TURKEY'S GENC PARTY: THE KEMALIST STATE'S NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003784 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV TU SUBJECT: TURKEY'S GENC PARTY: THE KEMALIST STATE'S NEW ALTERNATIVE TO AK? REF: A. ANKARA 2516 ¶B. ISTANBUL 752 (U) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch. Reason: 1.5 (b)(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: As reported in reftels, Motorola deadbeat Cem Uzan is trying to moderate Genc Party's nationalist-corporatist image by toning down his angry anti-U.S., anti-West rhetoric and by recruiting well-known politicians from the center-right. As part of this strategy, Uzan has been granting interviews to major dailies (not part of his own media empire) in which he has sounded a more mainstream, albeit decidedly nationalist, note. Privately to us, prominent Genc officials have tried to explain away strongly anti-U.S. Genc ads on television and in newspapers prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom as "mere politics." The evolution of Genc strategy reflects its preparations for the nation-wide local elections that must be held by April 2004 but could come sooner. End summary. -------------- The New Opposition? -------------- ¶2. (C) Uzan's media blitz is having its intended effect as some recent public opinion polls show Genc Party as second only to the ruling AK party: at around 16 percent, well behind AK but several points ahead of the Establishmentarian CHP, which leads the parliamentary opposition. Contacts across the spectrum attribute much of Genc's current popularity to Uzan's exploitation of his own numerous media outlets and the party's strong, angry nationalist message, which continues to resonate with impoverished Turks and other, less enlightened social-political elements. -- Like AK and its predecessors, Genc is developing novel campaign tactics. But whereas AK and its like specialize in grassroots activism and door-to-door precinct work reminiscent of the Chicago machine, Genc is taking its cue from the latest trends in U.S-style politicking, running a top-down, media-heavy (and media-savvy) campaign unprecedented in Turkish political history. -- Selma Acuner, former chairman of the women's group Ka-Der, is a close Embassy contact with political ambitions whom Genc is trying to recruit. She told us recently that Uzan has quietly established a think tank-like organization in Ankara as a policy planning/propaganda center aimed at a more elite audience. According to Acuner, Genc is carefully trying to ;keep its distance publicly from this organization in order not to undermine its carefully-nurtured image as an "independent" -- and thus credible -- institution. ¶3. (C) In a bid to soften Genc's image, Uzan is personally staking out more nuanced rhetorical turf. Gone, for now, are the media ads explicitly suggesting that the U.S. is bent on attacking Turkey militarily. (This theme, which Uzan propounded in print and on the airwaves in the months before the Iraq war, undoubtedly is reflected in recent opinion surveys purporting to show a significant level of public animosity toward the United States.) While Uzan himself is maintaining his opposition to the war, he also criticizes the AK government for failing to negotiate a better deal from the USG in return for Turkey's support. Privately in meetings with us, Genc officials -- including Ahmet Oguz Ozcu, an executive in the Uzan business empire who is formally the party's Number Two man -- have tried to explain that the USG "misunderstands" Genc, that the anti-American ad campaigns and stump speeches are "just politics." When repeatedly told that Genc rhetoric is irresponsible and does not square with the party's effort to fashion a more moderate image, Genc officials say only that the Genc message is "not anti-American, but pro-Turkey." ¶4. (C) There are other signs that the Uzan way of doing business survives the Genc makeover attempt. A leading banker told Ambassador that the Uzan's Cukurova Electricity Company has abused its monopoly in electricity generation, transmission and distribution in the southern city of Adana to extort money and favors from local industry. Other sources tell us Cukurova Electricity has failed to honor its investment commitments to the GOT, and has failed to comply with a GOT regulation requiring it to turn over its electricity transmission facilities to the Government. Istanbul banking sources say the Uzan's bank, Imar, is a "black hole," in that the entire financial community has no idea what, if any, banking business it does. -------------- AK Wary -------------- ¶5. (C) The ruling AK Party increasingly sees Genc, not Deniz Baykal's CHP, as its most serious challenger on the national scene. They privately concede that Genc is likely eventually to establish a geographic electoral base in Izmir -- where Genc polled remarkably well in the Nov. 2003 national elections -- and other Aegean provinces that had previously been a bastion of Kemalist/Establishmentarian probity. Indeed, AK vice chairman Firat asserted to us recently that the Genc threat is spurring AK to tie up loose ends -- even in Ankara, where the strained relations between Mayor Gokcek, formerly with Refah/Fazilet, and P.M/AK Chairman Erdogan could split the AK constituency and provide an opportunity for the party's rivals. According to Firat, Erdogan's effort to woo Gokcek into the AK fold is showing signs of bearing fruit. "Erdogan is no fool," he said. -------------- The New "Party of the State?" -------------- ¶6. (C) Genc officials hope to present themselves as the "choice of the State" and, with CHP apparently going no where politically, as the only real choice for Establishment types worried about AK. Several contacts tell us that, consequently, Uzan is reaching out to the military for support. Several prominent Genc members have privately asserted to us that they have contacts among senior military officials. Leading journalists, including "Hurriyet's" Cuneyt Ulsever, and senior officials in AK and other parties, assess that the "Genc alternative" resonates with elements of the Turkish State. According to center-right DYP Vice Chairman M. Salim Ensarioglu, retired Gen. Cevik Bir, former TGS Deputy Chief and a principal figure in the "post-modern" coup of 1997 against the then Islamist-led government, is on the Genc payroll as a party "coordinator." -------------- -------------- Genc and the Transformation of the Establishment: Implications -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Genc's angry nationalism is not new. The party's understanding of the world has much in common with that of the MHP (junior partner in the previous government and voted out of Parliament in the Nov. 2002 election that brought AK to power) and the numerous, fledgling Kemalist parties led by such Establishmentarian/Deep State stalwarts as former Supreme Court President Yetka Gungor Ozden and retired Chief Prosecutor Vural Savas (septel). What is different now is that Erdogan and AK are in power, while CHP is proving a disappointment to an Establishment eager for someone to undercut the AK challenge to the status quo. As a result, Genc is seeking to exploit the Turkish State's discomfort -- and any AK economic or other missteps that turn off voters -- to establish itself as a contender. ¶8. (C) For Uzan, a key political question will be whether, and to what extent, Turkey's Kemalist elites write off "the Party of Ataturk" and turn to Genc. As demonstrated in the 2002 elections, Genc already has a foothold in areas previously dominated by the Establishment. In this context, the nationwide local elections, which must be held by April 2004, could be a herald of things to come. PEARSON