TURKEY'S RULING AK PARTY: DISCONTENT ON HIGH AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001931 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV TU SUBJECT: TURKEY'S RULING AK PARTY: DISCONTENT ON HIGH AND AT GRASSROOTS REF: A. ANKARA 1350 ¶B. ANKARA 1740 (U) Classified by Polcouns John Kunstadter. Reasons: 1.5 (b)(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Senior AK party reps express concern to us at AK's mishandling of the Iraq question and relations with the U.S. Local AK party bosses in Ankara districts complain bitterly to us about AK's failure to pass the U.S. deployment resolution (ref A) and what they see as AK's subsequent unseemly bargaining with the USG. They are also increasingly frustrated with: (1) national AK leadership for not sharing enough information on policy of direct concern to them and their constituents; and (2) AK's inability to counter the tactics of Establishmentarian opposition CHP and State entities, which, they say, have left AK wearing the jacket on Iraq. End summary. ¶2. (C) Three AK deputy chairmen, an AK M.P. who was previously P.M. Erdogan's private secretary, and two AK parliamentary group deputy chairmen, all representing varying currents in the party, have separately expressed concern to us at potential negative trends in U.S.-Turkish relations. All acknowledge the negative effect of AK's failure to pass the U.S. troop deployment resolution and to secure a workable political understanding on N. Iraq and a broad economic support package. The deputy chairmen (Kurdish patrician and director of policy and legal affairs Firat; director for foreign policy Disli; and usually truculent director of press and public relations Mercan) and former private secretary Comez, all of whom we talked to after the overflight permission was held up, also understand the deleterious effect of the overflight delay. They all expressed interest in rebuilding U.S.-Turkish relations. ¶3. (C) To varying degrees, the latter four have also been unusually forthcoming in admitting weaknesses in AK's approach. Among other points cited by one or more of them: lack of good communications between the party leadership and the parliamentary group; pernicious influence of Islamist journalist Fehmi Koru and Islamist academic Ahmet Davutoglu in misleading Erdogan and former P.M. Gul to think they could prevent the U.S. operation by preventing a northern option; an inability to avoid the political trap set by the Presidency and General Staff, whom they are beginning to admit openly are hostile to AK; and the political sabotage being carried out against his own party leadership by parliamentary Speaker Arinc. ¶4. (C) As laid out below, the AK leadership's failures to manage the Iraq question, relations with the U.S., and internal party dynamics has had a negative effect on AK's grassroots structures. -------------- Information Underload -------------- ¶5. (C) Two of AK's Ankara district chairmen -- middle-class Yenimahalle's Hamdi Balaban and lower-middle-class Altindag's Orhan Kaya -- pointed out to us that there has been little guidance from AK party headquarters with respect to GOT Iraq policy. As a result, they have been unable to explain the government's policies to local constituents, who are uncomfortable with the lack of clear decision making from P.M. Erdogan and former P.M. (now Fonmin) Gul. Balaban lamented then-P.M. Gul's lack of strong leadership in the run-up to the failed deployment vote on March 1: "he should have worked harder." -- Balaban, a former administrator in center-right DYP, also explained to us recently that although there are anti-war elements among Turks, his constituents are most concerned with the prevailing GOT uncertainty about what will come next. AK leaders' dithering has compounded public doubt, he said. Balaban is further worried that continued poor economic conditions exacerbated by the government's waffling will harm AK's chances for success in nationwide local elections scheduled for April 2004. -- According to Kaya, parliamentary Deputy Speaker and Ankara AK deputy Ismail Alptekin attended Altindag's most recent, and raucous, party meeting -- but refused numerous entreaties to comment on GOT Iraq policy. "We are registering our concerns with AK headquarters, but no one responds," Kaya charged. -------------- AK Wears the Jacket -------------- ¶6. (C) Both Balaban and Kaya are concerned that AK has allowed itself to be painted into a corner by opposition CHP and its allies in the Kemalist State apparatus -- which they see as "unfairly" exploiting AK's own confusion on Iraq. With considerable exasperation, Kaya noted that "Iraq is a State policy -- not just the responsibility of the elected government." He stated that his constituents have taken note of the "unhelpful" role played by President Sezer, CHP, and the TGS in foisting all of the responsibility on AK's shoulders. "Everyone sees this," he said hopefully. "How can a party like CHP -- with all of those retired ambassadors -- not recognize the importance of the current situation?" he lamented. -------------- Comment: Crushed Shoes and Top Hats -------------- ¶7. (C) AK officials assert, with some justification, that the party has been set up as the fall guy on Iraq (ref A). Yet the frustration of Kaya, Balaban, and others over AK's wearing the jacket of blame stems primarily from what they see as the leadership's inexplicable willingness to stand meekly while the tailors did the fitting. This frustration reflects how much AK is divided against itself in its relations with the Kemalist Establishment, seeing Kemalism as an obstacle yet craving the legitimacy and acceptance of the very State with which AK and its predecessor parties have long been at odds. On the streets, where the Establishment's image is threadbare, AK's confused quest for mainstream respectability, and its perceived submissiveness, is distressing. ¶8. (C) Well aware of this grassroots discontent, AK's Islamist rival Saadet is also courting discontent M.P.s (ref B). At a March 21 ceremony marking his formal accession to Saadet, Islamist godfather Erbakan appealed to his erstwhile followers in AK and elsewhere to "return to the true faith." Judging from our contacts' concerns, the crafty Hoca will have some success. PEARSON