BAGHDAD BASED IRAQIS SHARE THEIR PERSONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005698

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2013
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI JO
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD BASED IRAQIS SHARE THEIR PERSONAL
EXPERIENCES ON LIFE IN IRAQ

Classified By: CDA David Hale for Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) PolOff discussed with two Baghdad based Iraqis what
their lives in Iraq are like post-Saddam, Iraqi expectations
vs. current realities, the lack of security and basic
services, and observations on how the U.S. can ensure
stability, democracy and prosperity in Iraq. Among their
chief concerns is the continued instability and the political
power given to the Shi'a community. End Summary.

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IRAQIS HOPES DWINDLING
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2. (C) PolOff met September 3 with Vahe Minas, an Iraqi
Christian, businessman and wealthy landowner living in
Baghdad, to discuss his views on the current situation in
Iraq. Minas holds Jordanian residency and travels frequently
between Baghdad and Amman, where his extended family resides.
Minas described the situation in Baghdad as "chaotic". He
owns a cosmetics company, with 20 employees, and continues to
operate his factory with the aid of generators. He said
Baghdadis, while hopeful and optimistic after the war, NOW
feel that the U.S. presence has done nothing for them, citing
how Iraqis, NOW more than ever, rely on the Saddam-era
"ration" system for their daily subsistence. High among his
many concerns is the deteriorating security situation. He
described how he hid his 6 late model cars before the war in
a friend's walled garden for safekeeping and how they remain
there due to the high incidence of carjackings. In Baghdad,
he drives a beat up car to try to stay unnoticed by roaming
carjackers. He has friends who have been stopped, ordered
out of their cars, and seen their cars driven off by gangs
who seem to operate with total impunity.


3. (C) Minas detailed how U.S. forces are losing much of the
goodwill they initially enjoyed after the war. He related
how he found his house looted after the war with only a few
pieces of furniture left. Adding insult to injury, he
returned days later to find that U.S. forces had broken his
front door, burst in looking for documents, and damaged the
few remaining pieces of furniture. He wondered why U.S.
forces had not contacted him and asked for keys to the house.
He said the U.S. forces later claimed they were searching
for important documents but all they found were Minas family
deeds to properties owned in Iraq. He claimed U.S. forces
often rely on misinformation supplied by ill intentioned
informants. Minas is very concerned about kidnappings for
ransom and the lack of security along the Baghdad-Amman
corridor. He cannot understand why U.S. forces are not able
to patrol such a vital road and provide travelers a greater
level of security. He said bandits are known to operate in
the Ramadi-Falluja sector.

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Political Landscape
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4. (C) Minas said that the Governing Council (GC) lacks
confidence and credibility. Iraqis view them as unknowns and
consider GC member Adnan Pachachi as a follower rather than a
leader. On INC leader Ahmed Chalabi, Minas acknowledged
that, although he comes from a prominent and respected Iraqi
family, he is tarnished by allegations of corruption and seen
as an outsider rather than someone who endured the many
hardships suffered by Iraqis under Saddam's rule. He added
that many Iraqis have a soft spot for Hashemite pretender
Sharif Ali, seen by some Iraqis as next-in-line to the Iraqi
royal family.

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Bring back the Ba'athi Armed Forces and more...
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5. On September 2 PolOff met with Dr. Nihad Jassam, a Sunni,
Baghdad based businessman and member of an informal "think
tank" composed of Iraqis from different religions, political
backgrounds and walks of life. Jassam said the biggest
mistake the U.S. made was abolishing the Iraqi regular armed
forces. The regular army was not closely aligned with
Saddam's regime and was widely supported by the people.
Evidence of this, he highlighted, was that the regular army
did not fight against U.S. forces. He stressed that the U.S.
must bring back the Ba'athi armed forces, "wearing the same
old uniforms and using the same tanks" to show people a 100%
Iraqi face they recognize. This step would allow U.S. forces
to get out of major cities and make the "occupation" less
visible. He added that the U.S. armed forces hold no
credibility with average Iraqis.


6. (C) Jassam described the Governing Council as an
ineffective body that "has no arms and legs". Jassam also
recommended, after bringing back the regular armed forces,
naming Ministers of Defense (letting the army itself make the
choice) and Foreign Affairs would contribute to the
stabilization of the country to be followed by the
establishment of parliament. Why, asked Jassam rhetorically,
must Iraqis waste time drafting a new constitution when the
1921 Constitution can be updated and modernized. He warned
against federalism, which he believed could promote
sectarianism, and suggested following King Faisal's
autonomous governorates approach.

7. (C) Jassam added that bringing back the Iraqi monarchy
would act as a unifying symbol for all Iraqis. Iraqis would
have to determine, he stressed, the type of monarchy, the
powers of the King and whether the armed forces would be
under the control of the King or a separate Prime Minister.
He opined that the armed forces must be composed of mixed
Sunni, Shi'a, Christian, Kurdish and Turkmen regiments and
stressed that the U.S. would be instrumental in making it a
professional army.

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Shi'a Empowerment: Double Edged Sword
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8. (C) Jassam warned against allowing the Shi'a to gain the
"political" upperhand in Iraq. Jassam, a Sunni married to a
Shi'a, said that the Sunni were the "glue" that held Iraq
together. He stressed the region is mainly Sunni, Christians
view the Sunni as moderates and have established strong
bonds, and the Shi'a accept them as fellow Arabs. He
believes the Shi'a are playing a game of "wait and see" and
warned that once they've obtained what they want no one will
be able to control them. He would not go into further
details but promised to continue the dialogue with PolOff
when he next visits Amman.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) Both Minas and Jassam consider themselves part of an
elite group of Iraqis who want to rebuild Iraq. They both
want to see the U.S. succeed in Iraq and set the country on a
prosperous and democratic road. While still optimistic, they
are deeply concerned with the slow progress and continuing
political and social instability. Minas and Jassam both
believe that the U.S. opened up a political "Pandora's box"
in Iraq, and that it will prove difficult to determine what
shape the Iraqi political landscape will follow.
HALE