NIGERIA: OBASANJO'S MANDATE - HOW HE WON IT;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000860

SIPDIS


NSC FOR JFRASER
CAIRO FOR MAXSTADT
LONDON FOR GURNEY


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: OBASANJO'S MANDATE - HOW HE WON IT;
WHAT HE MUST DO NOW.


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reason:
1.5(d).



1. (C) SUMMARY: According to the Independent National
Electoral Commission, President Obasanjo won the
election with 62 percent of the vote, with the ANPP's
Muhammadu Buhari trailing in the distance at 32
percent. Despite his first Administration not living
up to popular expectations, most Nigerians accept that
Obasanjo won the Presidency outright. However, they
believe the margin of victory was less. In addition
to the dispute over Obasanjo's margin of victory, the
actual outcomes of many gubernatorial and National
Assembly contests are controversial and in dispute.
Consequently, many Nigerians are discontented with the
overall results of the recent elections.



2. (C) The official results give the PDP eighty
percent of the gubernatorial seats as well as "super-
majorities" in the National Assembly (House of
Representatives and Senate) and most State Assemblies.
On paper, the PDP looks like a leviathan "mega-party";
however, many Nigerians see a much more divided
political organization and movement. While the
Obasanjo/PDP mandate looks both fat and firm, in
reality it is leaner and less sturdy. Obasanjo should
reach out to the opposition to lower political
tension, and, in the process, enhance his ability to
govern. END SUMMARY


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MISGIVINGS OVER OBASANJO'S MANDATE
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3. (U) Obasanjo won the election with 62 percent of
the national vote compared to Buhari's 32 percent.
Obasanjo also received the minimum 25 percent of votes
cast in 32 states, surpassing the eligibility
requirements of one-quarter of the votes in two-thirds
of Nigeria's 36 states and the Federal Capital
Territory. These are the official results.



4. (C) Buhari die-hards and some other opposition
figures aside, most Nigerians concede victory to
Obasanjo. However, they question Obasanjo's margin of
victory and the strong mandate it implies. They fear
that Obasanjo will act more imperially than before if
he deceives himself into believing that these skewed
figures reflect his popular approval. At the very
least, the 30 point differential between Obasanjo and
Buhari is inflated. Our calculations point to
Obasanjo winning in a closer race.



5. (C) The discrepancy between the official and actual
results and how that shapes the Presidential mandate
is worrisome enough by itself. However, there
actually is more controversy over some of the
gubernatorial and National Assembly contests. This
controversy only compounds the turbid atmosphere.
Unlike the Presidential election where most people
assumed Obasanjo would win, there are dozens of
contests where the focus is not on the margin of
victory; the actual outcomes are disputed and
disbelieved by much of the electorate. There are many
"official" winners who lost the actual vote. Because
most of these ersatz victors are PDP members, there is
a spill-over onto the Presidential contest. Anger
over the legislative and gubernatorial elections has
negatively affected public perception of the
President. To a certain degree, discontent over these
lesser elections has merged with the suspicion over
the President's margin of victory; this has served to
cast a glare on Obasanjo who, to a large degree, has
become the ex-officio lightning rod for criticism of
all alleged PDP electoral chicanery.



6. (C) Some observers fret that these elections have
put Nigeria on a road to the establishment of a one-
party state, with all of the possible anti-democratic
consequences such a development could entail.
Moreover, many people are irate because they sense
that PDP majorities in the national and state
legislatures and the PDP's hold on most state houses
would have been weakened, perhaps significantly, if
the vote had been properly tallied. Their concerns
cannot be dismissed summarily. Despite a pallid
performance at all levels of government over the past
four years, this election has turned the PDP into a
behemoth. It is a "mega-party"; the largest single
party in Africa. The PDP has 28 of 36 governorships,
a super-majority in the National Assembly, and super-
majorities in most State Assemblies. If party loyalty
is maintained, there are few laws or constitutional
amendments the PDP cannot pass. This concentration of
political power frightens some Nigerians. (Comment:
Already some alarmist opposition politicians are
contending that returning PDP governors will seek to
remove the two-term limit from the constitution.
Given the PDP track record over the past four years,
maintenance of strict party loyalty will give way to
internecine fractions and rivalries. This
factionalization would impede attempts to establish
the PDP as a super-party or to amend the constitution.
End Comment)



7. (C) On paper, Obasanjo and the PDP have strong,
definitive mandates. In reality, the election
outcomes were probably much closer and results more
ambiguous as to which party or parties appealed to the
general public. Minus electoral irregularities, the
number of PDP victors would be fewer and the PDP's
overall mandate less resounding. If Obasanjo and the
PDP think the INEC results genuinely reflect the
popular will and that the party by itself represents a
national political consensus, they could act
arrogantly, and perhaps even capriciously, toward the
opposition. Cross-carpet dialogue could be minimized
as the PDP uses its substantial majorities to govern
as it pleases with little consultation or regard for
the positions of other parties. Discontent could
mount and the art of governance would become more
complicated over time, with a frustrated opposition
seeking to undermine government, question authority,
and even foment trouble by inciting ethnic, religious
or other animosities. However, if the PDP recognizes
that some of its gains were purloined, it may be more
willing to reach out and find ways to invite
opposition participation in governance. This would
reduce friction and be a positive step toward creating
a genuine political consensus. In short, there is a
need for some post-electoral adjustments that better
reflect political reality. This may weaken the PDP
paper mandate but, in making that mandate more
genuine, it also would make it stronger.


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OBANSANJO - WHY HE WON
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8. (C) Despite his failings, Obasanjo remained the
only candidate with national reach, recognition, and
appeal. Although he was weak in many parts of the
North, Obasanjo still had some support there, even in
the core Northwest. Conversely, Buhari's perceived
regional chauvinism, religious extremism, and record
as a merciless Head of State frightened people,
particularly in many areas of the South. Despite the
fact that Buhari was running as a challenger, his
negatives were stronger than those of Obasanjo.
Buhari's appeals to religion as an instrument to
attract support frightened many voters, Christians and
Muslims alike. Buhari's running mate, Chuba Okadigbo,
once expelled from the Senate over allegations of
corruption, brought nothing to the ticket, and may
have even diminished Buhari's image. The fractious
ANPP party convention severely weakened the party's
image, and projected an image of ANPP disunity and
serious questions about Buhari's democratic
credentials. By contrast, the PDP's well organized
and orderly convention projected an image, however
contrived, of near unity within that political
movement.



9. (C) While Obasanjo did not play well in parts of
the North, Buhari did not place at all in many areas
of the South. The religious card and Buhari's
opposition to the Niger Delta Development Corporation
(NDDC) were factors in his lack of appeal. Further,
unlike 1999, either Obasanjo came home to the
Southwest or the Southwest warmed to him. In any
event, the Yoruba's bloc went to Obasanjo, in a show
of unambiguous support. Meanwhile, none of the other
16 presidential candidates had enough national
presence to mount a challenge.


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HOW OBANSANJO WON - ORGANIZATION AND NUMBERS
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10. (SBU) The PDP was well organized and present
throughout the country. Not only did the PDP control
the Presidency, it also held a majority in both the
House of Representatives and Senate and controlled 21
state government houses. Moreover, the PDP also
controlled a majority of state legislatures. This
advantage allowed widespread dissemination of
information and resources through these elected
officials. It also allowed the PDP to influence INEC
in those jurisdictions under the party's control.



11. (U) Obasanjo started campaigning much earlier and
more intensely than his challengers. He was well
financed so his campaign had more staying power.
Obasanjo made campaign stops in almost every state.
He totally out-distanced his rivals, and in some
instances, Obasanjo visited a state several times,
particularly in the Southwest where he won
overwhelmingly. VP Atiku also campaigned actively in
the Northeast, visiting most of the regional states
several times.



12. (U) Buhari did not start until March 8, after
returning from the Hajj. He fell ill shortly
thereafter. He launched his campaign in Port
Harcourt, Rivers State; however, the ANPP's support
remained based in the North, and Buhari covered that
region well. Buhari managed to make campaign stops in
34 of Nigeria's 36 states in the run-up to the
Presidential elections; however, his campaign was
overly concentrated in the North, the area where he
was already strong. Thus, neither Buhari nor his team
could come close to matching the geographic coverage
Obasanjo and his campaign machinery achieved. While
Buhari's visits outside the North were relegated to
rallies in major cities for the most part, Obasanjo
would visit numerous places within a state and his
organization would canvas door-to-door, not only in
the cities but in towns and villages throughout the
country.


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HOW DID OBANSANJO WIN - PRESS COVERAGE
--------------



13. (C) Obasanjo enjoyed an advantage with the press.
Each of his campaign stops was extensively covered,
while Buhari's efforts received far less exposure
until the final two weeks of the campaign. Buhari's
first Port Harcourt rally was not immediately
televised and the print media took days to publish
articles covering it. In contrast, Obasanjo's rallies
were highly publicized, both by the print and
electronic media. Numbers were not always published
except to say that the rally was widely attended.
Movements were advertised well in advance and, in most
instances, organized by the state governors as
official functions. Local PDP supporters were
expected to fill the arenas and stadiums and many
Local Government Chairmen were tasked with providing
transportation and stipends for those attending. The
PDP was adept at generating crowds. All political
parties were required to get permits to hold rallies
and pay a fee for the venue. In some cases, permits
for the ANPP were denied. Most of Buhari's rallies
were very well-attended by onlookers drawn by the
chance to see the man; however, this did not
necessarily translate into votes.


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HOW DID OBANSANJO WIN - MONEY
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14. (C) The ANPP had a much smaller war-chest than the
PDP. With only nine incumbent governors, the ANPP was
not able to raise as much money from the states as
their primary rival. While commingling official state
activities with campaign events was improper, this
prohibition was not obeyed in practice. The line
between the use of the state apparatus for campaign
purposes became a blur. In addition, major
contributors to the PDP included some of the biggest
names in Nigerian business circles. Aliko Dangote in
the North, Emeka Offor in the Southeast, and Mike
Adenuga in the Southwest were prime examples of
prominent businessmen depositing big checks into
Obasanjo's war chest. Fund-raising dinners generated
huge amounts of cash. The Director-General of the
Nigerian Stock Exchange formed a fund-raising
committee for Obasanjo-Atiku which many thought was
improper. Without similar sponsorship, the ANPP was
left depending on smaller contributions; it just could
not mount the same intensive, well-financed campaign
that the PDP was able to launch.


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COMMENT
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15. (C) Obasanjo has a mandate to lead the nation for
four more years. However, this mandate is not on the
order of magnitude that the official election results
would have us believe. There is a danger that the
ruling PDP, at all levels of government, will take the
official results as a "super-mandate" and act in ways
that do not take other politically relevant views and
actors into consideration. In 1999, Obasanjo brought
opposition APP and AD figures into government even
though he had a larger majority then than he has
today. Hopefully, Obasanjo will now feel as secure in
victory that he again will reach out to key elements
in the most important opposition parties, mainly the
pragmatic elements of the ANPP and APGA. If so,
Obasanjo will calm the post-election waters and could
actually buttress his mandate by lessening
disappointment and anger over the electoral process.
JETER