IRAQ: TURKS REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT KURDISH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004222 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2013 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS TU IZ SUBJECT: IRAQ: TURKS REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT KURDISH INFLUENCE AND SEEK ANSWERS TO THE "ZIYAL LIST" REF: A. DUNNIGAN-SILVERMAN EMAIL (MATRIX) ¶B. ANKARA 3975 ¶C. ZIYAL PAPER PROVIDED JUNE 16 ¶1. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. ¶2. (U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch. Reasons: 1.5 (B and D). ¶3. (C) Action Request: Refs A and B list GOT offers of assistance related to the reconstruction and stability of Iraq, for which Post has requested guidance from the Department or OCPA. DG for Mideast Affairs Burcuoglu convoked the DCM July 2 to raise several points of GOT concern (see below),including concerning the Turkish proposals cited previously in Refs A-C. Embassy looks forward to receiving Department's guidance on ref A issues, as well as those raised by Burcuoglu. ¶4. (C) Summary: DG for Mideast Affairs Burcuoglu convoked the DCM July 2 to discuss several issues of concern to the GOT. According to Burcuoglu: -- the disarmament of all groups in northern Iraq except the Kurds will create tensions and gives the impression that Kurdish predominance in Iraq is predetermined; -- Turkmen underrepresentation on the "Iraqi Political Advisory Committee" would be detrimental to the future of Iraqi democracy (Turkmen should be the third largest group represented among the 25-30 members); -- the KDP levying of ad hoc taxes and fees at the Habur gate is obstructing the return to normalcy of commercial traffic; -- the GOT is still waiting for a US response on the GOT's intention to reopen its consulate in Mosul; -- the Turkish embassy in Baghdad, like many others, continues to have difficulties finding points of contact at CPA and hopes the USG can facilitate this. End Summary. ¶5. (C) DG Burcuoglu convoked the DCM July 2 to raise numerous concerns regarding events in Iraq, but first he expressed the GOT's sympathy for the casualties coalition forces in Iraq were sustaining on an almost daily basis. He added that the US's success in Iraq was also a success for Iraq and for Turkey. Burcuoglu emphasized that the main issue of concern regarding events in Iraq was the coalition decision to disarm all groups in northern Iraq except the Kurds, which the GOT believed was discriminatory and provocative. Furthermore giving the Kurds the authority to approve other groups' licenses to carry small arms gave the impression that Kurdish authority in the north was predetermined, even though the interim authority had not yet even been established. He cited as an example a June 23 press conference in which a US LTC implied that among the 404th Civil Affairs Battalion's goals were to support the Kurdish authority in northern Iraq. Burcuoglu pressed for the USG to allow Assyrians and Turkmen to carry small arms for self-protection without the need for Kurdish approval. ¶6. (C) Burcuoglu's second item of GOT concern was the composition of the "Iraqi Political Advisory Committee." He noted that the GOT expected the Turkmen to be the third largest group on the 25-30 person body, as their exclusion or underrepresentation would be detrimental to the future of Iraqi democracy. In the same vein, the GOT expected the US to address the situation in Kirkuk, which he said was heavily favoring Kurdish influence there. ¶7. (C) On the issue of the Habur gate, the GOT was in the process of normalizing the commercial flow of traffic through that crossing, but the KDP on the Iraqi side was levying fees and taxes at will and disrupting that flow. Burcuoglu asked that the US take control of the Iraqi side of the border (from the KDP) or at least increase the US presence to prevent the KDP from creating problems. (Comment: The KDP denies that it is charging any taxes or fees, and the GOT denies that it is creating long queues by submitting transporters to intense scrutiny/bureaucracy. In addition, the truckers are undoubtedly complicating the situation by smuggling goods or claiming that they are paying fees they are probably pocketing. End Comment.) ¶5. (C) Burcuoglu then asked to follow up on two items that Ziyal raised in Washington on which the GOT is awaiting a reply: opening a Turkish consulate in Mosul and establishing better points of contact between the Turkish embassy in Baghdad and CPA. On the first, Burcuoglu said the GOT would like to send a couple of diplomats, probably accompanied by a couple of security personnel, to re-establish the Turkish consulate in Mosul. He noted that if, like the embassy in Baghdad, the US discouraged but did not prevent the opening of this office, the GOT would be satisfied. On the question of POCs at the CPA in Baghdad, Burcuoglu said that other diplomats in Baghdad were complaining of the same problem; Turkey did not feel discriminated against, but does not understand why the fruitful US-TU cooperation conducted in Washington and Ankara cannot also occur in Baghdad. ¶6. (C) DCM committed to relaying Burcuolgu's concerns to Washington and Baghdad. He asked for patience regarding the POCs in Baghdad as the situation/personnel there is constantly in flux and communications are not easy for anyone. PEARSON