TFIZ01: KING ABDULLAH, GOJ RETRENCH IN FACE OF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001798 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2013 TAGS: PREL MOPS IZ JO SUBJECT: TFIZ01: KING ABDULLAH, GOJ RETRENCH IN FACE OF PUBLIC ANGER AGAINST WAR IN IRAQ, BUT STILL SUPPORT US WHERE IT MATTERS REF: A. AMMAN 1675 ¶B. AMMAN 1706 ¶C. AMMAN 1718 ¶D. FBIS GMP20030323000339 ¶E. FBIS GMP20030323000308 ¶F. FBIS GMP20030323000292 ¶G. FBIS GMP20030324000163 ¶H. AMMAN 1774 Classified By: A/DCM Doug Silliman for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) The sharp and angry public reaction to the start of war in Iraq has forced King Abdullah and the GOJ to alter their public line to deal with the public ire. In a speech by King Abdullah on March 21, a press conference the next day with the PM, FonMin and InfoMin, and official news agency reports of cabinet and other meetings, the GOJ is trying to create the impression that it is working to end the war in Iraq. PM Abul Ragheb told the Ambassador March 24 that GOJ officials will have to say things the U.S. does not like to address public anger, but will choose their words carefully. The King has decided that he needs to be seen as working to end hostilities, although he has backed off slightly from an announced new diplomatic initiative, including a planned phone call to President Bush. Despite the public pressure, the GOJ has continued its support to coalition forces, has frozen Iraqi government assets, and has expelled Iraqi intelligence officers. END SUMMARY. -------------- ANGRY PUBLIC REACTION RATTLES GOJ -------------- ¶2. (S) The enraged Jordanian public reaction to the beginning of hostilities in Iraq (refs a and b and septel) has caused senior GOJ officials to rethink their public strategy. Our security liaison contacts have expressed concern over the mounting level of anti-U.S. feeling the war has engendered, and do not want those emotions projected onto the King or government. ¶3. (SBU) The King, Prime Minister Abul Ragheb, other senior officials, and the official Petra news agency have consequently focused their statements on expressions of opposition to hostilities (in almost exclusively humanitarian terms) and sympathy with the Iraqi people. The King in his March 21 speech to the nation (ref c) called for calm in Jordan, and tried to focus attention on what Jordan can do for the future of Iraqis. In a joint press conference March 23 with Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher and Information Minister Mohammad Adwan, the Prime Minister announced the GOJ's opposition to the war, as well as a new Jordanian diplomatic initiative to end it (refs d and e). The King was quoted as telling a cabinet meeting on March 23 that "we must work to stop the war against Iraq quickly," and denying that coalition aircraft were using Jordanian airspace to attack Iraq (ref f). The King reiterated the no-overflight statement to members of the Senate March 24, and said Jordanian territory would not be used to convey troops into Iraq that were to have gone through Turkey (ref g). -------------- PM: WE'LL HAVE TO SAY THINGS YOU WON'T LIKE -------------- ¶4. (S) PM Abul Ragheb told the Ambassador March 24 that he had carefully chosen his words during the March 23 news conference, noting that he had not used "words like killing, aggression, bombing," but instead had spoken of "military action" and the need to work to "save people's lives." That said, "we need to show our people we are really doing something" to end the war. Hence, Jordan was launching a new diplomatic offensive "to find a resolution acceptable to all parties." ¶5. (S) He said that, long before the outbreak of war, he had told the Ambassador that the GOJ "would have to say things you won't like." Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher, Abul Ragheb said, had also made this point to Secretary Powell in their recent phone conversation. The bottom line, the PM emphasized, is that Jordanians see pictures of people getting killed in Iraq in a war they do not support, and they are angry. The GOJ is taking steps to keep the level of public protest down, and he planned to meet with opposition party leaders in the next few days to reiterate that the GOJ will permit pre-approved rallies, but will crack down on un-approved protests or the use of violence. ¶6. (S) The Ambassador pushed back, saying that, now that the war has begun, it is clear that Saddam Hussein and his regime are finished. Jordan would have to consider the effect of its statements now on a post-Saddam government in Baghdad, and on the U.S. Backpedaling somewhat, Abul Ragheb responded that the GOJ has "determined that this will not be like 1991." -------------- POSITIVE NEWS AS WELL -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) Despite the increasingly anti-war public statements, the GOJ continues to take more quiet steps to support the coalition. The GOJ has continued its previously agreed military support to coalition forces (with a few minor hiccups). Jordan has frozen the assets of the Iraqi government in Jordan (ref h). It has also expelled several Iraqi intelligence officers operating under diplomatic and non-official cover, although there is now some question about who and how many Iraqis have been kicked out. The GOJ has also been helped by the lack of an economic crisis associated with the war in Iraq. There has been no capital flight, there are adequate stocks of food and fuel, the Amman stock exchange has remained stable, and three European air carriers have resumed earlier suspended flights into Amman. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (S) The King has told the Ambassador and senior USG officials several times that he believed the "tipping point" for the Jordanian public's reaction to war in Iraq would be scenes on al-Jazeera TV of jubilant Iraqis celebrating their liberation from Saddam Hussein. The King expected this in the early days of the war, and the lack of such scenes has made him feel exposed. Iraqi VP Taha Yassin Ramadan's ranting March 25 press conference attack on Jordan's support for the coalition has heightened anxiety. ¶9. (S) Given his political exposure, the King has moved to distance himself personally and the GOJ in general from military action, and has considered launching a series of phone calls to P-5 leaders and UN Secretary General Annan (although he rethought his planned March 25 call to the President). He wants to be able to tell his people that he is actively engaged in finding an end to the war, even if he is powerless to stop it. The Foreign Minister has stressed, however, that the King is determined to do nothing that undercuts the President's decision to topple Saddam Hussein. GNEHM