ECOWAS EXECSEC CHAMBAS ON GUINEA BISSAU

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001639 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2013 TAGS: KDEM KDEM NI PGOV PHUM PINR PREL XY GZ SUBJECT: ECOWAS EXECSEC CHAMBAS ON GUINEA BISSAU REF: A. DAKAR 2468 ¶B. STATE 267395 CLASSIFIED BY CDA ROGER MEECE FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) AND (d). ¶1. (C) CDA called on ECOWAS Executive Secretary Mohammed Ibn Chambas on September 19 to deliver demarche (REF B). Chambas shared his thoughts on recent developments in Guinea-Bissau and Liberia (reported septel). Characterizing GEN Seabra's September 14 takeover as a coup d'etat, Chambas said ECOWAS and the African Union would not recognize the military junta as the lawful government of Guinea-Bissau. ¶2. (C) Chambas said that while he and other West African leaders recognized the serious shortcomings of deposed President Yala, Nigerian President Obasanjo and Senegalese President Wade delivered a very clear message to GEN Seabra that the military should not lead the proposed transition government. Chambas confided that he and the regional leaders had explored the option of a transition led by civilian technocrats, leading quickly to a return to full Constitutional government. Chambas noted the Bissau-Guinean military's deployment of 650 troops in support of the ECOMIL PKO in Liberia and said he counseled GEN Seabra not to squander the positive image his military has recently cultivated. Chambas said he explained to GEN Seabra that should the military junta remain in power, Guinea-Bissau would likely be isolated diplomatically and would have little hope of receiving international aid since many prospective donor countries are constrained by domestic laws prohibiting lending assistance to governments born of unconstitutional regime change. Further, Chambas said GEN Seabra had originally agreed to step aside in favor of a civilian government once Yala had resigned, probably believing that Yala would not in fact step down . When Yala did so in response to the ECOWAS leaders' demarche, however, Seabra reneged on the agreement. Chambas believed the junta will not yield power to a civilian transition government and would stay in control of Guinea-Bissau for the foreseeable future. He observed that the junta is pressuring the representative "council" to call for continued military rule. ¶3. (C) While ECOWAS is taking a tough stand on Guinea-Bissau, Chambas noted that Cape Verde and Senegal would probably not fully toe the party line. Cape Verde, tied to Guinea-Bissau by language, culture and history, is unwilling to completely isolate the junta for removing a regime that, while democratically installed, had cancelled national elections three times and done little to improve the lot of the Bissau-Guinean people. Chambas also noted that the Cape Verde ruling party is linked with its counterparts in Guinea-Bissau, heretofore in opposition to Yala. Chambas observed as well that Senegalese President Wade is in a somewhat difficult position, and may seek to maintain at least some private relationship with the Guinea-Bissau military to avoid potential complications in the Cassamance. He emphasized, however, that neither country will take any public stance differing with the regional position. And in any event, he added, what could Cape Verde really do? ¶4. (C) COMMENT: Chambas was very pessimistic about the possibility GEN Seabra's junta might step aside in favor of a civilian transition government. He seemed resigned to the isolation of the Guinea-Bissau government for the near term, but was very firm that ECOWAS will continue to push for a restoration of civilian rule. MEECE