Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA1267
2003-02-26 12:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

IRAQ: CODEL HEFLEY PRESSES FOR TURKISH SUPPORT

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON ETRD TU IQ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001267 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD TU IQ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: CODEL HEFLEY PRESSES FOR TURKISH SUPPORT


(U) CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR W.R. PEARSON FOR REASONS 1.5(B)
AND (D).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001267

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD TU IQ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: CODEL HEFLEY PRESSES FOR TURKISH SUPPORT


(U) CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR W.R. PEARSON FOR REASONS 1.5(B)
AND (D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: In February 20-21 meetings, Codel Hefley
politely but aggressively pressed Turkey's leadership to
permit U.S. forces to use Turkey as a potential base for
operations. While recognizing the political difficulties
Turkey's elected politicians face, the Codel called upon them
to help enforce UNSCR 1441. From the interlocutors that
matter, particularly AK Party Chairman Erdogan and PM Gul,
the Codel heard assurances that Turkey would stand by its
long relationship with the United States when making the
decision whether to allow U.S. troops to deploy on Turkish
soil. The members elicited less support from President Sezer
and FM Yakis. END SUMMARY.



2. (C) COMMENT: Codel Hefley came to Ankara at a crucial
juncture in our efforts to convince the Turks of the need for
U.S. troops in SE Turkey. The members' consistent, firm, and
bipartisan message rounded out a broad series of political
and military contacts we have had with the GOT over the last
weeks. In the context of our asking the AK Party's
relatively new government to make an unpopular choice,
face-to-face contact between elected officials helped
reinforce to the GOT that the USG understands the dilemma
Parliament faces. The Codel, which coordinated its
statements well with our ongoing engagement of the GOT on
Iraq, left its interlocutors in no doubt of America's
determination to disarm Saddam. END COMMENT.



3. (U) Codel Hefley, which had visited Brussels and Paris as
the U.S. delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NPA),
came to Ankara at the invitation of the Turkish NPA
delegation. The U.S. delegation was headed by Congressman
Joel Hefley, who was accompanied by Congressmen John Tanner,
Paul Gillmor, Nick Lampson, Scott McInnis, and Dennis Moore.
The Codel met with President Sezer, PM Gul, AK Party Chairman
Erdogan, FM Yakis, Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA)
Chairman Arinc, and Foreign Ministry U/S Ziyal.


--------------
Codel Hefley's Message

--------------



4. (C) Codel Hefley presented a bipartisan and consistent
appeal to Turkey for its assistance against Iraq. The
members emphasized the USG's preference for Saddam's peaceful
disarmament. Nonetheless, the experience of the last twelve
years argued against his choosing to disarm voluntarily. As
Congressmen Hefley and Tanner pointed out to their
interlocutors, Saddam had already proven that he would use
weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors, as well as
against his own people. Turkey, as a "frontline" state, is
among those Saddam threatens the most.




--------------
Erdogan & Gul: Political Difficulties
--------------



5. (C) In separate meetings, PM Gul and AK Party Chairman
Erdogan (who is likely to become PM in March) cited the
Turkish public's "90 percent opposition to war." Erdogan
said that the public remains unconvinced of the case against
Saddam. Foremost in Turkish public opinion is the memory of
losses incurred during the course of the Gulf War, as well as
during the ongoing embargo, which hit Turkey's poor southeast
the hardest. Erdogan said the US economic package is
critical in winning public and parliamentary support for a
U.S. deployment. Gul, ideally, said he would like a second
UNSCR. At the Codel's prompting, however, he admitted that
Saddam, having long defied many resolutions, would be
unlikely to comply with yet another. To Gul, the value of
another resolution would be in "establishing the broadest
coalition possible" against Saddam's regime. Both Gul and
Erdogan averred that Turkey's strategic partnership with the
United States is Turkey's most vital relationship. Gul said
it is the "best thing Turkey has"; Erdogan said that Turkey
will not allow Iraq to overshadow the bilateral alliance.


--------------
MOU Negotiations
--------------



6. (C) FM Yakis made it clear that Turkey does not wish to
"make" the United States abandon what he called the "northern
option." He recognized that if there is a war in Iraq, it is
in Turkey's interest to have U.S. forces working from Turkish
soil. Foreign Ministry U/S Ziyal said that Turkey would
"make the right decision" and that the AK Party government
would do everything in its power to meet the USG's request.
Echoing statements from the PM and Erdogan, he said that
Turkey's vital interests require that the GOT stand up
against public opinion in regard to Iraq. If negotiations
seem difficult, he added, it is because the GOT takes its
commitments seriously and fully intends to carry them out.



7. (C) Both Yakis and Ziyal made appeals for U.S.
flexibility on the political, military and, particularly, on
the economic documents. Yakis cautioned that the current
Parliament is untested. The better the package the United
States presents, the more likely it is that Parliament will
allow U.S. troops into the country. The earlier legislation
that approved the site surveys and site preparation was not
as sensitive as the proposed troop deployment, which will
open Turkish territory for the United States to launch a war
against a neighbor. The current Parliament is more open to
debate than its predecessors; it is in the United State's
interest to give the GOT everything it can to make it
comfortable with making a hard decision to go against public
opinion. Ziyal underlined the fragility of Turkey's economy
even without the threat of war, while Yakis warned that a
bankrupt Turkey would be unable to effectively support the
United States. He argued for U.S. economic support
regardless of Parliament's approval for a U.S. troop
deployment.


--------------
Saddam and Iraq
--------------



8. (C) Ziyal dwelled on the future of Iraq. He doubted that
Saddam is in full "grasp of his faculties" and seems to get
"crazier and crazier" over time. Tariq Aziz showed the
strain on the regime during his recent visit to Istanbul,
when he was at "great unease." Turkey's preference is for
peaceful evolution in Iraq rather than revolution. Ziyal
said he hoped for a change of attitude in Baghdad and said
that the Turkey has worked hard to impress the need for
change on the Iraqis. Iraq's future is of immediate interest
to Turkey due both to proximity and to "relatives across the
border". Ziyal predicted that though the United States could
quickly invade Iraq, the military aspect of changing Iraq is
just the "tip of the iceberg." We should be ready for a
long-term commitment -- rebuilding Iraq will not be like
rebuilding Japan. Iraq is an "armed society" with a "culture
of violence." The first order of business will be to contain
violence -- Turkey understands that a northern front will
contribute to containing instability. Turkey is even more
willing to cooperate because issues in Iraq may look
different to Turkey than from the USG's cross-Altantic
perspective. This is especially the case in regard to the
vital issue of Iraq's territorial integrity.


-------------- --------------
Sezer Repeats His Call for a Second UNSC Resolution
-------------- --------------



9. (C) President Sezer sounded a different note than any
other interlocutor. He emphasized his interpretation that
Article 92 of the Turkish Constitution requires
"international legitimacy" for foreign troops to be based in
Turkey. The president claimed that the UNSC is the only body
that can confer it and that UNSCR 1441 is insufficient. In
his view, only a second UNSCR would allow the GOT to clear
what he referred to as a "constitutional hurdle." Staking
out a tougher position than the Codel heard elsewhere, he
said Turkey is already helping the United States more than
Turkey had helped during the Gulf War, relative to the lack
of a second resolution authorizing force. Absent a second
resolution, he predicted that the opposition party (the
Republican People's Party) would contest the approval of a
U.S. deployment in the Constitutional Court.


--------------
The Bilateral Relationship
--------------



10. (C) All parties praised the Turkish-U.S. strategic
partnership. Other than Iraq, four issues came up in two
venues:


-- President Sezer expressed appreciation for an October 16,
2002, Congressional resolution that thanked Turkey for its
support in the war against terror. He cited it as an
important, symbolic step in improving relations. Sezer also
applauded the creation of a Turkey caucus in the 107th
Congress. He hoped that it would be an active grouping in
the 108th.
-- Urging action, Sezer complained that the GOT has been
waiting for more than one year for the United States to
finalize arrangements for the establishment of Qualified
Industrial Zones in Turkey.


-- U/S Ziyal asked the Codel for a "better record from
Congress." Just as the USG is now asking Turkey to
subordinate some of its interests to America's appeal for
help against Iraq, he asked that Congress work to keep the
United State's national interest above "ethnic or local
considerations." Ziyal asked for a deeper understanding of
Turkey's sensitivity toward ARMENIAn genocide resolutions and
repeated Turkey's position that the issue is one best left to
historians.


-- Ziyal asked that the USG and, specifically, Congress try
to take a "balanced" approach on Cyprus. He worried that the
USG tends to hear only one side of the issue because Turkey
lacks a U.S.-based ethnic lobby to match the strength of the
Greek-American community.



11. (U) Codel Hefley did not clear this cable.
PEARSON