MULLAH KREKAR EXTRADITION: JORDANIANS THINK THE

S E C R E T AMMAN 000150 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2013 TAGS: SNAR PTER KCRM PREL JO NL SUBJECT: MULLAH KREKAR EXTRADITION: JORDANIANS THINK THE DUTCH ARE ASKING FOR THE IMPOSSIBLE REF: (A) THE HAGUE 27 (B) 12/30-12/31 BERRY-RUSSEL E-MAILS Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm. Reasons 1.5 (b,d). ¶1. (S) Post shares Embassy The Hague's frustration with the current state of play of the Mullah Krekar extradition case. To have Krekar walk free would be an outcome that would serve no one's interests and would send the wrong signal to all those working tirelessly in the fight against terrorism around the world. In the last week, the Ambassador has talked with the Foreign Minister about the case, the DCM with the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and other appropriate officers with GOJ counterparts. ¶2. (S/NF) Based on those multiple discussions and many previous contacts over the past several weeks, we have a different perspective from that in reftel on where the problem lies and what needs to be done to address it. The bottom line is that GOJ -- and the GID in particular -- has little confidence that anything they can provide the GONL will be sufficient to satisfy Dutch legal requirements. Both the Dutch reaction to the Jordanians' original efforts to get Krekar extradited on assassination charges, and the recent outcome of the Courtallier case (ref b) have solidified their thinking on this. Moreover, there is a real cost to the Jordanians in providing detailed intelligence information which will become public in a court hearing. ¶3. (S/NF) In the first instance, the Dutch refused to consider a Jordanian extradition request based on a valid Interpol arrest warrant because the charge in question was attempted assassination -- a crime which we understand the Dutch system does not recognize as a basis for extradition. Then, with the Courtallier case, the Dutch court ruled that information gathered through intelligence channels does not constitute a suitable basis for extradition. As the Krekar case is -- like Courtallier -- based on intel, the GID sees the writing on the wall and believes that there is little to be gained by providing the Dutch with yet more information that once in the public domain would jeopardize sources and methods. The end result, they believe, will be the same -- a Dutch court will refuse to extradite Krekar. ¶4. (S) In our view the current dilemma springs not from some sort of uncharacteristic recalcitrance on the Jordanians' part (although we agree that they could have been much more transparent in presenting their concerns to us at an earlier stage of the process),but rather with the standards of evidence required by Dutch courts. The Jordanians conscientiously have taken steps to address Dutch concerns (providing written assurances that Krekar would only be tried on the drug trafficking charges and, if convicted, would not face the death penalty). They tell us they have provided the evidence available to them short of compromising sources and methods. However, neither our Jordanian counterparts nor we can see how they can meet Dutch requirements in a case clearly based on sensitive intelligence information. ¶5. (S) As we are not familiar with Dutch law we can not offer suggestions as to whether there are unexplored avenues to deal with the case in Dutch courts. We would welcome Embassy Oslo's comments on the likely outcome if Krekar is expelled from the Netherlands to Norway, as presently seems likely. Recommendations from the Department on legal aspects of the case would also be most welcome. ¶6. (C) Note: For the record, we note that the Dutch are mistaken if they believe a Jordanian security court has overridden the civilian courts on the matter of Ra'ed Hijazi's appeal of his death sentence (ref A). The issue will ultimately be decided by the Court of Cassation, not by the Security Court. GNEHM