S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001483

SIPDIS


NOFORN


DEPT. FOR P, EUR, EUR/SE, NEA AND NEA/NGA;
NSC FOR AMB. KHALILZAD;
OSD FOR LUTI


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS PREF PHUM TU IZ
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRAQ: PUK "PM" BARHAM SALIH ON TURKISH
INTERVENTION/MULTI-PARTY TALKS, UNIFICATION WITH KDP,
KIRKUK AND BADR CORPS PRESENCE IN N.IRAQ

REF: A. ANKARA 1391

B. ANKARA 1374

C. ANKARA 1360


Classified by Political-Military Affairs Counselor Stuart
Brown. Reasons 1.5 b and d.


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Summary
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1. (S/NF) Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) "Prime Minister"
Barham Salih met with Operation Northern Watch POLAD March 7
in Ankara. Salih planned to raise with Turkish MFA and
military officials later in the day what he characterized as
the strong, grass-roots objections of the vast majority of
northern Iraq's people to any Turkish intervention there, and
to note that Turkey was, by planning a cross-border move and
discussing it in public, making Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) leader Masoud Barzani a local hero. Salih also planned
to tell the Turks that Turkey's humanitarian assistance plan
needed to be coordinated and shared with the KDP and PUK, who
administer the area, in order to harmonize efforts, avoid
duplication and waste resources, and to avoid
misunderstandings. So far, he told us, no such effort has
been made. When we asked him if there were plans for
follow-up to the TGS-KDP-PUK-Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF)
meeting on military planning that took place Feb. 17 in
Silopi, Turkey, Salih said the Iraqi Kurds would only agree
if the USG sent a representative to the next round. On
Kirkuk, Salih said that the PUK could prevent displaced Kurds
from rushing back to Kirkuk if Washington made a public
commitment to the return of all the displaced through a
legal, political process. Salih briefed us on his detailed
proposal to unify KDP and PUK administrations now being
considered by the KDP. End summary.


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Ideally, Zero Turkish Troops
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2. (S/NF) In Ankara for talks with Turkish MFA and military
officials, PUK "PM" Salih met with ONW POLAD March 7. Salih
said he would leave Turkey for Washington March 8 and that he
would be in Washington for a week, and asked for assistance
in getting as many appointments in Washington as possible.
We asked Salih how he would like to see Turkish involvement
in northern Iraq during possible US military operations.
Salih replied, "Ideally, there would be zero Turkish military
involvement. If push comes to shove and the coalition needs
Turkey to be involved, we will need assurances that our
political rights will be protected, that Turkey will not get
involved in Iraqi Kurd-Turkoman politics, and that we will
have the right to tell the Turks to go home. We will need to
have clearly defined and agreed to Turkey's mission, rules of
engagement and depth of presence."


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Military and Humanitarian Coordination Lacking
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3. (S/NF) We asked Salih if there were plans for another
round of Turkey-KDP/PUK-ITF military talks to follow up the
Feb. 17 Silopi meeting. Salih said the Iraqi Kurds were only
interested in such a meeting if the US were represented as
well. He said the US needed to tell the Turks and the Iraqi
Kurds at the same time "the way it was going to be." He
noted that Turkey still had not shared with the KDP or PUK
Turkish plans for humanitarian assistance, which Turkey
claimed was why its troops needed to cross the border. Salih
planned to say to the Turks that such plans must be shared
and harmonized with KDP and PUK humanitarian assistance plans
to maximize effectiveness, minimize waste and duplication and
avoid misunderstandings. He said this was not a political
matter, but one of common sense and careful use of limited
resources.


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Turkey Making Barzani a Hero
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4. (S/NF) Salih, who met with KDP leader Masoud Barzani March
5, said he had never seen Barzani so angry, emotional and
irreconcilable about anything as he was about the prospect of
Turkish military intervention. Salih told us he could not
overstate the depth of anger among the people - not just the
politically involved - in northern Iraq toward Turkey, and
that Barzani was dangerously playing on that anger. Salih
planned to tell the Turks that they were making Masoud
Barzani a local hero by threatening military intervention in
northern Iraq. Salih believed there was potential for a "war
within a war" between the Iraqi Kurds and the Turks. Such a
situation, he said, would help Iran, and the Iranians would
play that card to complicate things for the US. He suspected
the recent movement of SCIRI's Badr Brigade forces into
northern Iraq may have been designed in part by Iran to draw
in the Turks.


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Badr Brigade: Iranian Surrogate or Opposition Fighters?
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5. (S/NF) Turning to the Badr Brigade presence, Salih
confirmed that approximately 1,000 troops were now located
near Darbandikan in northern Iraq. They were there, he said,
under the terms of a 1996 SCIRI-PUK agreement to coordinate
military activity against Saddam Hussein. When we asked what
he thought their motivation was for deploying into northern
Iraq, he replied, "everyone wants a piece of the pie." Salih
said the PUK leadership was split on whether they represented
an Iranian surrogate or a legitimate Iraqi opposition force,
but the PUK's hand against Iran was too weak to resist them,
given the 1996 agreement. Salih said he expected the Badr
troops to cooperate against Saddam during the fight, be a
possible source of pro-Iranian trouble-making during the
transition period, but to assume a legitimate Iraqi role in
post-Saddam Iraq.


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Need US Commitment on Returnees to Kirkuk
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6. (S/NF) When we asked Salih if he thought the PUK could
ensure that displaced Kurds would not storm back to Kirkuk as
soon as it was liberated (which could trigger a major
complicating Turkish response), Salih said that to do so, the
PUK would need a public statement from the US guaranteeing a
political/legal process of restitution and repatriation that
committed to getting people back to their original homes.


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KDP-PUK Unification Plans
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7. (S/NF) We asked Salih for details on Ref A plans to unify
KDP and PUK administrations and peshmerga forces. Salih said
that for now, the two parties have agreed to have a joint
political-military committee comprised of Masoud Barzani and
Jalal Talabani plus four reps from each side. The PUK reps
will be Salih, Khosrat Rasul Ali, Dr. Fuad Masoum, and
Nushirwan Mustafa. Salih did not know who the KDP would
propose for their reps. Salih said he had sent a letter to
Masoud Barzani proposing the following unification plan: The
administration would have a single "PM" (the KDP had the
option of deciding who that would be); a unified cabinet
including at least one Arab minister; two "Deputy PM's" - one
Turkoman and one Assyrian (with the ITF to be given first
chance at the Turkoman slot - if they refuse, the slot would
be offered to another Turkoman); and ministries and
subordinate offices would be integrated slowly, one at a
time. Salih's plan keeps regional finances separate until
resolution of differences over revenue-sharing can be
bridged.



8. (S/NF) Salih argued that rapid implementation of this plan
would allow the KDP and PUK to consolidate their position and
place them in a powerful spot to advocate federalism,
including their areas as one geographic federal unit in the
post-Saddam environment. Masoud Barzani told Salih that the
two sides needed to sit down and discuss the proposal, and
Salih believed Barzani was unenthusiastic, in part because he
is riding on a ground-swell of popularity for opposing
Turkey. Salih said KDP "PM" Nechirvan Barzani was unhappy
with offering a "Deputy PM" slot to the ITF. Still, Salih
said, unification could move quickly if it were pushed.


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A US-KDP-PKK Plot Against the PUK?
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9. (S/NF) Salih told us that a few days ago the local Turkish
liaison in Sulaymaniyah had come to him and suggested that
the US, the KDP and the PKK/KADEK were working together on a
secret plan to marginalize the PUK. We assured him this was

SIPDIS
not true. He said he knew it was not, but wondered what the
Turks were up to in suggesting it. Finally, he offered the
comment that if the Turks thought ITF Chairman Sanan Aga was
the man to protect Turkey's interests, the Turks were sorely
mistaken.
PEARSON