JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER MEETS IRAQI GOVERNING

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 005257

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2013
TAGS: PREL IZ JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER MEETS IRAQI GOVERNING
COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVE

REF: STATE 238110

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David Hale for Reasons 1.5 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Iraqi Governing Council (GC) member Dr.
Mowaffak Al Rubaie met with Jordanian PM Ali Abul Ragheb on
August 19 in Amman to discuss bilateral issues. Dr. Al
Rubaie characterized their talks as "very positive" and said
that Abul Ragheb promised that the GOJ would continue to
receive GC delegations and work with the GC on issues of
common concern. Abul Ragheb stressed, however, that the GOJ
would not formally recognize the GC so long as Ahmad Chalabi
was a member, nor would it accept Chalabi in a leadership
role or have any dealings with him. End Summary.


2. (C) During a brief visit to Amman, GC member Al Rubaie
directly telephoned Jordanian PM Abul Ragheb, who Al Rubaie
personally knew from a prior business relationship, to
request a meeting. Abul Ragheb subsequently met with Al
Rubaie for approximately 45 minutes. Directly after the
meeting, Al Rubaie briefed PolOff and said that the talks had
gone very well, and that the overall atmosphere had been warm
and friendly.


3. (C) Al Rubaie started his meeting with Abul Ragheb by
recounting the long-standing ties between Iraq and Jordan and
emphasizing their many shared interests. On the economic
front, Al Rubaie noted the considerable commerce between the
two countries and said that while Jordan could benefit from
Iraq's abundant natural resources, Iraq could benefit by
learning from and emulating Jordan's economic reforms.


4. (C) With respect to relations with the U.S., Al Rubaie
opined that just as Jordan was a close U.S. ally, the GC
hoped that post-Saddam Iraq would remain a firm friend of the
U.S. While both Al Rubaie and Abul Ragheb agreed that U.S.
forces and administrators needed to withdraw completely from
Iraq, Al Rubaie stressed that conditions for such a
withdrawal would not be ripe in the near future. If U.S.
troops left prematurely, he argued, the country could descend
into chaos or civil war.


5. (C) Al Rubaie told PolOff that he had discussed several
"problematic" issues with Abul Ragheb, including payment of
outstanding loans, the disposition of frozen Iraqi assets,
and Jordanian requests for discounted oil, but expressed
confidence that all these issues could be resolved through
discussions. The one problem that Al Rubaie characterized as
"insoluble" was Ahmad Chalabi.


6. (C) According to Al Rubaie, Abul Ragheb was "obsessed"
with Chalabi and repeatedly raised the issue throughout their
meeting. While Abul Ragheb said that the GOJ would be happy
to receive future GC delegations and that the GOJ would work
with the GC on bilateral issues, he stated that the GOJ would
not formally recognize the GC as the legitimate
representative of the Iraqi people as long as Chalabi was a
GC member. Jordan would refuse to have any dealings
whatsoever with Chalabi and, more over, Abul Ragheb pleaded
with Al Rubaie to shut down or at least muzzle INC-controlled
newspapers in Iraq that were "slandering" the GOJ and
Jordanian officials.


7. (C) COMMENT: The fact that Abul Ragheb welcomed Al Rubaie
into his office and pledged cooperation with the GC is
another clear sign that -- despite problems over Chalabi --
Jordan is eager to continue its strong support for political
transition and reconstruction in Iraq, and ready to deal
naturally with GC members and other officials, with one
exception. End Comment.
HALE