Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUJA1730
2003-10-08 17:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON TAYLOR

Tags:  PREL LI NI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001730 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2013
TAGS: PREL LI NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON TAYLOR


REF: A. ABUJA 1654

B. ABUJA 1630

C. SECTO 13


CLASSIFIED BY CDA ROGER MEECE FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) AND (d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001730

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2013
TAGS: PREL LI NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON TAYLOR


REF: A. ABUJA 1654

B. ABUJA 1630

C. SECTO 13


CLASSIFIED BY CDA ROGER MEECE FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) AND (d).



1. (C) CDA took the opportunity of a meeting with Foreign
Minister Adeniji October 7 to express appreciation for
Nigeria's leadership efforts on Liberia and Guinea-Bissau,
but also to express continuing concern over Charles Taylor's
interference in Liberian affairs. Noting the GON's interest
in sharing information about Taylor, CDA previewed
Washington's awareness and acknowledged that we were working
the issue.



2. (C) Adeniji replied that it was almost impossible to
believe that Taylor would have no influence on a Blah
government that was almost a continuation of Taylor's, but
Nigeria expected that would change with the new Bryant
government from October 10. Adeniji listed the following
factors:


-- Although Taylor's party would remain in the government,
Bryant would not permit them to play a role out of tune with
the other members of the government;


-- "For good or bad," UNSYG Representative Klein would also
work to show that Taylor had no influence in the new
government;


-- LURD and MODEL members of the government, as well as civil
society members, would keep Taylor's influence minimal;


-- ECOWAS Representative Aboubakar (now in Liberia) would
keep engaged for the foreseeable future; and


-- Nigeria's Ambassador to Liberia has been instructed to
work specifically on this in concert with the American
Embassy there.


In short, Adeniji continued, Taylor's influence would wane no
matter what he did as the new government took control, and
Nigeria would keep a tight leash on him as well. He had
already been rebuked publicly by the GON when he strayed
close to the line of acceptable behavior (Ref B). Adeniji
added that it was essential that the U.S. remain fully
engaged, in Liberia and at the UNSC, for the ECOWAS/UN effort
to succeed.



3. (C) CDA expressed appreciation for the Minister's
comments, noting that Ambassador Blaney in Monrovia was in
contact with Klein and the Nigerian Ambassador, and that we
were continuing to work with all levels of the GON here. CDA
asked if the Taylor crossed the line Adeniji had mentioned,
would the GON consider turning him over to the Sierra Leone
Special Court. Adeniji replied with vigor that the such a
proposal should not be made to President Obasanjo. "In the
future," Adeniji continued, "Taylor's moving on might come
up, but please do not mention sending him to any judicial
body now."


--------------
C-130s, Training
--------------



4. (C) Adeniji mentioned that he had requested USG assistance
on spare parts for Nigeria's C-130s and on training
additional Nigerian army battalions (Ref C). Now that the
Secretary "had conceded the point," Adeniji hoped there would

SIPDIS
be urgent follow up. Nigeria wants to use its C-130s to
supply its peacekeepers in Liberia, and soon the DRC, and
needs to train additional battalions to take the place on
rotation of the trained battalions now deployed. CDA noted
that vagaries of the Congress and Continuing Resolution made
this complicated, but we would do our best.
ROBERTS