NIGERIA: NO POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN WARRI YET

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001909

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2013
TAGS: PGOV PHUM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: NO POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN WARRI YET


REF: ABUJA 1234


Classified by Political Counselor James Maxstadt for reasons
1.5 (b) and (d).



1. (C) Summary: While sporadic fighting among the Ijaw,
Uhrobo and Itsekiri continues in the creeks of Warri, the
debate is intensifying among Nigerians over how to resolve
political grievances underlying the Warri crisis. Ijaw and
Itsekiri leaders -- each backing rival policies -- are
putting pressure on President Obasanjo to settle the debate
in their favor or face greater instability in the Warri area.
End Summary



2. (C) The 2003 rounds of fighting in Warri, part of a
recurring conflict almost 10 years old, is largely over
resource control -- the establishment of local rights over
prime oil producing territory, and deciding just who is
"local." Itsekiris see themselves as the hereditary
"landlords" of the Warri kingdom and the Ijaws as "tenants"
who arrived in the area recently (the past century) and are
encroaching on Itsekiri turf. The Ijaws of Warri, three of
over 20 Ijaw clans in Nigeria, feel they are the politically
marginalized majority denied their fair share of the
lucrative royalties from oil produced in their home areas.



3. (C) The resource control fight is defined in terms of
political representation, specifically the local government
areas (LGAs) dominated by each group and the division of
electoral wards within those LGAs. Itsekiri have long
controlled the area now encompassed by the three LGAs of
Warri -- Warri North, Warri South, and Warri Southwest.
Chairmen of these local governments have been Itsekiri, as
have most of the Commissioners in these local governments.
In practical terms, this means that federal funds allocated
to the three Warri LGAs are largely disbursed for the benefit
of Itsekiri residents. Ijaws are the majority outside the
three Warri LGAs, and feel they are now the majority in Warri
Southwest and a sizable, yet unrepresented population in the
other two LGAs. The Itsekiri feel they ceded other areas
near Warri (e.g. Sapele LGA) to Ijaw and Uhrobo populations
that are now trying to crowd them from the three Warri LGAs
-- one step away from losing everything.


FOUR SPUTTERING RESOLUTION EFFORTS -- Danjuma Report
-------------- --------------



4. (C) Created by President Obasanjo as a Committee Chaired
by then-Defense Minister Theophilus Danjuma, the Warri Crisis
Committee continued under Danjuma's leadership after the
April 2003 elections. Danjuma summoned delegations of elders
from the three warring factions -- Uhrobo, Itsekiri and Ijaw
-- to Abuja or to the Delta State capital of Asaba. Numerous
participating representatives from the three groups tell us
that the limited number of full Committee meetings were
characterized by highly polarized recitations of each group's
position or demands. By the end of August, Danjuma had
drafted and submitted a report to Obasanjo on the Committee's
deliberations, though he did not share this draft with the
committee's ethnic-representative participants. The report,
while cited often, has yet to be distributed outside the
Presidential Villa. Comments from sources close to the
President and the Danjuma Committee's work, however, suggest
the report contains little in the way of detailed proposals
to resolve the issues.


The Delta State Government "Road Map"
--------------



5. (C) Delta State Governor Chief James Ibori spent
significant time in dialogue with the warring factions from
April 2003. With great fanfare, in May Ibori moved his
office from the State capital (Asaba) to Warri, and pledged
he would remain in Warri until a viable peace plan had been
forged. After several weeks of traveling in June and July
through the Warri communities affected by the fighting, Ibori
began speaking of a "Road Map for Peace in Warri." This plan
is grounded on the assumption that the warring parties have
gone beyond the point of return to their previous, peaceful
coexistence, and therefore calls for new LGAs or District
Councils (the local administrative unit seen during the
military years) delineated along ethnic lines to be created
out of the existing three Warri LGAs. While this would give
Ijaws heretofore unseen political representation in Warri
(separate from the many LGAs controlled by Ijaws outside of
Warri),it would further diminish the political turf of the
micro-minority Itsekiri who currently dominate only three
LGAs in all of Nigeria.


Obasanjo's Intervention
--------------



6. (C) Ibori's road map was dealt a severe blow on September
9, when Obasanjo visited Warri and met with leaders of the
three ethnic groups in Effurun, outside Warri town. During
that meeting, the President strongly urged the warring groups
to pursue "accommodation" of each other's interests and
demands as the way to achieve peace in the area. Obasanjo
heaped scorn on proposals to re-divide the area into more new
local government areas (LGAs),saying that such division
would only accentuate differences and further fuel the
crisis. This public criticism was widely interpreted as
targeting Governor Ibori, who has drawn President Obasanjo's
ire in the past. The Itsekiri were the only party to applaud
the President's stance, and Obasanjo has not provided a
concrete political plan of actions to take instead of
creating new LGAs.


Military Threats
--------------



7. (C) Ijaw leaders responded viscerally to President
Obasanjo's rejection of new LGAs, threatening renewed
violence in the region. At Obasanjo's September 9 meeting
with the ethnic leaders, Ijaw Chief Mamamu -- who was
standing in for Chief E.K. Clark -- told the President
directly that the Ijaw would return to violence if their
demands for new LGAs were not met. Ijaw youth groups,
including the FNDIC militants, have echoed this threat in
recent discussions with Mission officers traveling to the
Warri area. In a November 1 phone conversation with CRO,
Clark confirmed the accuracy of October 30 press reports of
the Ijaw leader's open criticism of Obasanjo. Clark, who
returned to Warri October 29 after two months of medical
leave in the U.K., stated that the President must not be
allowed to block the creation of new ethnically-defined LGAs.



8. (C) Although upwards of four battalions of Nigerian
military have been deployed to the Delta for some months to
deal with such threats, thus far the military has stuck to
its bases. Essentially the Nigerian military has not ended
either the threat or the capacity for violence by the Ijaws,
nor have the Ijaws been able to gain their demands.


Comment
--------------



9. (C) Obasanjo's appeal for "accommodation" among the three
feuding groups rings hollow in light of federal development
assistance to Warri not increasing on the ground, and federal
security personnel not being able to date to restore law and
order across the Delta. Governor Ibori's plan to divide
Warri into ethnically-delineated LGAs seems to be the only
political solution on the table. Ibori's return from Warri
to Asaba reflects his unhappiness with Obasanjo;
nevertheless, Ibori will likely push his "Road Map" through
the Delta State Assembly (which he controls) and maybe
through the National Assembly in Abuja. Obasanjo may not
like the uninspiring report from Danjuma, but he has not put
out any other political alternative in his effort to block
Ibori from dividing Warri into ethnic enclaves. The military
alternative has not succeeded yet, for Obasanjo or for the
Ijaws. While no political solution to Warri's problems can
end the fighting absolutely, not having a political solution
absolutely guarantees continued instability in this oil-rich
swamp.
MEECE