and fair trial.
Parliament adopted another package June 19, the sixth package
in the past two years, and the GOT plans to pass a seventh
package before a parliamentary recess in August. Our
contacts have confirmed press reports that the seventh
package will be focused on limiting the military's political
influence, including measures that will change the structure
of the National Security Council. However, the pro-EU,
pro-reform AK government faces opposition from nationalistic
opponents in the bureaucracy and parts of the military. In
several instances, bureaucratic institutions have undermined
reform legislation by developing highly restrictive
implementing regulations. For example, Parliament lifted
restrictions on Kurdish language broadcasting, but the
subsequent Radio and Television Board regulation set strict
time limits and restricted such broadcasts to state-owned
media outlets. In addition, our European contacts say that
while the GOT has made impressive legal reforms, Turkey's
standing in the EU has also been undermined by recent actions
such as the closing of the pro-Kurdish HADEP party and
indictment of its sister party, DEHAP, and the recent police
raid of the Human Rights Association's Ankara offices.


--------------
Turkish Military
--------------



11. (S) Contacts in the MFA, press, and among national
security analysts think the Turkish military misjudged
Turkey's equities in Iraq after the end of operations and
that TGS's efforts to use the Turkmen issue as a wedge
against U.S. policy was a mistake. TGS D/CHOD Buyukanit,
regarded as one of the senior officers pushing a harder line
against the US during the Iraq war, also admitted that the
Turkish military had misplayed its hand on Iraq. While
arguing that both sides had made mistakes and defending
(without great conviction) TGS's attempts to persuade the
Parliament to pass the March 1 troop deployment resolution,
Buyukanit had said -- before the July 4 incident -- that TGS
was ready to move forward with the U.S. TGS supported the
recent Cabinet decree to allow the U.S. and other coalition
partners to use Turkish bases and ports for operations
consistent with UNSCR 1483, including a positive response in
principle to EUCOM's request to station up to 10 tankers and
1 ISR aircraft at Incirlik in support of OEF and OIF
operations (EUCOM is in the process of reviewing TGS's
operating guidelines for the deployment and stationing of the
aircraft, but we are taking a slow approach in the wake of
the detention of TSF in Iraq).



12. (C) TGS asserts privately and publicly that it supports
Turkey's EU candidacy and wants to adopt stances on important
issues (i.e. non-military approach to PKK/KADEK) that would
help Turkey vis-a-vis the EU. However, top military officers
also have recently publicly criticized the EU and taken
measures to delay EU-related reforms. Many continue to
believe that TGS was behind President Sezer's recent decision
to veto an article of the GOT's 6th EU-related reform package
and that the Turkish military will continue to resist all
efforts by AK to lessen the military's control over what it
considers to be its sacred role in protecting Turkey's
"secular" status and national security interests.



13. (S) On the TGS horizon is the August Supreme Military
Council (YAS). Among the four-star ranks, both the Navy and
Air Force commanders retire this year, as will the commanders
of the First and Third Turkish Armies, and the National
Security Council Secretary General. The YAS could allow
Ozkok, who is beginning the second year of his four-year tour
as Chief of the Turkish General Staff, the first real
opportunity to shape his own leadership team. Last year,
contrary to tradition, the outgoing chief made all the
general officer assignment and promotion selections. Ozkok,
however, may be constrained by the hard-liners and other
traditionalists with whom he is contending on a number of
issues.


--------------
The Economy
--------------



14. (SBU) The economy is sending mixed signals. On the one
hand, there are solid signs of growth and declining
inflation. On the other hand, after having rallied strongly
in the aftermath of the Iraq operation, particularly once the
USG announced it would provide $1 billion in financial
assistance, markets have stalled due to the lack of investor
confidence in the government's commitment to reform. Markets
are particularly concerned about continuing delays in
completing the work for the fifth review under the IMF
program. As a result, interest rates on the extremely large
government debt remain high, and the economy remains
vulnerable to a sharp depreciation of the currency, which
would put the entire program and economic stability at risk.
We need to stress the importance of Turkey flawlessly
implementing its commitments to the IMF. Disbursement of USD
1 billion in U.S. assistance is contingent on continued
implementation of the IMF program.



15. (SBU) In June, MFA U/S Ziyal and U/S Larson agreed to
convene a fall meeting of the Economic Partnership Commission
(EPC),which was established in early 2002 to find ways to
enhance the bilateral economic relationship. The meeting
will be an opportunity to press a broad economic agenda
including structural reform, reduction of trade barriers
improving the investment climate, and enhancing regional
economic cooperation.
PEARSON