NIGERIA OPEN TO DISCUSSION OF ARTICLE 98

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000552 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL:03/20/2013 TAGS: PREL MARR NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA OPEN TO DISCUSSION OF ARTICLE 98 REFS: (A) 02 STATE 192375 (B) STATE 22119 (C) 02 ABUJA 2872 (D) 02 ABUJA 2978 (E) ABUJA 328 (F) ABUJA 342 CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5(b). ¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy efforts to obtain GON signature to an Article 98 Agreement continue despite initial resistance and skepticism in several GON quarters. The Ambassador most recently raised the subject on March 20, this time with MFA PermSec Hart. Hart voiced strong "personal" reservations but said the GON was open to discussion. We doubt the threat of ASPA-based sanctions will move the GON, but its own interests might. We continue to pursue this key objective energetically. End Summary. -------------- STRATEGY -------------- ¶2. (C) The GON was deeply involved in the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC),and Nigeria offered a candidate (who lost) for one of the seats. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) resistance to an Article 98 Agreement was anticipated. Thus, Mission strategy in pursuit of an agreement foresaw approaching others in the GON before engaging with MFA. Indeed, an early mention of Article 98 had produced very strong opposition from Foreign Minister Sule Lamido (Ref C). -------------- DEMARCHES -------------- ¶3. (C) In October and November of last year, the Ambassador raised Article 98 with National Security Advisor LTG Aliyu Mohammed (ret) and Minister of Defense LTG Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma (ret),providing each with a draft agreement for consideration. Mohammed (Ref C) was interested in exploring possibilities and encouraged us to engage with Danjuma and Minister of Justice Kanu Godwin Agabi. The Ambassador stressed that, as a major contributor to PKOs in Africa and beyond, Nigeria's national interest might be well-served by signing Article 98 agreements with other countries as well, particularly countries in ECOWAS. Danjuma (ref D) expressed some doubt and said he would discuss the matter with FM Lamido. ¶4. (C) In a meeting at the end of January, Agabi (Ref E) took on board the Ambassador's points, including those about the ASPA, and promised to acquaint President Obasanjo with the issue. We left a draft Article 98 Agreement with Agabi also. The Ambassador and AF DAS Bridgewater raised Article 98 with Obasanjo on February 14 (Ref F). Initially criticizing the USG for not being a member of the ICC, Obasanjo became more receptive to Article 98 as the discussion proceeded. At the end, he instructed his International Affairs Advisor (Ad'Obe Obe) to ask FM Sule Lamido to convene an Inter-Ministerial Committee to examine whether Nigeria should enter into an Article 98 Agreement. -------------- CONTINUED RESISTANCE -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM, March 20 made a strong pitch for Article 98 to MFA Permanent Secretary Dan Hart. Hart explained that Nigeria had played an important role in the establishment of the ICC and strongly backed its principles. The Ambassador responded that the USG had no objection to the principles behind the ICC and that Article 98 Agreements were bilateral accords for which the Rome Statute specifically provides. The Ambassador related to Hart the substance of his meeting with Obasanjo (Ref F) and wondered whether the Inter-Ministerial Committee had been formed. Hart said it had not. He welcomed the Ambassador's offer of a draft Article 98 Agreement and other materials, adding that he was certain the matter would be discussed within the GON "before long." ¶6. (C) In response to the Ambassador's point that Nigeria might have its own strong interest in concluding Article 98 Agreements with countries in the region, Hart commented that he "personally" was not concerned about the possibility of Nigerian troops being convicted of war crimes if they had committed them. War must be conducted to "correct and humane standards," he added. The Ambassador replied that the U.S. agreed completely but took a different approach; accusations of war crimes should be addressed in national courts or by special-purpose ad-hoc bodies established to respond to the results of a particular conflict situation. The U.S. believed that the Rome Statute had gone too far, could be manipulated for political purposes, and infringe on national sovereignty issues. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: MFA opposes Article 98 and is not in any hurry to convene an Inter-Ministerial Committee. We will again raise President Obasanjo's mid-February instruction with Obe in the near future. However, progress in a positive direction is very unlikely as long as the war in Iraq continues. We do not think the threat of ASPA sanctions will motivate the GON to conclude an agreement with us. Obasanjo, who seemed not to fully understand the ICC's mandate ("The International Criminal Court is fine for drug traffickers, money launderers and the like, but I'm not sure it's right for the military."),clearly was open to considering an Article 98 Agreement with the U.S. ¶8. (C) For now, our approach will be to prod the various players gently to gather in their Inter-Ministerial forum and discuss Article 98 in the context of Nigeria's role in PKOs in Africa and beyond. We will, of course, ensure that they are aware of the provisions of ASPA, but we will not make these provisions a central theme. JETER