Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUJA1730
2003-10-08 17:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON TAYLOR

Tags:  PREL LI NI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001730 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2013
TAGS: PREL LI NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON TAYLOR


REF: A. ABUJA 1654

B. ABUJA 1630

C. SECTO 13


CLASSIFIED BY CDA ROGER MEECE FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) AND (d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001730 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2013 TAGS: PREL LI NI SUBJECT: NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON TAYLOR REF: A. ABUJA 1654 ¶B. ABUJA 1630 ¶C. SECTO 13 CLASSIFIED BY CDA ROGER MEECE FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) AND (d). ¶1. (C) CDA took the opportunity of a meeting with Foreign Minister Adeniji October 7 to express appreciation for Nigeria's leadership efforts on Liberia and Guinea-Bissau, but also to express continuing concern over Charles Taylor's interference in Liberian affairs. Noting the GON's interest in sharing information about Taylor, CDA previewed Washington's awareness and acknowledged that we were working the issue. ¶2. (C) Adeniji replied that it was almost impossible to believe that Taylor would have no influence on a Blah government that was almost a continuation of Taylor's, but Nigeria expected that would change with the new Bryant government from October 10. Adeniji listed the following factors: -- Although Taylor's party would remain in the government, Bryant would not permit them to play a role out of tune with the other members of the government; -- "For good or bad," UNSYG Representative Klein would also work to show that Taylor had no influence in the new government; -- LURD and MODEL members of the government, as well as civil society members, would keep Taylor's influence minimal; -- ECOWAS Representative Aboubakar (now in Liberia) would keep engaged for the foreseeable future; and -- Nigeria's Ambassador to Liberia has been instructed to work specifically on this in concert with the American Embassy there. In short, Adeniji continued, Taylor's influence would wane no matter what he did as the new government took control, and Nigeria would keep a tight leash on him as well. He had already been rebuked publicly by the GON when he strayed close to the line of acceptable behavior (Ref B). Adeniji added that it was essential that the U.S. remain fully engaged, in Liberia and at the UNSC, for the ECOWAS/UN effort to succeed. ¶3. (C) CDA expressed appreciation for the Minister's comments, noting that Ambassador Blaney in Monrovia was in contact with Klein and the Nigerian Ambassador, and that we were continuing to work with all levels of the GON here. CDA asked if the Taylor crossed the line Adeniji had mentioned, would the GON consider turning him over to the Sierra Leone Special Court. Adeniji replied with vigor that the such a proposal should not be made to President Obasanjo. "In the future," Adeniji continued, "Taylor's moving on might come up, but please do not mention sending him to any judicial body now." -------------- C-130s, Training -------------- ¶4. (C) Adeniji mentioned that he had requested USG assistance on spare parts for Nigeria's C-130s and on training additional Nigerian army battalions (Ref C). Now that the Secretary "had conceded the point," Adeniji hoped there would SIPDIS be urgent follow up. Nigeria wants to use its C-130s to supply its peacekeepers in Liberia, and soon the DRC, and needs to train additional battalions to take the place on rotation of the trained battalions now deployed. CDA noted that vagaries of the Congress and Continuing Resolution made this complicated, but we would do our best. ROBERTS

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