C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001639

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2013
TAGS: KDEM KDEM NI PGOV PHUM PINR PREL XY GZ
SUBJECT: ECOWAS EXECSEC CHAMBAS ON GUINEA BISSAU


REF: A. DAKAR 2468

B. STATE 267395


CLASSIFIED BY CDA ROGER MEECE FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) AND (d).



1. (C) CDA called on ECOWAS Executive Secretary Mohammed Ibn
Chambas on September 19 to deliver demarche (REF B). Chambas
shared his thoughts on recent developments in Guinea-Bissau
and Liberia (reported septel). Characterizing GEN Seabra's
September 14 takeover as a coup d'etat, Chambas said ECOWAS
and the African Union would not recognize the military junta
as the lawful government of Guinea-Bissau.



2. (C) Chambas said that while he and other West African
leaders recognized the serious shortcomings of deposed
President Yala, Nigerian President Obasanjo and Senegalese
President Wade delivered a very clear message to GEN Seabra
that the military should not lead the proposed transition
government. Chambas confided that he and the regional
leaders had explored the option of a transition led by
civilian technocrats, leading quickly to a return to full
Constitutional government. Chambas noted the Bissau-Guinean
military's deployment of 650 troops in support of the ECOMIL
PKO in Liberia and said he counseled GEN Seabra not to
squander the positive image his military has recently
cultivated. Chambas said he explained to GEN Seabra that
should the military junta remain in power, Guinea-Bissau
would likely be isolated diplomatically and would have little
hope of receiving international aid since many prospective
donor countries are constrained by domestic laws prohibiting
lending assistance to governments born of unconstitutional
regime change. Further, Chambas said GEN Seabra had
originally agreed to step aside in favor of a civilian
government once Yala had resigned, probably believing that
Yala would not in fact step down . When Yala did so in
response to the ECOWAS leaders' demarche, however, Seabra
reneged on the agreement. Chambas believed the junta will
not yield power to a civilian transition government and would
stay in control of Guinea-Bissau for the foreseeable future.
He observed that the junta is pressuring the representative
"council" to call for continued military rule.



3. (C) While ECOWAS is taking a tough stand on Guinea-Bissau,
Chambas noted that Cape Verde and Senegal would probably not
fully toe the party line. Cape Verde, tied to Guinea-Bissau
by language, culture and history, is unwilling to completely
isolate the junta for removing a regime that, while
democratically installed, had cancelled national elections
three times and done little to improve the lot of the
Bissau-Guinean people. Chambas also noted that the Cape
Verde ruling party is linked with its counterparts in
Guinea-Bissau, heretofore in opposition to Yala. Chambas
observed as well that Senegalese President Wade is in a
somewhat difficult position, and may seek to maintain at
least some private relationship with the Guinea-Bissau
military to avoid potential complications in the Cassamance.
He emphasized, however, that neither country will take any
public stance differing with the regional position. And in
any event, he added, what could Cape Verde really do?



4. (C) COMMENT: Chambas was very pessimistic about the
possibility GEN Seabra's junta might step aside in favor of a
civilian transition government. He seemed resigned to the
isolation of the Guinea-Bissau government for the near term,
but was very firm that ECOWAS will continue to push for a
restoration of civilian rule.


MEECE