GOJ OFFICIALS ON ARAB ECONOMIC REFORM, PEACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 008450

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2013
TAGS: PREL KPAL ECON IS IZ SY JO
SUBJECT: GOJ OFFICIALS ON ARAB ECONOMIC REFORM, PEACE
PROCESS, IRAQ, AND RELATIONS WITH SYRIA AND ISRAEL

REF: AMMAN 08242

Classified By: Ambassador Edward W Gnehm for Reason
1.5 (b),(d)

SUMMARY


1. (C) NEA DAS Satterfield and Ambassador met
separately December 19 with Planning Minister Awadallah
and Foreign Minister Muasher. Discussion covered the
Aqaba "workshop," Abu Ala'a and the peace process, Iraq
and Syria, Article 98 negotiations, and Jordan-Israel
relations. End Summary.

AQABA "WORKSHOP"


2. (C) Planning Minister Bassam Awadallah briefed DAS
Satterfield, Ambassador & EconCouns on the results of
the just completed workshop in Aqaba organized by the
Jordanians to discuss reform in the Arab world.
Awadallah noted the difficulties in both organizing and
in conducting the meeting, which was held under the
umbrella of the "Arab Business Council." In the end,
despite the difficulties, there was agreement on a
"working draft" and on the principle of a follow-on
meeting. He said King Abdullah was an engaged
participant, attending lunch and dinner. The "working
draft" is to be discussed next on the margins of the
January World Economic Forum in Davos. The goal is for
formal adoption and public release of a document at
Davos, to begin a process favoring genuine reform.
Awadallah offered to provide us with the text. He said
Rima Khalaf made an important contribution with her
excellent presentation on socio-economic issues.


3. (C) The "working draft" addresses economic,
governance, and political reform. According to
Awadallah, the Egyptians and Saudis were forthcoming on
the economic agenda, but not on the
political/governance side hich he had to "push down
their throats." He acknowledged having softened some
points to accommodate them to reach an agreement. The
Egyptian attendees, all close to Gamal Mubarak, did not
have a reformist mindset, in Awadallah's estimation.
He seemed to lament the absence of Mahmoud Mohieldin, a
reformer reputedly close to Gamal and a key
interlocutor on the workshop, who traveled instead to
Morocco because of a prior commitment. Although
Foreign Minister Muasher thought his absence was both a
surprise and a negative signal, Awadallah put forward a
more benign spin, saying Mohieldin had always said his
prior commitment in Morocco took precedence.


4. (C) Satterfield stressed that the Egyptians were
key to the success of this initiative. He suggested
that the group think about ways to engage the G-8.
Awadallah agreed, but said that the Saudis, who were
also key, were reluctant partners. Saudi suspicions
about U.S. intentions vis-`-vis Saudi Arabia were a
factor, with even such pro-Western figures and Aqaba
participants as Abdullah Salih Kamel, Amer Dabbagh,
Fahd Mubarak and Lubna Olayan all asserting that the
U.S. had written off Saudi Arabia and decided to get
its oil elsewhere. If the U.S. is serious about reform
in Saudi Arabia, Awadallah suggested working more
closely with such people.


5. (C) Muasher commented on the reluctance of both the
Egyptian and Gulf participants to make commitments;
they kept stressing that they were only formulating a
"working draft," and did not want any publicity for the
workshop or the draft. The Gulf Arabs demanded
avoidance of such words as "democracy." Muasher added
that the "working draft" described the process as one
that will result in principles of reform, and itself be
a product of agreement by all in principle, points
reached only after heated debate. Muasher also said
the Egyptians were insistent that there be no specific
reference to a follow-on meeting in Egypt even though
they understood such a meeting was possible.


PEACE PROCESS


6. (C) Muasher was pessimistic about the opportunity
for progress between Israelis and the Palestinians, and
urged the U.S. to press Abu Ala'a to be more active;
his passivity was not bringing results. Muasher was
convinced that Abu Ala'a: a) would not act on
security; and b) discounts American and Israeli
seriousness of purpose, claiming the U.S. wants him to
act on an article of faith. Muasher said Abu Ala'a
seeks a direct deal with Israel, in part because of
Egyptian sugarcoating ugarcoating which has misled
Arafat into thinking the U.S. view of him is softening.
Muasher characterized the current U.S. approach as one
of encouraging "baby steps," but feared it would lead
nowhere or even to further deterioration. For example,
Sharon was moving in the wrong direction; the "security
fence" looked to be the death of the two-state
solution; and the creation of new facts on the ground
could make the President's timeline of 2005 obsolete.
He called for stronger U.S. re-engagement; Jordan can
help deliver the message, he said, but only the U.S.
can make things happen.


IRAQ


7. (C) Satterfield and Muasher discussed the need for
more focused efforts to draw the Iraqi Sunni community
into the governing process in Iraq. Muasher offered to
share a Jordanian document now in preparation and to
contribute to the evolving U.S. strategy.


SYRIA


8. (C) Muasher described King Abdullah's souring mood
toward Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. Despite the
King's repeated efforts to develop strong personal
bonds, including by traveling to Syria, Asad had failed
to reciprocate. During the recent up tic in hostile
Jordanian-Syrian rhetoric (reftel),the King was not in
an apologetic mood, although Muasher made several
conciliatory statements. Internally, Syria remained in
the grip of the old guard, according to Muasher n
old guard that is not taking Washington's verbal
warnings seriously, necessitating stronger action to
induce change in behavior.

ARTICLE 98


9. (C) Muasher reaffirmed that the Article 98
negotiations involved existential issues for Jordan.
He said Jordan will sign an agreement upon resolution
of the two outstanding issues, and expected progress
when the two sides resumed talks in New York early next
month.


JORDANIAN PRISONERS IN ISRAEL


10. (C) Muasher described the state of play on the
release of Jordanian prisoners and the issue of the
return of Jordan's Ambassador to Israel. Although he
maintained the two issues were not linked, Muasher
seemed to contradict himself. He indicated that Jordan
could return an Ambassador before the physical release
of the four prisoners it regards as of critical
importance, but only after Israel agreed to their later
release. He also indicated that Israel had agreed on
releasing 20-25 of the 30-35 names on the list, but
that the Israeli security services, according to
Foreign Minister Shalom, balked at releasing these four
prisoners as a first step. Muasher claimed that the
release of the four had become a "national issue,"
making progress impossible without their release.
(COMMENT: Jordanian MFA press releases are largely
responsible for drawing national attention to this
issue. End Comment.) Muasher complained, as he has
previously, that Hizballah, in its prisoner release
talks with Israel, was getting better treatment than
Jordan.

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