MOGEROA - ENTERING A SEASON OF POLITICAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 001385

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS NI
SUBJECT: MOGEROA - ENTERING A SEASON OF POLITICAL
TURBIDITY

Classified by Charge Rick Roberts. Reasons: 1.5
(B&D).



1. (S) SUMMARY: Politically, Nigeria is tense and
this probably will not significantly abate in the near
future. Opposition politicians and much of the
general populace remain disenchanted with the results
of the April elections and the irregularities that
attended them. Many opposition figures suspect that
Obasanjo wants to amend the constitution to allow
himself a third term. The North feels estranged
believing that ANPP Presidential candidate Muhammedu
Buhari was cheated and that Obasanjo is placing
Yorubas and Southerners in key positions in the
military and government at the expense of Northerners.
Meanwhile, the economy is experiencing arythmia; the
non-oil sector have not seen national growth and
government coffers are unusually lean due to lost oil
revenue caused by the Warri crisis. Fuel and the
prices of many imported commodities are high.
Recently the media has been filled with headlines and
editorials about political instability. Given this
milieu, many people have been expressing concern that
the potential for military intervention cannot be
ignored. END SUMMARY.


--------------
THE CLEAR MANDATE THAT WASN'T
--------------



2. (C) President Obasanjo won the presidential
election with 62 percent of the vote. His ruling PDP
swept the gubernatorial races (28 of 36),as well as
the national and state assemblies. On the surface,
the results would indicate that Obasanjo and the
ruling PDP were popular. However, that is not the
case. Neither Obasanjo nor the PDP distinguished
themselves during the previous four years in office.
Their 2003 electoral landslide was not solely the
product of an accurate vote tabulation. Electoral
malpractice was involved. While probably winning more
votes than Buhari, his nearest competitor, Obasanjo
did not genuinely attract 60 percent of the
electorate.



3. (C) Moreover several PDP incumbent governors have
performed poorly during their tenure. If the
elections had been fair, a number of incumbent
governors in the PDP as well as the AD and ANPP would
have gotten pink slips from the electorate. Given the
anti-incumbent sentiment, the PDP, probably should
have suffered a net loss of seats. Instead, the PDP
scored a significant net gain in the 2003 elections.
This has lead some Nigerians and, not exclusively
opposition figures, to remark that the 2003 edition
overall was the most soiled exercise in the country's
checkered electoral history. (Comment: While such
statements are inherently impossible to prove, that
they are being voiced by a significant number of
partisan and relatively neutral observers is
significant. As such, this sentiment represents an
unignorable political reality). END COMMENT.



4. (C) The PDP could have doused the brewing tension
by opting for a "political solution," that would have
entailed an agreement between the GON and PDP on one
hand and moderates in the key opposition parties on
the other to work through the Independent National
Electoral Commission or the electoral tribunals to
shift some elected offices to the opposition. In
exchange, the opposition would have "accepted"
Obasanjo's victory and those of most other PDP
candidates, thus still preserving PDP majorities in
most instances.



5. (S) There were numerous conversations between PDP
officials and opposition figures, particularly the
Igbo-based APGA and southerners in the ANPP.
President Obasanjo participated in sensitive
discussions with the APGA national chairman about
"transferring" several National Assembly and perhaps
two gubernatorial seats to APGA. However, these talks
ultimately were desultory. The PDP decided that the
price of relinquishing even some of their most
controversial seats was too dear to pay for reducing
the opposition's indignation and anger. Thus, the
foundation for today's tense political climate was
laid. Perceived PDP electoral conniving compounded by
the sense that the PDP was flaunting its purloined
victories set the groundwork for today's current
political frictions.



6. (C) Tension also could have been alleviated had
the PDP attempted to consult with opposition leaders
and civil society leaders on key issues of substantive
governance, trying to form a national consensus around
some core issues. Instead, in June, President
Obasanjo took two very unpopular decisions. First, he
announced the commissioning of a panel to review the
constitutional provisions on local governments. This
immediately raised suspicions that Obasanjo was
setting the stage for a later constitutional amendment
that would scrap the present two-term limit, thus
allowing him to run in 2007 for a third time. Second,
he raised fuel prices. While the move had economic
justification; its implementation was callous and
apolitic. Obasanjo had neither consulted widely nor
put his arms around his public explaining to them why
this measure was necessary. The price hike reinforced
the impression of arrogance and insensitivity in Aso
Villa. GON handling of the ensuing national strike by
organized labor and the loss of lives that accompanied
the strike further reinforced the perception that
President Obasanjo was out of step with the economic
challenges that faced the average Nigerian.



7. (C) As if the level of political friction was not
sufficient drama, the economic news was not much
better. The crisis in Warri has clipped government
revenue by approximately 20 percent. The non-oil
sector continues to sputter. Agricultural production
remains insulated by bureaucratic, infrastructural and
financial from significant growth. Unemployment is
high, as are the prices of many food staples. There
is a general sense that the national economy is
veering in the wrong direction or, at the very least,
not moving nearly fast enough in the right one.



8. (C) The edge of August may represent another
dramatic moment. The National Labor Congress, buoyed
by the efficacy of the July fuel strike, has
threatened to strike at month's end unless the GON
honors its promise to increase wages by 12.5 percent.
The strike threat only adds to a feeling of
uncertainty and decline that the GON seems unable to
arrect, at the moment.


--------------
NORTH AND SOUTHEAST: REALLY NOT HAPPY
--------------



9. (C) The North continues to emit the strongest
anti-Obasanjo sentiment. Northerners see Obasanjo's
personnel selections in government and the military as
vehicles to marginalize them while promoting Yoruba
and southern interests. The last set of retirements
within the military were predominantly Northerners who
thought they had more years left before they hung-up
their uniforms for the last time. While each state
can claim a cabinet minister, Northerners decry that
the choke positions went to Southerners. Even among
Yoruba cabinet selectees, they say Obasanjo
discriminated by failing to name one Yoruba Muslim.
Additionally, Northerners bemoan the fact that access
to government contracts, an important lifeline for the
Northern economy, has been stifled. There is a sense
that the regional economy is purposely being starved
to make people pledge loyalty to Obasanjo before they
get a drop of government largesse.



10. (C) Northerners thought to be pro-Obasanjo have
been roundly criticized. In a rare manifestation of
disrespect and anger, youths threw stones at the
usually revered Emir of Kano recently. At the
beginning of the year former Head of State Babangida
was viewed as a hero and always followed by an adoring
throng in his Northern travels. Recently, he too was
jostled and stoned. His felony was his non-support of
ANPP candidate Buhari and alleged tacit support for
Obasanjo in the 2003 election. Now, many of the rank
and file Northerners, especially the young adult
males, see Babangida as a sell-out and they oppose
him.



11. (C) The beneficiary of all of this is Buhari.
People may not be familiar with Buhari's substantive
policy positions. However, they see him as the
personification of order and discipline. They see him
as the "anti-Obasanjo," the man who can bring a sense
of direction to replace the growing fear that Nigeria
is adrift. There is also a touch of religion and
regional chauvinism among the Buhari supporters. They
see a national leadership under Buhari as a chance to
return the reins of national power to the North, its
historic home.



12. (C) Buhari, thus far, has channeled his
electoral grievances through the courts. However,
there will come a moment of decision for either Buhari
or the courts that is freighted with political
significance. If the courts decide in favor of
Buhari, the entire election and Obasanjo's presidency
are in doubt and may have to be redone. By putting
the country in such uncharted waters, such a decision
would cause a monumental political crisis.



13. (C) This is an unlikely turn of events. The
more likely outcome would be that Buhari's petition is
ultimately denied by the courts. In that instance,
Buhari has told us he would huddle with his followers
to determine next steps. However, he has been
consistently adamant that he will not discontinue his
challenge against Obasanjo. It is likely that Buhari
may resume his call for "mass action" against the
government.



14. (C) Meanwhile, anger in the Southeast is brewing
because the Igbo-dominated APGA did well among the
voters but not with INEC vote counters. APGA was
probably deprived of at least two gubernatorial seats
and perhaps as much as a score National Assembly
seats. Fueled by this frustration, Igbo opposition
leaders have hastily created institutions such as the
Igbo National Assembly, a symbol of non-acceptance of
the National Assembly and also of heightened ethnic
political fervor.



15. (C) Northern and Southeastern opposition
political figures have discussed cooperating
politically against the Obasanjo administration and
the PDP. Thus far, regional, ethnic and religious
differences have limited this cooperation to little
more than discussion and some public statements.
However, this could change depending on perceptions of
Obasanjo's performance in the coming week and months.


--------------
THE DELTA - A CAULDRON
--------------



16. (C) Nowhere has Nigeria's political and economic
distemper been on display better than in the Delta -
in Warri. Ijaw militants have held 20 percent of
Nigeria's oil production at ransom to their nebulous
demands for local antinomy. In some ways, they are
the Nigeria oil sector's equivalent of the early days
of Columbia's drug baron. As such, this is an
uncharted rebellion against the federal government.
Moreover, oil bunkering (theft) in the Delta has
reached such proportions that the equivalent of 10
percent of legitimate oil production is being siphoned
through illicit channels. The wealth and political
power that this signifies could be considerable. That
the central government has been unable to resolve
neither the Ijaw-instigated Warri crisis nor bunkering
makes the central government seem week. This apparent
vulnerability may encourage other challenges in the
Delta and elsewhere unless the GON takes firm action
that weds law enforcement with dire policy
consideration of the root political and economic
causes of the turbulence in areas of the Delta.


--------------
PEOPLE ARE TALKING/THE MEDIA IS WRITING
--------------



17. (C) In private conversations and in the print
media, the multiple political crisis facing Nigeria
are being widely bruited. Editorials in leading daily
newspaper and weekly magazines about "political
instability" and a crisis of leadership are regular
media gruel right now. One magazine even featured a
front cover story on a coup plot allegedly foiled in
May. Few Nigerians wants a return of the military;
however people are privately talking about it as a
growing possibility if the affairs of state continue
as they are.


--------------
COMMENT
--------------



18. (C) The political climate in Nigeria tends to be
cyclical. Currently, the country is in a low trough;
some might say a depression. Because of Nigeria's
political antecedents, some observers are speculating
that the chance for military intervention is slowly
moving from slight to moderate. They fear that
perhaps the "red light" against military intervention
may be replaced by an amber one in the months and
perhaps weeks to come unless Obasanjo and his
government improve their performance.



19. (C) Unfortunately, Obasanjo has gotten off to a
discordant and edgy start. Being his second time
around, he should have done better, knowing that this
honeymoon would be shorter. The palpable and
widespread frustration has turned the alleged
electoral mandate into pulp and ash. Despite the
level of unpopularity and concern, a military
intervention is unlikely. However, Obasanjo has stiff
military political opposition that he must face. To
get Nigeria out of this current doldrum, he will have
to show political and diplomatic acuity, thus far
lacking.



20. (C) Obasanjo needs to seek a political modus
vivendi with moderates in the political opposition.
Then he needs to energize his government to
effectively work a few key but important issues like
agriculture and employment. Third, he must find a way
to safeguard the GON revenue stream by ending the
threat to the central government posed by elements in
the Delta. None of these will be easy, but unless he
makes some heading in these areas, we will continue to
hear about Nigeria's instability.


ROBERTS