REPORT OF GROWING WAR ANXIETY IN TURKEY'S KURDISH

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002018 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IZ SUBJECT: REPORT OF GROWING WAR ANXIETY IN TURKEY'S KURDISH SOUTHEAST REF: A. ANKARA 1631 ¶B. ANKARA 1740 (U) Classified by Polcouns John Kunstadter; reasons: 1.5 (b)(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Kurdish M.P. from Diyarbakir who is also a member of opposition CHP's Central Administrative Board has elaborated on concerns expressed to us recently by other Kurdish politicians (ref A) regarding fallout in southeastern Turkey from the war in Iraq. Moreover, he asserted that (1) there is a growing sense among Kurds that the war in Iraq is going poorly and (2) a growing number of Kurds in Diyarbakir view the conflict in increasingly stark, "Islamic" terms. End summary. ¶2. (C) A Kurdish M.P. from "secular" CHP -- one of the few straight shooters we know in that party -- asserted to us March 27 that the initial positive sentiment about the war in Iraq has faded among many Kurds in Turkey's Southeast. He claimed the mood in Diyarbakir, the region's largest city and our contact's hometown, is one of "controlled panic." Diyarbakir Kurds, he averred, "are genuinely concerned that the U.S. will bomb them. Even if Iraq shoots a missile against Diyarbakir, people will blame the U.S." Our contact recognizes the absurdity of such a fear but believes it comes from a growing sense -- fanned by local religious leaders -- that the U.S. is conducting a war against Islam. "You must take care not to bomb religious sites in Iraq," he warned, "or you will risk greater opposition in the Southeast." ¶3. (C) Moreover, the M.P. noted that many in the Southeast may not support the war because of familial and tribal ties to the terrorist PKK/KADEK. He noted that his own brother had joined the PKK in 1988 at the age of 15, though he has not been seen since. Kurds, he said, fear that whatever post-Saddam regime emerges in Iraq, it will at a minimum exclude PKK/KADEK from a place at the table and may even attempt to destroy it. Consequently, the pro-PKK/KADEK Kurdish Medya TV, he said, is broadcasting this concern. (Comment: In one of the ironies of the current political situation, we note that numerous senior figures in the pro-Kurdish DEHAP and defunct HADEP parties, both with a relationship to PKK/KADEK akin to that of Sinn Fein with the IRA, have eagerly expressed to us privately their support for USG actions in Iraq. End comment.) -------------- Comment: The Kurdish Dilemma -------------- ¶4. (C) Our senior CHP contact's comments emphasize different aspects of the situation than the views espoused by some of our other leading (pro-Barzani) Kurdish contacts, including those in CHP. On the one hand, they reflect diffuse tolerance of PKK/KADEK, not because it is a terrorist organization but because "these are our sons." Second, in previous, more official settings, this particular contact has been careful to enunciate the CHP line -- even as he simultaneously expressed hope that the USG war effort will succeed in improving conditions for Kurds in Iraq. As a secularist, however, he is also more prone to warn against rising Islamic sentiment than his more traditional brethren. ¶5. (C) As a whole, Kurds are more openly religious than ethnic Turkish citizens. While this helps foster a sense of the Kurds as distinct from, and victims of, the "Kemalist" Turks, it also makes many susceptible to pan-Islamic arguments that the USG is leading a "Crusade" against Muslim Iraq (ref B). In this contact's view, at least, there is a growing convergence of interests between some militant Islamist elements and far-left nationalists in the Kurdish Southeast. PEARSON