NIGERIA: THE ALEX EKWUEME FACTOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000233

SIPDIS


CAIRO FOR POL -- J. MAXSTADT


E.O. 12958 DECL: 1/23/13
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: THE ALEX EKWUEME FACTOR

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER.
REASON: 1.5 (G).



1. (C) SUMMARY: During an extensive January 9
conversation with Ambassador Jeter, defeated PDP
contestant Alex Ekwueme did not "recognize" Obasanjo's
convention victory. Ekwueme contended that Obasanjo's
victory was the result of bribes, political threats
and chicanery regarding the actual delegate voting.
Notwithstanding his displeasure, Ekwueme asserted he
would remain in the PDP but would retire to the life
of an elder, inactive statesman. Ekwueme described the
ANPP convention as even worse than the PDP's and its
selection of former Head of State Buhari as abysmal.
No self-respecting Christian would vote for Buhari, he
declared. His professions of retirement could not mask
Ekwueme's desire to stay in the game. Rankled by
Obasanjo's "thefts" of the 1999 and 2003 PDP mandates
and pressured by supporters, the former Vice President
will kick up as much dust as he can. On January 15,
Ekwueme publicly called for another PDP convention; on
January 23, he filed a lawsuit seeking his unlikely
dream of a second convention; On January 26, he
publicly suggested the formation of a broad
"coalition" of parties to combat the PDP. End
summary.


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HE DID IT TO ME AGAIN!
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2. (C) Taking a few days respite from the public
rostrum in the aftermath of the tumultuous PDP
convention, former Vice President Ekwueme emerged on
January 9 for a relaxed morning conversation with the
Ambassador at the CMR. After the meeting, Ekwueme
would start in earnest his initial round of post-
convention consultations with various advisors and
politicians in and out of the PDP.



3. (C) The reserved Ekwueme contended that the PDP
convention was blatantly unfair; as in 1999, democracy
and the will of the delegates had been hijacked by the
influence of money, he lamented. His major allegation
was that PDP chairman Audu Ogbeh consorted with the
Obasanjo campaign by serially numbering the delegate
ballots. Convention voting was to be conducted by
secret ballot; however, by numbering the ballots,

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recording the numbered ballots given each state, then
having the delegates vote in alphabetical order meant
that any delegate's vote could be identified; at the
very least, a state's collective vote could be
determined. Ekwueme maintained that this procedure
effectively eliminated the secrecy of the ballot.
Coupled with blatant political threats by the
Presidency, this caused many governors and hundreds of
delegates to change their minds. People voted for
Obasanjo because they feared the consequences, Ekwueme
explained. (Comment: Hakeem Baba-Ahmed, Secretary of
the Independent National Electoral Commission, told us
that INEC had advised the PDP Chairman prior to the
convention against numbering the ballots. INEC
correctly thought the numbering would give rise to
suspicions of vote tracking, Baba-Ahmed recalled.
INEC observed the PDP and other parties' national
conventions pursuant to its constitutional mandate to
monitor party activities. End Comment.)



4. (C) Ekwueme claimed he would have sought to
postpone the convention if apprised beforehand of the
numbered ballots. However, he had accepted at face
value PDP Chairman Ogbeh's pre-convention pledge to
ensure the integrity of the vote. Thus, Ekwueme went
into the convention confident the balloting would
truly be secret. However, he was flabbergasted when
it was announced that Abia State, the first delegation
to vote, was given ballots numbered 1-95. Ekwueme
sent supporters to find out what was happening. When
they reported that the ballots were numbered, he felt
victimized by cruel deception. At that point, Ekwueme
had to decide whether to disrupt the convention by
walking out or to stay put and contain his frustration
and sense of betrayal. Ekwueme told the Ambassador
that his sense of decorum ultimately kept him seated.
Discounting remonstrations that his post-convention
criticism was nothing but a loser's lament, Ekwueme
said he did not regret his decision remain at the
convention. Walking out would have signaled surrender.
Moreover, Ekwueme argued that the timing of his
complaint could neither enhance nor diminish its
validity. If the vote was unduly influenced, that
conclusion remained valid regardless of when the hue
and cry was raised.



5. (C) Ekwueme mentioned other problems with the
balloting. Customarily, contestants appear in
alphabetical order on the ballot paper. This time, the
President appeared first despite his surname.
Additionally, Senator Ike Nwachukwu remained on the
ballot although he had defected to the NDP (and would
become that party's presidential nominee.) Ekwueme
and Nwachukwu were next to each other on the ballot.
Because the PDP used photographs of both men in
traditional Igbo attire, the two challengers may have
looked the same on the ballot, a potential source of
confusion for delegates.



6. (C) Comment: Ekwueme was correct that he appeared
to be ahead early in the convention and that money,
blandishments and political threats turned his once
firm position into dust. However, numbered ballots
were not his downfall. The change had taken place
before then, on Saturday when VP Atiku let everyone
know his lot was cast with Obasanjo. Atiku controlled
the key governors who, in turn, controlled the
delegates. With Atiku back in line, the vote would
become a formality, the numbered ballots a form of
unneeded insurance. Moreover, Ekwueme's accusations
downplay some important facts. Ekwueme's campaign was
not pristine. Credible reports indicate that his
supporters were not above giving delegates money and
making promises in exchange for support. If Ekwueme's
team had possessed the tools of political
intimidation, it probably would have used them.
Ekwueme played the game but he simply could not play
it as hard as Obasanjo; thus, it is insufficient to
state that convention delegates succumbed to
enticement and coercion.



7. (C) Comment Cont: Moreover, the total number of
ballots nullified because Nwachukwu's name was
selected numbered fewer than 20. Obasanjo defeated
Ekwueme by nearly 2000 votes. In the final analysis,
Ekwueme entered the race late and briefly scented
victory because of widespread unhappiness with
Obasanjo. If Ekwueme's support had been firmer, more
delegates would have stuck with him despite the
pressure applied by Obasanjo. Last, one of Ekweume's
big problems was that many political elites in the PDP
did not trust him on the delicate question of
Nigerian's territorial integrity. Because Ekweume is
an Igbo, the historical specter of Biafra came into
play. We have heard many politicians state that
Nigeria is not yet ready for an Igbo President. End
Comment.



8. (C) Finally, Ekwueme acknowledged that his failure
to persuade Atiku to abandon Obasanjo was a severe
blow. He and Atiku passed messages several times
during the convention, with Ekwueme offering Atiku the
second spot on his ticket. At first, Atiku apparently
wanted to run himself but was precluded because he
never filed a nomination form, Ekwueme told the
Ambassador. Atiku then seemed ready to explore
teaming with Ekwueme. Denying press reports that he
tried to seduce Atiku by pledging to retire in mid-
term, Ekwueme said his desire would have been to
resign from the Presidency around his 74th birthday
(November 2006) with 5-6 months left in office. He
would have done all he could by then, he offered. In
stepping aside, he would make room for a smooth
transition by making it clear he would not seek re-
election. (Comment: No matter how the scheme is
described or what motives are ascribed, the practical
result of an early resignation would be Atiku
ascending to the Presidency and running as the
incumbent in 2007. There is no way around the fact
that Ekwueme dangled the early retirement option to
entice Atiku. End Comment.)



9. (C) In the end, Atiku was too frightened that
Obasanjo would destroy him politically, Ekwueme
believed. The former Vice President also discounted
rumors that NSA Aliyu Mohammed had been a potential
running mate. Ekwueme stated that he never talked to
Mohammed about this possibility. He attributed the
speculation of a link between him and Mohammed to the
latter's close ties with former Head of State
Babangida. Ekwueme said he had received tentative
support from Babangida but very strong support from
former Head of State Abdulsalami Abubakar, Babangida's
close friend. Ekwueme observed that Babangida's
support was lukewarm because of Babangida's obsession
for maintaining all his options for as long as
possible. Babangida hated to choose a sole course of
action unless absolutely sure of success. While this
craftiness might work in military government, it was
not well suited for a more democratic environment
where others, simply by acting, took advantage of the
space opened by Babangida's indecision. (Comment: In
the end, Ekwueme was abandoned by Babangida and
Abdulsalami who was conveniently abroad during the PDP
convention. End Comment.)


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ANPP TO THE RESCUE
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10. (C) Both Obasanjo and the PDP were politically
wounded by the conduct of the convention. However,
the ANPP convention helped salve those wounds. First,
the ANPP erred by trying to force through a
"consensus" candidate who was the choice of the ANPP
governors rather than the party's grassroots. Ekwueme
chuckled that the ANPP confab was made to look more
contrived than the PDP when the Southern candidates
left after the ANPP hierarchy had tapped Buhari.
Moreover, Buhari's selection made matters worst by
confirming the widespread impression that the ANPP was
Northern dominated. Marking Buhari a religious bigot,
Ekwueme said no decent Christian would vote for him.
Ekwueme did not think Buhari had a chance of winning
because he lacked support in the South and his running
mate Chuba Okagidbo would not attract much. Ekwueme
commented that, although he would not campaign
actively for Obasanjo, he would vote for the President
not Buhari. Still, Ekwueme rued that Nigeria's two
main parties had settled on two former military
leaders with autocratic dispositions. With the
emergence of Buhari, Ekwueme feared the presidential
campaign could acquire combative religious, regional
and ethnic overtones.


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WHAT NEXT GENTLEMAN ALEX
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11. (C) Although not ready to toss his towel into the
ring and publicly concede victory to Obasanjo, Ekwueme
told the Ambassador that he would withdraw from active
politics, return to Anambra state and "do nothing" for
a while.


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COMMENT
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12. (C) Despite the clear statement that he would
retire, Ekwueme did not appear ready to leave the
playing field. His quiet demeanor could not mask the
fight still left in him. After having lost two
consecutive conventions to Obasanjo, it should not be
surprising that Ekwueme would harbor resentment and
might be planning ways to scuttle Obasanjo's
ambitions. Instead of an early retirement, we believe
Ekwueme will do his best to stir the pot, either to
win concessions from the PDP or, as a last resort, to
strengthen the challenge that other parties may
present the President. Recent events have borne out
these expectations.



13. (C) Earlier this month, Ekwueme filed a lawsuit
seeking a second convention; few people give this
quixotic lawsuit a chance. Trying to increase the
political pressure on the PDP, Ekwueme told supporters
after meeting the UNPP's flagbearer Senator Jim
Nwobodo in Enugu that Nigerians should "make the
necessary sacrifice to get the country back on the
track of democracy." "Sacrifice could come in
different ways, including the formation of coalitions
by the political parties to ensure that democracy was
achieved in the country," Ekwueme reportedly said.
While Ekwueme probably does not intend to campaign
against Obasanjo, he is sending a signal to the
President that he must not be ignored.



14. (C) While many think Ekwueme will bolt from the
PDP, it is more likely that he may be fishing for
political concessions from Obasanjo, such as
appointments for key supporters. This is something
Ekwueme did not do in 1999. If this is his ploy and
if successful, it will enable him to maintain
influence in the party and the government.



15. (C) Ekwueme's actions have little leverage unless
they carry the implicit threat that he might defect.
Thus, defection remains possible. During his
conversation with the Ambassador, Ekwueme downplayed
his relationship with Babangida and NSA Aliyu
Mohammed. He might be working more closely with them
than he would have us believe. However, Ekwueme is not
a Babangida fan; their relationship would be an anti-
Obasanjo marriage of convenience that Ekwueme would
have no pride in acknowledging. Babangida and Mohammed
may or may not have encouraged Ekwueme to file the
lawsuit. However, they probably will encourage
Ekwueme to leave the PDP if the suit fails. Babangida
neither wants Atiku to be Vice President nor does he
want Buhari to become head of State in 2003. Thus, IBB
must find a credible alternative. Alex Ekwueme could
help forge one if not become that alternative himself.
While his mind knows that challenging Obasanjo in the
general election would be a steep challenge, Ekwueme
could be persuaded to become a leading member of an
anti-Obasanjo coalition if he does not receive some
political concessions from the PDP.
JETER