KING, GOVERNMENT PUBLICLY SUPPORT IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 006622

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2013
TAGS: PREL ECON IZ JO
SUBJECT: KING, GOVERNMENT PUBLICLY SUPPORT IRAQ
RECONSTRUCTION AND TRAINING FOR IRAQI POLICE; ISLAMISTS
STRONGLY OPPOSE


Classified By: Amb. Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (b)(d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (U) Both Prime Minister Abul Ragheb and King Abdullah
continue to publicly express their support for direct
Jordanian involvement in reconstruction efforts in Iraq,
including security-related training. The Jordanian Cabinet
formally endorsed October 14 a contract for the training in
Jordan of up to 32,000 members of the Iraqi police. The
Islamic Action Front (IAF),on the other hand, continues to
call on the GOJ to refrain from actions, including training
and the dispatch of troops, that would "legitimize" or
facilitate the American occupation of Iraq. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
THE GOVERNMENT SAYS "YES" TO IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION . . .
-------------- --------------


2. (U) Jordanian Prime Minister Abul Ragheb recently held a
series of publicized meetings with visiting Iraq officials in
which he stressed Jordan's commitment to assist in the
reconstruction of Iraq. On October 9, Abul Ragheb met with
Iraqi Minister of Transportation Bahnam Bolis to discuss
transport and economic cooperation between Jordan and Iraq.
Similarly, during the recent Jordan Economic Forum, Abul
Ragheb met with Iraqi Housing and Reconstruction Minister
Bayan Zubeidi to promote cooperation between the private
sectors of the two countries and joint Jordanian-Iraqi
projects in the rebuilding of Iraq.


3. (C) Abul Ragheb was careful to emphasize to the press
that Jordan wants to see a complete return of sovereignty to
the Iraqi people and the (eventual) withdrawal of all foreign
forces. But these recent meetings, like Abul
Ragheb's prior talks with members of the Iraqi Governing
Council (IGC),clearly demonstrate the GOJ's continued strong
backing of CPA reconstruction efforts.

--------------
. . . AND "YES" TO POLICE TRAINING . . .
--------------


4. (U) Attending the World Economic Forum's East Asia Summit
in Singapore October 13, King Abdullah publicly voiced his
support for the training of Iraqi police in Jordan. The King
characterized the police training as a positive step in the
restoration of normal life for Iraqis, and he stressed
Jordan's commitment to help the Iraqi people by
"rehabilitating" its professionals from various fields. The
King drew the line, however, on sending troops into Iraq,
saying that "I don't think that any country that borders Iraq
should play an active role inside of Iraq."


5. (C) On October 14, the Jordanian Cabinet formally
endorsed a contractual agreement signed October 11 between
the CPA and the Jordanian Public Security Department (PSD) to
provide training in Jordan for up to 32,000 members of the
Iraqi police (N.B: two side letters, necessary to make the
contract operational, have yet to be signed pending a further
round of negotiations to begin October 16). Minister of
Information Nabil Sharif told the press that the PSD would
carry out the training "in association with the concerned
bodies in Iraq," and further stated that the training would
"help our Iraqi brothers reinstate order and security to
their country."

--------------
. . . BUT THE ISLAMISTS SAY "NO"
--------------


6. (U) Reflecting its deep opposition to the U.S. presence
in Iraq, the IAF has denounced plans to train Iraqi police in
Jordan. In a memo sent by the IAF to the Prime Minister
around October 6, the IAF called on the GOJ to retract its
decision to provide police training. The IAF argued that the
offer of training had been coerced by occupation forces as
"part of the American-British project to wipe out national
resistance." The memo also stated that Iraqi "resistance
fighters" had admonished neighboring countries not to assist
the occupation of Iraq and, consequently, the IAF warned that
if the GOJ moved forward with its plans, "the battleground
might move to Jordan or reach our sons and interests in
Iraq."


7. (U) In a similar move, the IAF recently sent another
letter to the Prime Minister warning against sending
Jordanian forces into Iraq. In the letter, the IAF asserted
that it had received information about "secret plans" to
dispatch 3,000 Jordanian troops to Baghdad. The IAF
leadership branded such a move as "dangerous" and asked the
Prime Minister to put out an official statement denying these
rumors.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) The divide between the stance of the King and the
government, on one hand, and the IAF, on the other, with
respect to security assistance for Iraq shows no signs of
narrowing. Although the IAF cannot legitimately claim to
speak for a majority of Jordanians, it is trying to tap into
a strong public sense of unease about the U.S. presence in
Iraq and GOJ moves perceived as assisting that presence. The
IAF has not ruled out all cooperation with
Iraqis, as evidenced by its non-objection to increased trade
between Jordan and Iraq, but only condones "cooperation with
legitimate governments that represent the interests of their
people and nation, not an occupation that oppresses them,
plunders their resources, and confiscates their will."
Against this backdrop, the King and his government will have
to tread softly in public as they back U.S. efforts to
restore security in Iraq.


9. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.

Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/

or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET
home page.
GNEHM