Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUJA352
2003-02-18 16:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:
Bakassi -- Meeting with Ould-Abdallah: Cameroon
how-toThis record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000352
SIPDIS
YAOUNDE ALSO FOR EMBASSY BANGUI
E.O. 12958: DECL:12/16/2012
TAGS: PREL PBTS SENV EPET EFIS NI CM
SUBJECT: Bakassi -- Meeting with Ould-Abdallah: Cameroon
Bound to a Reticent Biya and Nigeria's Commitment Uncertain.
REF: Yaounde 171 (NOTAL)
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON: 1.5 (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000352
SIPDIS
YAOUNDE ALSO FOR EMBASSY BANGUI
E.O. 12958: DECL:12/16/2012
TAGS: PREL PBTS SENV EPET EFIS NI CM
SUBJECT: Bakassi -- Meeting with Ould-Abdallah: Cameroon
Bound to a Reticent Biya and Nigeria's Commitment Uncertain.
REF: Yaounde 171 (NOTAL)
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON: 1.5 (D).
1. (U) This is an action message; see para 10.
2. (C) Summary: Nigeria's approach to its border dispute
with Cameroon is sophisticated, but its commitment to execute
what it negotiates less certain, UNSYG representative Ould-
Abdallah told Ambassador Jeter. However, the Cameroonians
understood international boundary law less well and were
hobbled by Biya's odd combination of micro-management and
aloofness. Ould-Abdallah thought continued confidence-
building measures (CBMs),together with an early Summit of the
near-moribund Lake Chad Basin Commission, would help advance
the process. Ould-Abdallah asked us to encourage Biya to
visit Nigeria; reftel offers an opening. See also
recommendation in para 10. End Summary.
--------------
MAKE HASTE SLOWLY
--------------
3. (C) During a private breakfast meeting at the Residence,
UNSYG Representative to West Africa Amadou Ould-Abdallah
February 6 told Ambassador Jeter that Nigerian President
Olusegun Obasanjo was personally interested in resolving
border issues affecting Nigeria's relationship with Cameroon.
However, Obasanjo faced internal pressures that forced him to
move deliberately. The reconciliation process needed a firm
foundation resting on mutual confidence-building measures
(CBMs); without them, full implementation of the ICJ ruling
that awarded Bakassi and territory in and around Lake Chad to
Cameroon would be difficult. Moreover, the Nigerian press
could prove especially nettlesome. The sentiment that
"Bakassi is ours" prevails in many major Nigerian
institutions, including the military, the Ambassador also
noted.
4. (C) Ould-Abdallah said Obasanjo would have to "go slowly"
until the national elections were over. The UN envoy said he
had proposed an interim exchange of military liaison officers
but that Nigeria was "not interested for now." Biya needed to
visit Abuja before the elections, Ould-Abdallah argued,
pointing out that Obasanjo had consistently made himself
available; it was time now for Biya to reciprocate. The two
leaders could use their meeting to announce a Summit of the
near-moribund Lake Chad Basin Commission. Cameroon's key
concern, Ould-Abdallah said, was the fate of its citizens
living in and around Lake Chad. As the waters of this great
inland sea have receded over the past 50 years, Nigerians have
moved into Cameroonian territory, sometimes even receiving
what purported to be land titles.
--------------
IT'S NOT JUST BAKASSI
--------------
5. (C) Resolving land tenure issues in the North could
ultimately prove more difficult than finding solutions for
Bakassi. Ould-Abdallah agreed with the Ambassador that most
permanent residents of Bakassi identified themselves as
Nigerians. However, contrary to Nigerian assertions of a
Bakassi population of 300,000-plus, the permanent residents
probably numbered 30,000-50,000, and a significant number were
Ghanaian or Beninois fishermen. The seasonal surge, almost
all fishermen, was heavily Ghanaian and Beninois, according to
Ould-Abdallah.
6. (C) In response to the Ambassador's query, Ould-Abdallah
confirmed that Vice President Atiku Abubakar, who opened the
Mixed Commission meeting for the GON, had affirmed Nigeria's
desire to settle the boundary dispute peaceably. The key
question, Ould-Abdallah offered, was whether Nigeria would
stick to its commitments. The Nigerian delegation was much
stronger and deeper, with a genuine international expert on
boundary issues (Prince Bola Ajibola) at its head while the
Cameroonians were led by a competent but far less expert
figure, Minister of Justice Amadou Ali. At least, the UN
representative commented, Cameroon had had the good sense to
keep its unhelpful Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, Martin Belinga Eboutou, in New York. Belinga's
deadlines and timetables were disruptive and destabilizing.
Moreover, Ould-Abdallah continued, Belinga was obsessed with
bringing implementation to conclusion before Cameroon's UNSC
term ended, falsely fearing that Yaounde would lose leverage
once 2003 comes to an end. Biya, however, understood the need
for patience, grasping that Obasanjo faced elections and did
not have the freedom to act that Biya himself enjoyed.
--------------
CAMEROONIAN CHARM OFFENSIVE REQUIRED
--------------
7. (C) What Biya apparently did not comprehend was that he
had to reach out to Obasanjo, to follow African diplomatic
traditions to resolve differences. While Obasanjo had
received the Mixed Commission for 40 minutes during its Abuja
meeting, Biya had been unavailable during the Commission's
previous meeting in Cameroon. As the "victor" in the dispute,
Biya had to make a conciliatory gesture toward Obasanjo. He
needed, Ould-Abdallah repeated several times, to visit Abuja
before Nigeria's elections and to commit himself to attend a
follow-on extraordinary Lake Chad Basin Commission Summit.
Would the U.S. please use its influence with Biya to encourage
him in this direction?, Ould-Abdallah implored.
8. (U) COMMENT: In this letter to President Bush (reftel),
Biya states, inter alia, "I would like you in person and your
country to help Nigeria and Cameroon to comply with and
enforce...the ruling. Cameroon has been striving to show a
sense of moderation and patience so as to give peace and
justice a chance."
9. (C) Biya's assertion is valid up to a point. The
Nigerians, however, remain annoyed because they accepted
compulsory ICJ jurisdiction in the sixties while, they say,
Cameroon waited to do so until it was ready to file a case.
They see more studied calculation than goodwill in Yaounde's
behavior, and a decision in Cameroon's favor on key points in
the case magnifies their distrust. We concur in Ould-
Abdallah's assessment, both that Obasanjo wants to resolve the
dispute with Cameroon peaceably and that he will be hard-
pressed to go further without a high-profile gesture from
Cameroon. END COMMENT.
10. (C) ACTION REQUESTED: That President Bush's response to
Biya explicitly urge him to pay a visit to Abuja before the
mid-April elections in order to give his Nigerian counterpart
the political cover he needs to take next steps, and that Biya
also be encouraged to engage Nigeria in the Lake Chad Basin
Commission. END ACTION REQUEST.
--------------
OTHER NEXT STEPS
--------------
11. (C) Ould-Abdallah heard hopeful notes in Vice President
Atiku Abubakar's opening remarks. The proposal to include
Equatorial Guinea in discussion about the demarcation of the
southern end of the maritime boundary bodes well for better
cooperation on resource management in the Gulf of Guinea. The
call for "withdrawal of administrative and security personnel
of both countries in areas that are ceded to the other" hinted
at Nigerian willingness to let go of Bakassi, Ould-Abdallah
believed, cautioning once again that Nigeria's readiness to
stick with commitments might have to be tested.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
12. (C) Ould-Abdallah clearly finds himself more at ease with
the Nigerian side. He finds them more competent technically
and more engaged in the back-and-forth needed to discover the
foundations of compromise and to build them into fully-fledged
proposals. His annoyance at Biya's detachment from the
process was also evident, as was his conviction that Biya
needed to practice the personal diplomacy traditional among
African Heads of State. If the SYG's representative feels
this way, how much more so might the Nigerians, and how much
more useful even than Ould-Abdallah believes might be a visit
by Biya to Abuja. Ould-Abdallah is right to be cautious when
the GON undertakes a commitment. The solution is not
cynicism, however; it is to examine the proposed commitment
from every possible angle, avoiding exploitable gray areas.
13. (C) Obasanjo has told the Ambassador that he will not
meet with Biya again outside of the African Continent. A Biya
visit to Abuja would build trust, and we believe, give
considerable impetus to peaceful resolution of the Bakassi
issue.
JETER
SIPDIS
YAOUNDE ALSO FOR EMBASSY BANGUI
E.O. 12958: DECL:12/16/2012
TAGS: PREL PBTS SENV EPET EFIS NI CM
SUBJECT: Bakassi -- Meeting with Ould-Abdallah: Cameroon
Bound to a Reticent Biya and Nigeria's Commitment Uncertain.
REF: Yaounde 171 (NOTAL)
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON: 1.5 (D).
1. (U) This is an action message; see para 10.
2. (C) Summary: Nigeria's approach to its border dispute
with Cameroon is sophisticated, but its commitment to execute
what it negotiates less certain, UNSYG representative Ould-
Abdallah told Ambassador Jeter. However, the Cameroonians
understood international boundary law less well and were
hobbled by Biya's odd combination of micro-management and
aloofness. Ould-Abdallah thought continued confidence-
building measures (CBMs),together with an early Summit of the
near-moribund Lake Chad Basin Commission, would help advance
the process. Ould-Abdallah asked us to encourage Biya to
visit Nigeria; reftel offers an opening. See also
recommendation in para 10. End Summary.
--------------
MAKE HASTE SLOWLY
--------------
3. (C) During a private breakfast meeting at the Residence,
UNSYG Representative to West Africa Amadou Ould-Abdallah
February 6 told Ambassador Jeter that Nigerian President
Olusegun Obasanjo was personally interested in resolving
border issues affecting Nigeria's relationship with Cameroon.
However, Obasanjo faced internal pressures that forced him to
move deliberately. The reconciliation process needed a firm
foundation resting on mutual confidence-building measures
(CBMs); without them, full implementation of the ICJ ruling
that awarded Bakassi and territory in and around Lake Chad to
Cameroon would be difficult. Moreover, the Nigerian press
could prove especially nettlesome. The sentiment that
"Bakassi is ours" prevails in many major Nigerian
institutions, including the military, the Ambassador also
noted.
4. (C) Ould-Abdallah said Obasanjo would have to "go slowly"
until the national elections were over. The UN envoy said he
had proposed an interim exchange of military liaison officers
but that Nigeria was "not interested for now." Biya needed to
visit Abuja before the elections, Ould-Abdallah argued,
pointing out that Obasanjo had consistently made himself
available; it was time now for Biya to reciprocate. The two
leaders could use their meeting to announce a Summit of the
near-moribund Lake Chad Basin Commission. Cameroon's key
concern, Ould-Abdallah said, was the fate of its citizens
living in and around Lake Chad. As the waters of this great
inland sea have receded over the past 50 years, Nigerians have
moved into Cameroonian territory, sometimes even receiving
what purported to be land titles.
--------------
IT'S NOT JUST BAKASSI
--------------
5. (C) Resolving land tenure issues in the North could
ultimately prove more difficult than finding solutions for
Bakassi. Ould-Abdallah agreed with the Ambassador that most
permanent residents of Bakassi identified themselves as
Nigerians. However, contrary to Nigerian assertions of a
Bakassi population of 300,000-plus, the permanent residents
probably numbered 30,000-50,000, and a significant number were
Ghanaian or Beninois fishermen. The seasonal surge, almost
all fishermen, was heavily Ghanaian and Beninois, according to
Ould-Abdallah.
6. (C) In response to the Ambassador's query, Ould-Abdallah
confirmed that Vice President Atiku Abubakar, who opened the
Mixed Commission meeting for the GON, had affirmed Nigeria's
desire to settle the boundary dispute peaceably. The key
question, Ould-Abdallah offered, was whether Nigeria would
stick to its commitments. The Nigerian delegation was much
stronger and deeper, with a genuine international expert on
boundary issues (Prince Bola Ajibola) at its head while the
Cameroonians were led by a competent but far less expert
figure, Minister of Justice Amadou Ali. At least, the UN
representative commented, Cameroon had had the good sense to
keep its unhelpful Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, Martin Belinga Eboutou, in New York. Belinga's
deadlines and timetables were disruptive and destabilizing.
Moreover, Ould-Abdallah continued, Belinga was obsessed with
bringing implementation to conclusion before Cameroon's UNSC
term ended, falsely fearing that Yaounde would lose leverage
once 2003 comes to an end. Biya, however, understood the need
for patience, grasping that Obasanjo faced elections and did
not have the freedom to act that Biya himself enjoyed.
--------------
CAMEROONIAN CHARM OFFENSIVE REQUIRED
--------------
7. (C) What Biya apparently did not comprehend was that he
had to reach out to Obasanjo, to follow African diplomatic
traditions to resolve differences. While Obasanjo had
received the Mixed Commission for 40 minutes during its Abuja
meeting, Biya had been unavailable during the Commission's
previous meeting in Cameroon. As the "victor" in the dispute,
Biya had to make a conciliatory gesture toward Obasanjo. He
needed, Ould-Abdallah repeated several times, to visit Abuja
before Nigeria's elections and to commit himself to attend a
follow-on extraordinary Lake Chad Basin Commission Summit.
Would the U.S. please use its influence with Biya to encourage
him in this direction?, Ould-Abdallah implored.
8. (U) COMMENT: In this letter to President Bush (reftel),
Biya states, inter alia, "I would like you in person and your
country to help Nigeria and Cameroon to comply with and
enforce...the ruling. Cameroon has been striving to show a
sense of moderation and patience so as to give peace and
justice a chance."
9. (C) Biya's assertion is valid up to a point. The
Nigerians, however, remain annoyed because they accepted
compulsory ICJ jurisdiction in the sixties while, they say,
Cameroon waited to do so until it was ready to file a case.
They see more studied calculation than goodwill in Yaounde's
behavior, and a decision in Cameroon's favor on key points in
the case magnifies their distrust. We concur in Ould-
Abdallah's assessment, both that Obasanjo wants to resolve the
dispute with Cameroon peaceably and that he will be hard-
pressed to go further without a high-profile gesture from
Cameroon. END COMMENT.
10. (C) ACTION REQUESTED: That President Bush's response to
Biya explicitly urge him to pay a visit to Abuja before the
mid-April elections in order to give his Nigerian counterpart
the political cover he needs to take next steps, and that Biya
also be encouraged to engage Nigeria in the Lake Chad Basin
Commission. END ACTION REQUEST.
--------------
OTHER NEXT STEPS
--------------
11. (C) Ould-Abdallah heard hopeful notes in Vice President
Atiku Abubakar's opening remarks. The proposal to include
Equatorial Guinea in discussion about the demarcation of the
southern end of the maritime boundary bodes well for better
cooperation on resource management in the Gulf of Guinea. The
call for "withdrawal of administrative and security personnel
of both countries in areas that are ceded to the other" hinted
at Nigerian willingness to let go of Bakassi, Ould-Abdallah
believed, cautioning once again that Nigeria's readiness to
stick with commitments might have to be tested.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
12. (C) Ould-Abdallah clearly finds himself more at ease with
the Nigerian side. He finds them more competent technically
and more engaged in the back-and-forth needed to discover the
foundations of compromise and to build them into fully-fledged
proposals. His annoyance at Biya's detachment from the
process was also evident, as was his conviction that Biya
needed to practice the personal diplomacy traditional among
African Heads of State. If the SYG's representative feels
this way, how much more so might the Nigerians, and how much
more useful even than Ould-Abdallah believes might be a visit
by Biya to Abuja. Ould-Abdallah is right to be cautious when
the GON undertakes a commitment. The solution is not
cynicism, however; it is to examine the proposed commitment
from every possible angle, avoiding exploitable gray areas.
13. (C) Obasanjo has told the Ambassador that he will not
meet with Biya again outside of the African Continent. A Biya
visit to Abuja would build trust, and we believe, give
considerable impetus to peaceful resolution of the Bakassi
issue.
JETER