NIGERIA,S MOOD REMAINS SOUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002205

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA,S MOOD REMAINS SOUR

REF: A. ABUJA 1385


B. LAGOS 2574

CLASSIFIED BY CDA RICK ROBERTS FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) AND (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Nigerians remain in the same funk as in August (Ref
A). Throughout the country the loudest sound is that of
grumbling, both stomachs and mouths. While the economy
continues to fester, President Obasanjo's policies -- whether
reform or asserting his authority -- stoke the coals of
discontent in virtually every walk of society. Obasanjo's
two international spectaculars occurred on schedule and
without disruptions, he has been winning on gasoline
deregulation (although the GON apparently just pegged the
price again -- Ref B) and slimming the government (and
removing those who have incurred his wrath),and the Court of
Appeals has not thrown out his election. The Nigerian
masses, however, see neither benefit nor reason from any of
this and, in fact, grumble more because of the President's
apparent insensitivity to what they feel is important.
Obasanjo's famously vindictive nature and penchant for
revenge on anyone he perceives as challenging his ultimate
work alienate even his supporters. Most of the original
leaders of his ruling PDP have since left the party. And
this funk carries across most segments of Nigerian society.
End Summary.

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THE POLITICAL CLASS
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2. (C) The most common theme among politicians today is
despair and anger. Whether members of the opposition or the
ruling party, whether winning or losing, politicians
encountered in all regions of the country say President
Obasanjo is entirely focused on creating an international
image for himself at the expense of Nigeria's interests. The
political class generally does not see Nigeria, or
themselves, moving forward -- only Obasanjo. It would seem
as sour grapes on a massive scale, except that it also comes
from many working in the ruling PDP and Obasanjo's
administration.


3. (C) These politicos' reaction ranges from "why bother" to
"its time for a revolution." Why bother appears to hold a
winning hand, although talking about revolution is popular
among intellectuals and those unable to eat from the trough.
Many of those who do have their snouts in complain that
Obasanjo treats them as "family staff," hiring and firing
them at will. The politicians not on Obasanjo's payroll do
not expect him to last out 2004, and they debate among
themselves whether his downfall will be accomplished by
politicians, the military or the masses. But the politicos
are not yet ready to advance plans for action, let alone
resolve the outstanding issues in Nigeria. They are merely
cognizant that at every turn in Nigeria's history it was the
military who came to sort out the mess made by the political
class, and they would like to avoid that this time.

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THE MASSES
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4. (C) Still reeling from the price hikes of fuel
"deregulation," more Nigerians than ever are sinking into
poverty. There is more gasoline in Abuja and Lagos, but
retrenchment is the word of the day among government workers,
with NNPC already slashing another 1,300 jobs and the
expectation that the government as a whole will slash up to
forty percent of its staff in the next few weeks (many of
whom are already not getting paid their salaries/pensions,
benefits or both). All of the newly out-of-work civil
servants will join the approximately forty percent of the
nation's workforce already unemployed. (Among recent
university graduates, the rate is closer to 75 percent.)
Most Nigerians are still longing for the "dividends of
democracy," but Obasanjo is asking them to suffer longer to
improve the nation. One even occasionally hears, among
civilians, of longing for a return to the military, comments
that "at least things worked."


5. (C) Others among the masses are ready to battle the
non-representative system and officials imposed through the
faulty 2003 elections, but remain skeptical of who would lead
them. During the July fuel strikes, they were ready to fight
to the finish under the NLC; today there is precious little
support for a strike and most folks believe the NLC
leadership will sell out labor's interests in return for
government favors.

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MILITARY
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6. (C) The military's respect for democratic institutions is
still strong but could be eroding. The GON has not paid
military pensions for months. In a series of lectures this
fall to officers on issues of the day, Obasanjo alienated
many officers when he left out military issues. According to
officers attending several of the various meetings held in
about eight locations around the country, the President
sought no advice from the military on the current security
situation in the country. Instead he harangued them for not
doing their jobs well, and told them that they had no choice
but to back him "in the name of democracy." Perceived as
unconcerned about the welfare of the soldiers, Obasanjo
brushed off questions and embarrassed the officers in front
of their subordinates. According to the wife of one general,
"the (enlisted) ranks are grumbling that the officers do not
care about them and believe that they should intervene to
save the country."


7. (C) Talk in the barracks is openly critical of the
President, and allusions to coup plots are openly bruited.
According to one GON intelligence officer, the admonition
from Nigeria's founding fathers that the "worst democracy is
better than the best military government" is being
discounted. "Most believe we have no democracy," he said.
While most soldiers want to feel loyal to the constitution
and the country, the awareness that they are being asked to
sacrifice for parochial interests rather than the good of the
nation abounds. He asserted that 80 percent of the votes
cast in the barracks during the presidential elections were
for Buhari; comparing that with the rather different results
announced for Obasanjo would indicate the degree of danger.
In another recent meeting, on COJA security, one high-ranking
general reportedly upbraided Vice President Atiku for the
regime's insensitivity towards the needs of the military.
The general told the VP that the military would not respond
to security calls without a clear mission guideline,
transport for the troops and logistical support on the
ground. "None of these existed during COJA," he said.


8. (C) Military officers tell us the bottom line, however, is
that individually and as an institution they believe
civilians do not want a military coup, much less another
military government. President Obasanjo has been successful
in forcing out military officers who would seek government
power for power's sake, and has also placed fellow
southerners or Christians in virtually every position
commanding significant numbers of soldiers.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) Grumbling continues unabated, and Obasanjo is not
changing course despite the criticism. Most interlocutors
contacted recently predict that the Obasanjo administration
will not survive until 2007. The politicians, however,
remain unwilling to cooperate with each other to bring that
about by political means. In the absence of political
movement, a coup can only come from the military stepping in
to effect change, or from the frustrated and angry masses
coming onto the streets. The NLC strike threat seems to be
fizzling, although a decision against Buhari in the courts
could bring mass action. More likely than either, given
Nigerians, well-known patience in the face of suffering,
most people will continue to muddle along without any
resolution of the underlying problems. Perhaps the Obasanjo
administration can turn its attention to them, now that
international shows have departed the Nigerian stage.
Roberts